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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOYCE ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE ] 
FINANCING, ] 
Respondent. 
i Case No. 920197 
i Priority 14 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This is not an appeal from a final agency order. This case is 
before the Court on Doyce Allen's original petition for certiorari 
to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Allen v. 
Utah Dep't of Health. 829 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1992) [Addendum A], 
which affirmed the final order of respondent Utah Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing ["Division"]. 
Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Supp. 
1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the 
determination of this case: 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992); 42 U.S.C. S 
1396a(a)(10) (1992)? 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17) (1992); 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(34) (1992); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1201, 416.1205, 416.1210 
(1992); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.831, 435.840-435.852 (1991); Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-18-1 to -48 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Utah Admin. Code R455-1-
1 to 455-1-48 (1991); and Utah Admin. Code R810-304-400, R810-304-
403, R810-304-411 (1991). The full texts of these are set forth in 
Addendum B to this brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Petitioner Doyce Allen misstates the issue before this Court. 
Because this is not an appeal of final agency action, the issue 
presented on certiorari is not whether the Division "erred in 
finding that [Allen] could not 'spend down' his assets to become 
eligible for Medicaid" (Brief of Petitioner at 1). Properly 
framed, the issues before this Court are: 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly conclude that 
federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and (34) (1992), 
does not require the Division to use a "resource spend down" 
methodology in determining Allen's eligibility for Medicaid 
coverage under Utah's optional Medically Needy Program? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the 
use of a fixed asset limit does not violate the federal requirement 
in section 1396a(a)(17) that eligibility standards for Utah's 
optional Medically Needy Program be reasonable? 
Whether an administrative agency's policy or rule conflicts 
with an authorizing statute is a question of law, on which this 
Court reviews the conclusions of the Utah Court of Appeals for 
correctness. See Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1128 
(Utah 1990); see also Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 
679 (Utah 1990). 
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679 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Allen's February 1991 application for payment of over $40,000 
in incurred medical bills under Utah's Medicaid program for the 
"medically needy" was denied by the Division because his total 
nonexempt assets were $7,745.90 more than the $3,000 asset limit 
for his two-person household (R. 113). After this determination of 
ineligibility was affirmed through the administrative appeals 
process (R. 78-79; 94-99), Allen sought review of the Division's 
final order in the Utah Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 
agency's determination in Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, 829 P.2d 
122 (Utah App. 1992). 
In his petition for certiorari, Allen claimed the Utah Court 
of Appeals erroneously held that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992) 
does not require the Division to use a "resource spend down" 
methodology in determining whether an applicant with resources 
above the applicable limit is eligible for coverage under the 
optional Medicaid program for the "medically needy." This Court 
granted certiorari on June 22, 1992, to review the Utah Court of 
Appeal's decision on this question. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Allen worked for many years as a truck driver for 
Intermountain Farmers Co-op until December 1988, when he retired at 
age 61 because of arthritis (R. 34, 36, 88, 98). While a fulltime 
employee there, he was covered by a group health insurance policy 
3 
issued by Blue Cross/Blue Shield (R. 98). After retirement, he 
continued group coverage as a former employee until June 30, 1990, 
when it expired (R. 5, 36, 98).2 He worked part-time in an 
Intermountain Farmers Co-op store beginning in the spring of 1990 
to save money for premiums on an individual health insurance policy 
when his extended coverage under Intermountain Farmers' group 
policy expired (R. 33, 68).2 
Allen applied to Blue Cross/Blue Shield in June 1990 for 
coverage under such an individual health insurance policy, but his 
application was denied due to pre-existing medical problems, 
including heart disease and open heart surgery in 1980 (R. 5-6, 33-
34, 37, 98). Allen inquired about health insurance coverage from 
other insurance companies, but chose not to pursue it and apply for 
coverage when told such a policy would cost from $400 to $600 per 
month with a $500 deductible (R. 37). In Allen's words, "So we 
figured that we had a year and a half to go [until Medicare 
coverage at age 65] and we hadn't been in the hospital for ten 
years, so we'd just have to chance it." (R. 37). According to 
Allen, money saved for health insurance premiums was instead kept 
as a "nest egg" (R. 68). 
Thus, after July 1, 1990, Allen had no health insurance 
federal law, referred to as COBRA, requires large employers 
to continue group health insurance coverage of former employees for 
up to eighteen months after they cease working due to disability. 
2Allen was not eligible for health insurance coverage through 
the federal Medicare program until he reached age 65 on January 24, 
1992. 
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coverage (R. 6/ 78). Allen ended his part-time employment at 
Intermountain Farmers Co-op in October 1990 (R. 102). On January 
23/ 1991/ the day before his sixty-fourth birthday/ Allen suffered 
a heart attack while in Arizona, where he lives several months of 
the year (R. 5, 7, 97, 98, 112). He was transported to Utah, where 
he lives the remainder of the year, and underwent heart-bypass 
surgery at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center (R. 98). Medical 
bills incurred as a result of his emergency treatment, air 
evacuation, and heart surgery exceeded $40,000 (R. 11, 98). On 
February 4, 1991, at the suggestion of the hospital, Allen applied 
for Medicaid coverage under the Medically Needy Program, 
retroactive to January 1, 1991 (R. 11, 88, 90, 145). 
In January and February 1991, Allen's household had $967 in 
monthly income in Social Security benefits (R. 18, 25, 27, 106). 
On the first moment of those months, Allen and his wife owned, in 
addition to exempt household effects and an unencumbered house 
worth $65,000, a savings account containing $3,029.86, a checking 
account containing about $100, a Lincoln automobile valued at about 
$600, a 1983 Ford pickup truck worth about $2,500, and an 
unencumbered 1981 travel trailer valued at about $7,000 (R. 7-8, 
31, 33, 50, 52-53, 98, 103, 105). The Division's Office of Family 
Support determined that, even after excluding as exempt the value 
of the pickup truck and the home, Allen exceeded the applicable 
$3,000 limit on nonexempt assets based on the cash in his savings 
account alone; therefore, it denied Allen's application (R. 14, 
5 
98, 113).3 
After a formal hearing at Allen's request, Hearing Officer 
Cornelius Hyzer recommended that the determination of Allen's 
ineligibility due to excess nonexempt assets be affirmed: 
The applicant was unable to demonstrate his assets were 
below the asset limit and, therefore, he failed to meet 
his burden of proof. Many alternatives were explored to 
try to determine that a correct decision was made by the 
Office of Family Support. After careful review with the 
applicant of regulations requiring that his assets be 
determined as of the first moment of each month, the 
applicant understood that his savings account alone 
exceeded the limit. Therefore, the value ascribed to his 
motor vehicles and the travel trailer were not necessary 
to sustain a denial. 
(R. 99). Upon further administrative review by the Division's 
director, the hearing officer's findings and conclusions were 
adopted, and the determination of ineligibility due to nonexempt 
assets in excess of the $3,000 limit was affirmed (R. 94-96). 
Allen's request for reconsideration was denied (R. 78), with the 
Division noting that there is no "resource spend down" rule that 
would allow Allen to become eligible for Medicaid by subtracting 
from the total nonexempt assets he held in January and February 
1991 the amount of unpaid medical bills he had incurred in those 
months (R. 79). 
3Allen contended that the entire value of the unencumbered 
travel trailer was exempt as a "medical necessity," but this issue 
was never ruled upon at the administrative level because the cash 
available to Allen in his savings and checking accounts was alone 
sufficient to sustain the determination of ineligibility. (R. 79). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Congress created optional Medicaid coverage for the "medically 
needy" in 1965, to be paid for with federal and state funds. It 
sought to encourage states to pay the uninsured medical bills of 
its citizens who, though poor, were less needy than the 
"categorically needy," whose incomes and resources are both below 
amounts essential for their maintenance. In section 
1396a(a)(17)(D), Congress required states to provide this optional 
coverage to persons whose incurred medical bills are greater than 
the amount by which their monthly incomes exceed the income level 
considered essential. There is no express or implicit requirement 
that states provide this optional coverage to persons who also have 
accumulated substantial assets. Instead, this choice has been 
appropriately left by Congress to the state legislatures 
themselves, as has the setting of reasonable eligibility criteria 
for the medically needy program. 
Consistent with Congressional objectives and the Medicaid 
statute, the Division determines who will receive assistance as 
"medically needy, " based on the relative need of all who are 
potentially eligible. Need is measured by applicants' incomes and 
resources. It is reasonable for the Division to distribute scarce 
public funds by rendering ineligible all those who have accumulated 
substantial assets from which they could provide for the costs of 
their own medical care even if, like Allen, they do not actually do 
so. It is thus also reasonable for the Division to treat excess 
7 
income differently from accumulated resourcesf by not allowing an 
applicant to spend down excess resources against incurred medical 
bills even though it allows such a spend down of excess income 
because required by Congress to do so. 
Contrary to Allen's representations to this Court and the 
mistaken belief of the dissenting judge on the Utah Court of 
Appeals, an applicant's eligibility is based on accumulated 
resources held at the first moment of the month for which Medicaid 
coverage is sought, not those held at the time of application for 
retroactive Medicaid coverage. Accordingly, it is not possible for 
a person to "spend down" excess resources by paying incurred 
medical bills before applying and thereby become eligible for 
retroactive Medicaid coverage. It is, therefore, reasonable for 
the Division not to allow "spend down" of excess resources at or 
after the time of application for retroactive coverage. 
This Court should affirm the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and decline Allen's invitation, under the guise of 
statutory interpretation of "implicit" Congressional purpose or 
intent, to rewrite the federal Medicaid statute and impose 
"resource spend down" as a method of determining who is eligible in 
Utah for optional Medicaid coverage as "medically needy." 
ARGUMENTS 
Introduction 
The only issue before this Court is whether the Utah Court of 
Appeals correctly determined that federal law, specifically 42 
8 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and (34), does not require participating 
states to use a "resource spend down" methodology when measuring 
the nonexempt assets held by an applicant for the medically needy 
program. 
Allen advances four separate arguments for reaching the 
opposite conclusion about what federal law demands: 1) the 
Division's failure to use a "resource spend down" methodology in 
calculating eligibility for the medically needy program is 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Medicaid program, contrary to 
section 1396a(a)(17)(A); 2) Congressional intent to require a 
resource spend down methodology is implicit in the express 
requirement in section 1396a(a)(17)(D) that participating states 
allow applicants for the medically needy program to "spend down" 
their excess income; 3) Congressional intent to require a resource 
spend down methodology is implicit in the provision in Medicaid 
law, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992), which creates a three-month 
retroactive application period; and 4) failure of the Division to 
adopt a resource spend down methodology creates an unreasonable 
eligibility standard, contrary to section 1396a(a)(17). In order 
to evaluate these claims, a basic understanding of the history and 
operation of the Medicaid program is necessary. 
Overview of the Medicaid Program and "Income Spend Down" 
Medicaid was established by Congress in 1965 as Title XIX of 
9 
the Social Security Act4 "for the purpose of providing federal 
financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain 
costs of medical treatment for needy persons." Harris v. McRae. 
448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). It is a program designed "to make 
medical services for the needy more generally available," S. Rep, 
No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 2014 (1965) [hereinafter 
1965 Senate Report, Addendum Item D]. To this end, Congress 
appropriates funds 
[f]or the purpose of enabling each State, as far as 
practicable under the conditions in such State, to 
furnish . . . medical assistance on behalf of families 
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled 
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient 
to meet the cost of necessary medical services . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992). Medicaid reimburses participating States 
a percentage of the cost of medical care provided to these types of 
eligible individuals and families. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 
154, 156-57 (1986). The federal government reimburses Utah at a 
75% rate, and the State pays the remaining 25% of the cost of the 
Medicaid program. 
In order to obtain reimbursement, a participating state must 
develop a plan that complies with the Medicaid statute and federal 
implementing regulations, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Atkins, 477 U.S. at 
157, and it must select a single agency to administer the plan. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992). The state plan must be approved by 
the Department of Health and Human Services, the federal agency 
^Public Law No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. S§ 1396 et seq. (1992)). 
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that oversees implementation of the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396 (1992); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981). 
A participating state must provide Medicaid coverage to 
"categorically needy" persons, 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(10)(A) (i) 
(1992), but it may choose whether or not to provide Medicaid 
coverage to "medically needy" persons "who meet the income and 
resources requirements of the appropriate State plan. . . . " 42 
U.S.C- § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (1992); see Schweiker v. Gray 
Panthers, 453 U.S. at 37. 
The "categorically needy"—a group that includes dependent 
children as well as aged, blind, or disabled adults—receive both 
cash payments and Medicaid coverage; however,* in order to be 
eligible for this assistance, their incomes and resources must both 
be below limits set by the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Significantly, a person applying for Medicaid coverage is not 
permitted to "spend down" excess resources against incurred medical 
bills in order to become eligible as "categorically needy." See 20 
C.F.R. §§ 416.1201, 416.1205, 416.1210 (1992) [Addendum B]. 
At the time Medicaid was enacted, these "categorically needy" 
persons were considered by Congress as the "most needy in the 
country," thus making it "appropriate for medical care costs to be 
met, first, for these people." H.R.R. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 66 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Report, Addendum Item C]. 
Persons who would qualify as "categorically needy" except for 
incomes or resources over the fixed dollar limits could still 
11 
qualify for Medicaid coverage as "medically needy" in a state 
opting to provide such coverage, but this latter group was deemed 
"less needy" by Congress. Id.; see also 1965 Senate Report, at 
2017.5 The basis for distinguishing between these two subgroups 
of the poor in this country was explained in Schweiker v. Hoqan, 
457 U.S. 569, 590, 102 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1982): 
Congress has differentiated between the categorically 
needy—a class of aged, blind, disabled, or dependent 
person who have very little income—and other persons 
with similar characteristics who are self-supporting. 
Members of the former class are automatically entitled to 
Medicaid; members of the latter class are not eligible 
unless a State elects to provide benefits to the 
medically needy and unless their income, after 
consideration of medical expenses, is below state 
standards of eligibility. 
Utah chose to participate in Medicaid with the adoption of the 
Medical Assistance Act in 1981. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to -
11 (1989 and Supp. 1992). The Division is the designated Utah 
agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program in 
accordance with federal and state law requirements. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-18-3(1) (Supp. 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1989). The 
Utah Legislature has given the Division broad authority to develop 
policies to implement the Medicaid program and to develop 
eligibility standards consistent with federal requirements. Utah 
5If a state opts to provide medical assistance to the 
"medically needy," it may not provide Medicaid coverage that is 
greater in amount, duration, or scope than that provided to the 
"categorically needy." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(ii) (1992). 
This provision was included "in order to make sure that the most 
needy in a State receive no less comprehensive care than those who 
are not as needy." 1965 House Report at 67. 
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Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) (1989); Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3(2) (Supp. 
1992). The state has complied with conditions set by federal law 
by creating a state Medicaid plan, found at Utah Admin. Code R455-
1-1 to -48 [Addendum B], which has been approved by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services. 
Federal law requires a state plan for medical assistance to 
(17) . . . include reasonable standards . . . 
for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical 
assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent the 
the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking 
into account only such income and resources as are . . . 
available to the applicant or recipient . . . (C) provide 
for reasonable evaluation of any such income or 
resources, and (D) . . . provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with respect to income by 
taking into account . . . the costs . . . incurred for 
medical care or for any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992). This provision underlies several 
of Allen's claims that the Division's failure to use a "resource 
spend down" method of determining his eligibility for Medicaid as 
a "medically needy" person is contrary to federal law. 
Utah's Medically Needy Program 
Unlike its neighboring states in the Intermountain West, Utah 
has elected to make the optional medically needy program available 
to some of its neediest citizens.6 Utah Admin. Code R455-1-17 
(1991). As required by federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) 
(1992), a person can apply for Medicaid coverage under the program 
6In a state such as Colorado that offers Medicaid only to the 
categorically needy, Allen would be ineligible for any Medicaid 
coverage because his $967 monthly household income is too high, 
even if his assets were below the $3,000 limit. 
13 
retroactively to three months before the month of application. 
Utah Admin. Code 455-1-11 (1991). In FY 1991, this optional 
program payed the uninsured medical bills of over 5,000 eligible 
Utahns at a cost of $19.7 million in federal and state Medicaid 
funds. MEDSTAT H.C.F.A. 2082 Report for Utah (Dec. 20, 1991). 
As noted above, the "medically needy" are persons who have 
characteristics of the categorically needy (i.e., as aged, blind, 
or disabled adults, or as dependent children), but who also have 
too much income or assets to meet the federal eligibility standards 
for those programs. Winter v. Miller, 676 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir. 
1982). Eligibility for the optional medically needy program 
likewise depends on: a) the total of the applicant's nonexempt 
resources7; and b) the applicant's monthly income. 
The applicable limit on allowable nonexempt resources, in this 
case $3,000 for a two-person household,8 is set by the federal 
Social Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(c) (1992) 
[Addendum B] . For purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility 
during a specific calendar month, countable assets are those held 
on the first moment of that month. Utah Admin. Code R810-304-403 
7
"Resources" are "cash or other liquid assets or any real or 
personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and 
could be converted to cash for his or her support and maintenance." 
20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a) (1992). Exempt resources include, among 
other things, a home, household goods, a vehicle, property 
essential for self-support, allotted Indian lands, life insurance, 
burial space and funds, and housing assistance. See 20 C.F.R. § 
416.1210 (1992); Utah Admin. Code R810-304-411 (1991). 
8Utah Admin. Code § R810-304-403 (1991) [Addendum B];' see R. 
13, 98. 
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[Addendum B]. "The case is ineligible for the entire month if 
countable assets exceed limits on the first moment of the month. 
Id. Under these eligibility standards, a person like Allen with 
nonexempt assets above the fixed $3,000 limit, measured at the 
first moment of the months for which he seeks coverage, is 
ineligible for Medicaid. Utah Admin. Code. R810-304-403. 
An applicant for the medically needy program whose nonexempt 
resources are below the fixed dollar limit must also meet the 
"income" eligibility criterion by having income below the 
applicable dollar limit, a figure set by the Social Security 
Administration based on federal poverty guidelines. See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 416.1205(c) (1991). However, in calculating an applicant's 
income for a specific month, the Division is required by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(17)(D), quoted above, and implementing federal 
regulations to use an "income spend down" methodology.9 
Under income spend down, an applicant must be allowed to 
9See, e.g., Atkins, 477 U.S. at 158; 106 S.Ct. at 2459 ("the 
spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) "allows the 
medically needy to spend down "the amount by which their income 
exceeds" the eligibility level); Foley v. Coler, No. 83-C-4736, 
1986 WL 20891 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1986) ("42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down") 
[Addendum E]; Harriman v. Commissioner, No. 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 
284515 (D. Me. Nov. 9, 1990) (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (D) 
"specifically requires the state to have an income spend-down 
rule") [Addendum F]; Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 
285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1990) ("Under the 'medically needy' 
procedure, applicants are permitted to 'spend down' their excess 
income for medical expenses."); Haley v. Commissioner of Public 
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985) (42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(17) "provide[s] for application of the spend down 
principle to income eligibility determinations"). 
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deduct from income any medical expenses incurred in that month that 
are not subject to payment by a third party.10 42 C.F.R. § 
435.831(c) (1991); Utah Admin. Code R810-303-331 (1991). After 
such a set-off, an applicant will meet the income eligibility 
criterion if the incurred medical costs reduce income to or below 
the applicable monthly income standard. 42 C.F.R. § 435.831(d) 
(1991). 
To see the federally mandated "income spend down" provision in 
operation, consider the following simplified hypothetical. Sara 
Johnson, disabled by emphysema, lives with her husband Sam, who 
earns minimum wage as a watchman at a small company with no health 
insurance benefits. She incurs $10,000 in uninsured medical bills 
in January 1991 during an emergency hospitalization for severe 
pneumonia, so she applies for the medically needy program. If 
Johnson has only $1,000 in total nonexempt cash and other assets on 
January 1, 1992, she satisfies the $3,000 resource eligibility 
criterion for her two-person household. 
The income limit for that two-person household, an amount 
considered minimally necessary for basic life maintenance, is $430. 
10According to the legislative history, the "income spend down" 
provision was inserted into section 1396a(a)(17)(D) to insure that 
the measurement of an applicant's income in any month, as part of 
the Medicaid eligibility determination process, took into account 
the applicant's costs of medical care incurred during that month. 
1965 House Report, at 68 [Addendum C]. There is no parallel 
language in the federal statute requiring states to set off an 
applicant's nonexempt resources held in any month, as part of the 
Medicaid eligibility determination process, against the costs of 
medical care incurred during that month. 
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If, like Allen and his wife, Johnson's countable income is $967 in 
January, she would be $537 over the income limit and thus 
ineligible as a "categorically needy" person. However, due to the 
federally mandated "income spend down" method of determining 
eligibility as a "medically needy" person, Johnson will be allowed 
to deduct from this countable income the amount of incurred medical 
bills, thereby bringing herself to the $430 income limit. She will 
thus be eligible in January under both the resources and income 
eligibility criteria for the Utah Medically Needy program, and 
Medicaid will cover all but $537 of the medical bills she 
incurred.11 
If, on the other hand, Johnson incurred only $500 in medical 
bills in January she would not be eligible as "medically needy" 
under the income criterion of eligibility. Even after the "income 
spend down" methodology was applied to deduct her incurred medical 
expenses from her gross income ($967-$500), she would be ineligible 
because her net income of $467 would be $37 more than the $430 
household income limit. 
As previously noted, the federally mandated eligibility 
guidelines for Medicaid coverage do not allow a person to become 
uThe amount of the income spend down, $537 in this 
hypothetical, remains the responsibility of Johnson to pay. But 
she need not actually pay the $537 toward a medical bill in Utah to 
become eligible for Medicaid under the Utah Medically Needy 
Program. In sharp contrast, the state plans in Massachusetts, 
Arizona, and North Carolina, discussed below at pages 23-26, 
required an applicant to actually expend assets on incurred medical 
bills in order to decrease resources to be counted in determining 
eligibility. 
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eligible as "categorically needy" by spending down excess resources 
against incurred medical bills. The eligibility standards for the 
medically needy program in Utah's approved state Medicaid plan 
likewise do not include a methodology for measuring available 
resources that permits the applicant to "spend down" excess 
nonexempt resources by setting them off against incurred medical 
bills. 
Allen contends that federal law requires the Division to adopt 
such a resource spend down methodology and thereby provide Medicaid 
coverage through this optional program to persons with substantial 
nonexempt resources in excess of fixed resource limits. He has, 
however, failed to demonstrate any error by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in rejecting his statutory claims. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT FEDERAL 
LAW, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and (34) (1992), DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THE DIVISION TO USE "RESOURCE SPEND DOWN" WHEN 
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR OPTIONAL MEDICAID COVERAGE AS 
"MEDICALLY NEEDY." 
1. Use of a fixed asset limit, without resource spend 
down, is consistent with the objective of the Medicaid 
statute, which is to help states provide medical 
assistance to persons least able to meet the costs of 
medical care from their own income and resources. 
Allen's first argument is that the Division's failure to use 
a resource spend down methodology in determining eligibility is 
inconsistent with the legislative purpose and intent behind the 
Medicaid program. Section 1396a(a)(17) requires a state plan to 
use reasonable eligibility standards consistent with the objectives 
of the Medicaid statutes in Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 
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In the appropriations provision at the beginning of that title, 
Congress stated that it was appropriating funds for Medicaid 
for the purpose of enabling each State, as far as 
practicable under the conditions in such State, to 
furnish medical assistance [to dependent children and 
aged, blind, or disabled individuals] whose income and 
resources are insufficient to meet the cost of necessary 
medical services . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992) (emphasis added). 
Nothing in Title XIX or its legislative history suggests that 
the financial assistance provided through Medicaid to the 
categorically needy or to the medically needy was intended by 
Congress to be national health insurance coverage for all persons 
whose income and resources are "insufficient" in the sense that 
they are less than incurred medical bills.12 This Congressional 
"purpose" ascribed by Allen to Medicaid is created out of thin air. 
12Contrary to Allen's assertion at page 12, the mere creation 
of a public assistance program for categorically needy and 
medically needy does not, by definition, preclude limiting 
participation to those whose assets are below fixed dollar limits. 
See Harriman, 595 A.2d at 1057; see also Ramsey, 783 S.W.2d at 364 
(federal Medicaid statute does not even permit states to use 
resource spend down methodology for medically needy applicants). 
Congress itself has dictated that a person with excess resources 
cannot spend down that excess against incurred medical bills to 
become eligible for Medicaid as "categorically needy." See 20 
C.F.R. §§ 416.1201, 416.1205, 416.1210 (1992). 
Furthermore, the fact that the federal statutory scheme and 
the state plan allow applicants to retain a certain amount of 
nonexempt resources and still be eligible for Medicaid as 
categorically needy or medically needy does not mean Congress 
impliedly intended that all persons with medical bills larger than 
their resources must be deemed eligible. Instead, allowing assets 
below the resource limit merely indicates Congressional intent that 
persons need not have zero in accumulated assets to be eligible for 
Medicaid, either as categorically needy or as medically needy. 
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Allen is really arguing, with no supporting authority, that 
Congress intended the optional medically needy program to be a 
national health insurance program paying the uninsured, 
catastrophic medical bills of all persons who otherwise qualify, 
notwithstanding the amount of assets they hold. If Congress had so 
intended, it could have compelled states that opt to provide 
medically needy coverage to use the "resource spend down" 
methodology of determining eligibility, one Allen is asking this 
Court to impose by judicial legislation. Congress could have 
restricted states in this manner by merely enacting statutory 
language like that in section 1396a(a)(17)(D), which compels the 
"income spend down" methodology of determining income eligibility, 
but it did not. See Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 757 (application of 
statutory construction rule, "express mention and implied 
exclusion," would lead to the conclusion that section 1396a(a) does 
not impose resource spend down methodology on states because it 
does not mention such a requirement among the express enumerations 
of what state* Medicaid plans must contain). 
Instead, Congress stated in the Medicaid statute its purpose 
to help a participating state provide medical assistance to as many 
of its needy citizens as possible, i.e., "as far as practicable 
under the conditions in such State[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992). 
In permitting the medically needy program to be optional, Congress 
left it up to each participating state to decide whether it could 
afford to provide medical assistance to any medically needy persons 
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at all. Congress also left it to each state choosing to provide 
this optional assistance to set its own income and resource 
eligibility standards, subject to the requirement in section 
1396a(a)(17) that these standards be reasonable. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded, although 
section 1396a(a)(17) permits a state to choose to provide Medicaid 
coverage to a larger group of needy citizens through the use of a 
"resource spend down" methodology of calculating resource 
eligibility, it does not compel a state do so. Allen, 829 P.2d at 
126. Every court that has addressed this issue has reached the 
same conclusion. E.g., Harriman v. Commissioner/ Medicare and 
Medicaid Guide f 39,089 (D. Me. Nov. 9, 1990) (1990 WL 284515) 
("The federal statute specifically requires the state to have an 
income spend-down rule. . . . But there is no similar requirement 
in the federal statute for a resource spend-down rule.") [Addendum 
Item F]; Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Me. 
1991) (court adopts prior district court holding that resource 
spend down is permitted but not required by section 1396a(a)(17)); 
Foley v. Coler, No. 83-C-4736, slip op. at 9 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 
1986) (1986 WL 20891) ("42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states 
to use income spend-down but is silent regarding resource spend-
down . . . . Resource spend-down is thus permitted, but not 
required, by the Medicaid statute and regulations") [Addendum Item 
E]; Hession v. Illinois Dep't of Public Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 
N.E.2d 751, 757 (1989) ("Simply stated, we perceive nothing in 
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section 1396a(a) (17) which precludes a State that participates in 
the Medicaid program from using the resource spend down methodology 
if it chooses to do so."), affirming Hession v. Illinois Dep't of 
Pub. Aid, 163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987); Haley 
v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 578 
(1985) (federal Medicaid statute does not require resource spend 
down methodology);13 see also Westmiller by Hubbard v. Sullivan, 
729 F.Supp. 260, 263 (W.D. N.Y. 1990) ("Although the Medicaid Act 
does not expressly mention a resource spend-down, it is clear from 
other sections of the Act and from the legislative history that the 
states have discretion in utilizing such a [resource] spend-down in 
determining eligibility."); Matarazzo v. Aronson, No. CV91-0388251, 
2 Medicare and Medicaid Law Rptr., para. 90. at 379-80 (Conn. 
Superior Court, June 30, 1992) (federal Medicaid law permits 
resource spend-down, but state statute prohibits it) [Addendum G]. 
Congress does not allow use of resource spend down to become 
Medicaid eligible as categorically needy. With regard to Medicaid 
eligibility as medically needy, Congress has left it to each 
participating state to determine how many needy citizens it can 
afford to provide medical assistance to out of the larger class of 
persons whose extraordinary uninsured medical expenses are greater 
13In Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 285, 783 
S.W.2d 361, 364 (1990), the Arkansas Supreme Court likewise held 
that federal Medicaid law does not require states to use a resource 
spend down methodology, but it went even further to conclude that 
states are not authorized by federal law to allow applicants to 
spend down resources to become eligible for Medicaid. 
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than their assets.1* This flexibility granted by Congress is 
consistent with its express intent to encourage states to choose to 
assist as many of the "less needy" as practicable within local 
conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992), including burgeoning state 
expenditures for mandatory "categorically needy" Medicaid coverage 
and state budgetary constraints in these recessionary times. The 
interpretation of section 1396a(a)(17) urged on this Court by 
Allen, which would dramatically increase the costs of the medically 
needy program by expanding eligibility through mandated "resource 
spend down," would eliminate this flexibility and would itself 
defeat the purposes of the medically needy program by discouraging 
states from offering this optional program to anyone. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the state 
supreme courts in Hession and Haley, in decisions mistakenly relied 
upon by Allen, ultimately concluded that their respective state 
Medicaid agencies were required by clear manifestations of state 
legislative intent, not Congressional intent, to use a "resource 
spend down" methodology of calculating an applicant's eligibility 
for the medically needy program. Allen, 829 P.2d at 126-28. In 
Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 757, the Illinois Supreme Court pointed out 
that Illinois statutes defined those eligible, required disregard 
of a fixed dollar amount of assets in determining Medicaid 
1AHere, that larger group of potentially eligible would consist 
of the 192,000 Utahns with no medical insurance, Deseret News, Feb. 
1, 1992, at Bl, as well as the uncounted numbers of Utahns who are 
underinsured for catastrophic health care costs. 
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eligibility, and specifically noted the special importance of 
preserving recipients' limited resources. Thus, the court phrased 
the issue before it as whether the lower "appellate court correctly 
concluded that the Illinois Public Aid Code (Code) requires the 
application of a resource spend down." Id. 
Similarly, in Haley, 476 N.E.2d at 579, the court addressed 
whether the Massachusetts Legislature "intended to require the use 
of a resource spend down." The court identified numerous 
provisions in the state laws about the medically needy program that 
strongly evinced the state legislature's intent that its medically 
needy program use a resource spend-down methodology. 
Significantly, these included provisions allowing medically needy 
applicants to dispose of excess assets by actually paying incurred 
medical bills before applying for retroactive coverage15 and to 
establish eligibility without depleting assets below an exempted 
amount. Furthermore, the state legislature had explicitly required 
a resource spend down methodology when applicants had assigned or 
transferred away assets before application in order to render 
themselves eligible for medical assistance. Id., at 578-79 & nn.8, 
9. Based on these state statutory provisions, the court concluded 
15The court stated that under the Massachusetts scheme, without 
resource spend-down, a person aware of the Medicaid agency's asset 
limit could use his excess assets to actually pay incurred medical 
bills and then become retroactively eligible, while the person 
unaware of the policy or unable to actually spend excess assets on 
medical bills before applying would be found ineligible. Haley, 
476 N.E.2d at 578-79 n.8. As discussed more fully at page 30-32, 
such a disparate result is not possible in Utah. 
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that use of resource spend down by the Massachusetts Medicaid 
agency was required by state law. Jxi. at 579-80, 
Similar statutory provisions regulating eligibility for the 
medically needy program in North Carolina led the court there to 
likewise conclude that resource spend down, which allows applicants 
to set off accrued medical bills against assets held at the time of 
application, was implicitly required by state legislation 
permitting applicants for the program to actually spend those 
assets on medical bills before applying and thereby bring 
themselves under applicable asset limits. Kempson v. North 
Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 482, 397 S.E.2d 
314, 316-18 (1990), aff'd by divided court, 328 N.C. 722, 403 
S.E.2d 279 (1991)16; accord Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hospital, 
Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d 878, 882 (1986) 
(involving same provisions in a state created medical assistance 
program, not Medicaid). 
Thus, in all the cases relied on by Allen, the state agency's 
failure to use resource spend down was considered contrary to 
express state legislative intent, as well as unfair to "blindsided" 
applicants who were unable (or unaware of the need to) use excess 
assets to actually pay medical bills before application. Haley, 
476 N.E.2d at 578-79 & n.8; Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 757; Kempson, 
16The Supreme Court of North Carolina was careful to point out 
that the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision it was 
affirming, because of an equally divided court, nonetheless has "no 
precedential value." 403 S.E.2d at 279. 
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397 S.E.2d at 316-17; Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hospital, 714 P.2d 
at 881-82. See note 15, supra. 
However, as Allen now concedes, Utah's legislature has enacted 
nothing on which to conclude that the Division's failure to allow 
resource spend down is contrary to state law or state legislative 
intent. Instead, the Utah Legislature has given the Division 
complete authority and broad discretion to administer and implement 
the Medicaid program, including authority to adopt policy and 
eligibility standards consistent with federal law. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-18-3 (1991). The Utah Legislature could have, but has not, 
directed the Division to use a resource spend down methodology, a 
change which would necessarily expand the pool of potentially 
eligible persons and thereby increase the cost of offering any 
medically needy program. See Harriman, 595 A. 2d at 1057 n.6. On 
the contrary, by continuing to fund the medically needy program 
without taking such preemptive action, the Utah Legislature has 
tacitly adopted the Division's policy of not using resource spend 
down. 
As a matter of sound and humane public policy, it may be 
desirable for the government to make catastrophic health insurance 
coverage accessible to all Americans so no one must spend a life's 
savings to pay exorbitant costs of necessary medical care. 
Nonetheless, this is a matter for legislative consideration and 
action. The policy determination of whether to offer the optional 
medically needy program and how many needy persons Utah can afford 
26 
to subsidize has properly been left by Congress to the 
determination of the state legislature. As the Court of Appeals 
recognized, it is not for the courts to rewrite eligibility 
criteria for public assistance programs. Allen, 829 P.2d at 128 
n.18; accord Harriman, 595 A. 2d at 1057 (court not justified in 
imposing on Medicaid agency a resource spend down methodology where 
state legislature has clearly refrained from requiring one); 
Bemowski v. Comm. , Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 582 A.2d 103, 106 (Pa. 
Cmwlth. 1990) (where state plan does not use resource spend down, 
"such a change in the eligibility criteria for . . . the medically 
needy category must be made legislatively or by regulation, not 
judicially"). 
For these reasons, this Court should conclude that failure to 
use a resource spend down methodology when measuring resources held 
by an applicant for the medically needy program is not inconsistent 
with Congress's objectives in creating the Medicaid program. 
2. The federal requirement in section 1396a(a)(17)(D) 
that a state use income spend down does not impliedly 
require a state to use resource spend down since, in 
setting criteria for public assistance eligibility, it is 
rational to treat income differently from accumulated 
resources. 
Characterizing resources as merely unspent income, Allen 
suggests that it is unreasonable for the Division not to use a 
resource spend down methodology since it is required by federal 
Medicaid law to use an income spend down methodology when 
determining eligibility for the medically needy program. However, 
as noted above, Congress itself has expressly required income spend 
27 
down in section 1396a(a)(17)(D), but has not required resource 
spend down. This is itself a strong indication of Congressional 
intent not to make resource spend down mandatory. 
As the Arkansas Supreme Court recently explained in a decision 
rejecting a claim that states must use resource spend down, there 
are quantitative differences between the two that justify such 
disparate treatment. Income "is accrued day to day in return for 
labor. On the other hand, resources in place, or acquired, are 
viewed as wealth in hand that increases the recipient's well-
being." Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 285, 783 
S.W.2d 361, 364 (1990). 
As discussed more fully below under point 4, a state can 
reasonably conclude that persons able to put money away and 
accumulate substantial assets are in a better position to provide 
for their own health care costs. Harriman v. Commissioner, 1 
Medicare and Medicaid Law Rptr., para. 318, at 1418 (D.Me. March 4, 
1992) [Addendum H]. Indeed, Congress itself has already reached 
this same conclusion by declining to allow applicants for Medicaid 
coverage as categorically needy to use resource spend down and set 
off incurred medical bills against excess resources, even if their 
incomes are below poverty level income limits and even if they have 
incurred medical bills far greater than their excess resources. 
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1201, 416.1205, 416.1210 (1992) [Addendum B]. 
It would be highly irrational for Congress to require states to 
provide optional Medicaid coverage to a "medically needy" person 
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through resource spend down when federal law does not allow 
resource spend down when determining if a person is eligible for 
mandatory categorically needy assistance. 
If a state chooses to use resource spend down in its medically 
needy program, it is rendering eligible for public assistance all 
applicants with substantial assets if they also have even more 
substantial uninsured medical bills. Recognizing this, Congress 
has not statutorily required states to use resource spend down, 
since such a requirement would force some states to choose between 
providing coverage to this huge pool of potentially medically 
needy, or to no one at all. 
Furthermore, there are considerable administrative problems 
(and attendant costs) not posed by income spend down that would 
accompany use of resource spend down. In most cases, it is simple 
to measure an applicant's regular monthly income stream, so income 
spend down is merely a computational matter. If an applicant has 
minimal nonexempt assets, the administrative burden on the state to 
evaluate them is slight. But if persons with substantial assets 
are to be eligible under a resource spend down methodology, the 
state will have to evaluate many more assets, including assets 
difficult to value like collectibles and stock not publicly traded. 
The state would also have to put in place a tracking system for 
assets to insure that they were not used repeatedly from month to 
month for resource spend down purposes. 
These additional administrative burdens provide added support 
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for the conclusion that it is rational to draw the line between 
income and resources for purposes of applying the spend down rule 
when determining eligibility for the optional medically needy 
program• Harriman v. Commissioner, 1 Medicare and Medicaid Law 
Rptr., para, 318, at 1418 (D.Me. March 4, 1992) [Addendum H]. As 
the Harriman court noted, use of a fixed asset limit instead of 
resource spend down represents a choice by the state to spend 
scarce Medicaid dollars on needy persons with assets under that 
limit, instead of spending those dollars on the increased 
administrative costs entailed in using a resource spend down 
methodology:: 
The State should not be compelled to use its limited 
budget to hire more people to apply a different rule 
where the alternative is to direct the funds to people in 
need even though not all people in need can be reached. 
Id. 
This Court should, therefore, reject Allen's argument that 
Congress impliedly required resource spend down when it expressly 
required income spend down, 
3. Because an Applicant Cannot Spend Excess Assets to 
Pay Incurred Medical Bills before Applying for 
Retroactive Medicaid Coverage, the Three-Month 
Retroactive Application Period in Section 1396a(a)(34) 
Does Not Impliedly Require Use of Resource Spend Down. 
Next, Allen contends that resource spend down is impliedly 
required by Congress's mandate, in section 1396a(a)(34), of up to 
three months of retroactive Medicaid coverage prior to the month of 
application. Relying on Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 318, he claims that 
applicants for such retroactive coverage in Utah are "blindsided" 
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by the resource limit if they are either unable to (or unaware of 
the need to) spend their excess assets before applying for 
coverage. This is the same unfair scenario envisioned by Judge 
Bench in his dissent below, in which he states erroneously that an 
applicant "savvy enough to spend down his or her assets before 
applying for Medicaid would be eligible, while the applicant who 
applies for benefits before spending down is not eligible." Allen, 
829 P.2d at 128-29 (Bench, J., dissenting). However, as counsel 
for Allen should know even if Judge Bench does not, it is 
impossible for this scenario to take place in Utah. 
The applicants for medical assistance in Kempson were unfairly 
"blindsided" because state law setting out medically needy 
eligibility standards allowed them to actually use excess assets to 
pay accrued medical bills and thereby bring their total assets 
below the resource limit by the time of application for retroactive 
coverage. Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 316-318. Under such a state 
eligibility system, which was also present in Haley, 476 N.E.2d at 
578-79, and Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hospital, 714 P.2d at 882, 
it is patently unreasonable to not permit resource spend down at 
the time of application by those who were unable to (or were 
unaware of the need to) do so before application. 
In contrast, under current Medicaid law and Utah's Medicaid 
eligibility standards, an applicant may not make himself eligible 
by using excess assets to pay incurred medical bills prior to 
applying for coverage. Allen's representations to the contrary at 
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pages 15 and 18 of his brief are simply not true. 
Section 1396a(a)(34) requires a state to provide for 
retroactive Medicaid coverage for medical bills incurred up to 
three months before the month of applicationr but only "if such 
individual was (or upon application would have been) eligible for 
such assistance at the time such care and services were furnished." 
In accordance with this directive, eligibility is determined based 
on the resources held by an applicant at the first moment of the 
month for which he seeks Medicaid coverage. See Utah Admin. Code 
R810-304-403. Resources are not, as Judge Bench believed, measured 
as of the date a person applies for retroactive Medicaid coverage. 
Thus, Allen could not have spent down his excess resources after 
incurring his hospital bills and thereby rendered himself eligible 
for Medicaid coverage retroactive to January and February 1991 when 
he applied on February 4, 1991. 
Because Utah's medically needy eligibility standards do not 
allow a "savvy" applicant to become eligible while an ignorant or 
unable applicant cannot, the federally mandated three-month 
retroactive application process does not impliedly require resource 
spend down. 
4. It is Reasonable for the Division to Base Eligibility 
for Medicaid Coverage under the Optional Medically Needy 
Program on Need, as Measured by the Amount of an 
Applicant's Accumulated Resources. 
Finally, Allen contends that the Division's failure to allow 
resource spend down is contrary to the requirement in section 
1396a(a)(17) that a state's eligibility criteria be "reasonable." 
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As support for this argument, he refers the Court only to the 1965 
Senate Report at page 2019 [Addendum D]. Significantly, that 
Report expressly acknowledges earlier in the same section, 
captioned "Determination of need for medical assistance," that 
"States may set a limitation on income and resources which 
individuals may hold and be eligible for aid." Id. at 2018. The 
subsequent language Allen apparently relies on, with emphasis 
added, is: 
The State may require the use of all the excess income 
of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some 
portion of that amount. In no event, however, with 
respect to this provision . . . may a State require the 
use of income or resources which would bring the 
individual's income below the amount established as the 
test of eligibility under the State plan. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals recognized, this section merely 
explains that section 1396a(a)(17)(D), i.e., "this provision," 
requires income spend down in determining whether one is eligible 
as medically needy. Allen, 829 P.2d at 126 n.10. The 1965 Senate 
Report emphasizes that states can require applicants to use all 
excess income (i.e., that above the applicable monthly income 
limit) toward medical bills, but states cannot require applicants 
to so use the protected amount of income (i.e., that below the 
applicable monthly income limit). The cited passage provides no 
support for a conclusion that it is unreasonable to exclude persons 
with substantial assets from participation in an optional program 
designed to encourage state assistance to the neediest citizens. 
Indeed, it is eminently rational for the Division to delineate 
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\rt\o is most in need of medical assistance by taking into account 
the level of applicants' accumulated resources. Harriman v. 
Commissioner, 1 Medicare and Medicaid Law Rptr. para. 318, at 1418 
(D.Me. March 4, 1992) [Addendum H]. In applying a fixed asset 
limit as an eligibility criterion for the Medically Needy Program, 
the Pivision has reasonably concluded that persons with assets 
above the resource limits are generally more able than those with 
assets below the resource limits to be able to meet the costs of 
their own medical care: 
[T]he State could rationally believe that [people with 
accumulated resources over resource limits] 'generally 
are better able to provide for their medical needs,' than 
people who have been unable to accumulate resources. In 
other words, people with accumulated resources, as a 
group, are likely to have greater flexibility in making 
alternative arrangements for their medical needs, whether 
it be by previous purchase of insurance, arranging for 
loans, family assistance, etc. 
Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Hoqan, 457 U.S. at 590). 
The facts in this specific case demonstrate the reasonableness 
of the Division's conclusion about the general class of persons to 
which Allen belongs, i.e., those who have accumulated assets in 
excess of resource limits. Allen and his wife owned their own 
$65,000 home and held over $10,000 in cash and other assets, in 
addition to other property exempted from consideration. When 
Allen's group health insurance coverage ended in June 1990, he 
could have protected himself for $400-600 per month for the 
eighteen months until he would gain Medicare coverage. Persons 
with meager or no accumulated assets have no such option. But 
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Allen decided to hold onto his "nest egg" and risk being without 
health insurance, despite a history of heart disease and prior open 
heart surgery. Although his nest egg and all his other assets may 
now be at risk for payment of his catastrophic uninsured medical 
bills, his predicament results from his own gamble, not from an 
unreasonable or unlawful method of determining his Medicaid 
eligibility. 
Finally, quoting from the dissent below, Allen asserts it is 
unreasonable not to permit resource spend down because an applicant 
who is "savvy enough to spend down his or her assets before 
applying for Medicaid would be eligible, while the applicant who 
applies for benefits before spending down is not eligible." Allen, 
829 P. 2d at 128-29 (Bench, J., dissenting). As discussed above 
under points 1 and 3, this admittedly unfair result is not possible 
under the Utah Medicaid program, although it was possible under the 
state eligibility standards examined in Haley, Kempson, and Boswell 
Memorial Hospital. In short, a "savvy" Allen could not have spent 
his excess assets in January and February 1991, prior to applying 
for Medicaid, and thereby made himself eligible for coverage for 
those months. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992); Utah Admin. Code § 
455-1-11 (1991). 
Because it is reasonable for the Division to establish 
eligibility standards for a public assistance program that take 
into account an applicant's accumulated resources, this Court 
should reject Allen's argument that failure to use resource spend 
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down contravenes section 1396a(a) (17) ,17 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject Allen's 
claims and affirm the Utah Court of Appeals' holding that federal 
law does not require the Division to use a resource spend down 
methodology when determining eligibility for Utah's optional 
Medically Needy Program. 
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17Allen also mentions, for the first time on appeal, an 
unsupported claim that the Division's failure to allow him to spend 
down his excess resources against incurred medical bills 
constitutes an unreasonable overvaluation of his available 
resources, contrary to section 1396a(a)(17)(C). (Brief of 
Petitioner) at 17-18. Although this belated, alternative 
"unreasonableness" argument should not even be addressed, Espinal 
v. Board of Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990), it lacks merit 
for the same reasons set forth by the Division in point 4. 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Doyce Allen (Allen) appeals from a final order of 
respondent Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing (DHCF) denying him Medicaid benefits. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On January 23, 1991, Allen suffered a heart attack while in 
Arizona. He was subsequently transported to Utah where he 
underwent heart bypass surgery, resulting in medical costs 
exceeding $40,000.00. At the time of his heart attack, Allen had 
no health insurance and was ineligible for Medicare assistance 
because he was not sixty-five years old. 
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991, 
seeking retroactive coverage to include medical bills incident to 
his heart surgery in January, 1991. Utah Medicaid guidelines 
require that Allen's assets be less than $3,000.00, on the first 
of each calendar month, to qualify for medical assistance. In 
both January and February, Allen owned a savings account in the 
amount of $3,029.86, a checking account in the amount of $100.00, 
a Lincoln automobile valued at approximately $600.00, a 1983 Ford 
pickup truck valued at approximately $2,500.00, and a 1981 travel 
trailer valued at approximately $7,000.00. 
On February 19, 1991, the Office of Family Support denied 
Allen's Medicaid application, finding his resources exceeded the 
$3,000.00 limit. Allen requested a formal hearing, after which a 
DHCF hearing officer sustained the denial on the ground that 
Allen's "savings account alone exceeded the limit." On April 29, 
1991, the DHCF issued a Final Agency Action and Order on Review, 
adopting the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer. 
Allen then filed a Request for Reconsideration which was denied. 
On appeal, Allen alleges the DHCF erred in denying his 
Medicaid application because: (1) The savings account funds are 
designated for burial expenses and, thus, exempt from 
consideration for Medicaid eligibility; (2) the travel trailer, 
modified to accommodate his wife's disabilities, is a medical 
necessity or personal effect and, thus, exempt from consideration 
for Medicaid eligibility; and (3) he should have been permitted 
to "spend down" his assets, by applying them to medical bills, in 
order to become eligible for Medicaid. 
I. THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS A BURIAL FUND 
Allen contends that his $3,029.86 savings account should not 
be included for purposes of Medicaid eligibility because it is 
exempt as a burial fund.1 In support of this claim, Allen points 
to a statement in his will directing that the savings account be 
used "to bury Doyce Allen and Lilly Allen." Allen alleges the 
will is properly before this court on appeal because it was 
submitted to the DHCF with his Request for Reconsideration. The 
DHCF responds that it is inappropriate for us to consider Allen's 
will as part of the record on review because it was never 
introduced as evidence at Allen's formal administrative hearing. 
A review of the record reveals that a copy of Allen's will 
was first presented to the DHCF as an attachment to a letter from 
Allen's counsel, dated June 3, 1991, requesting a transcript of 
1. Under the Utah Administrative Code, "a $1,500 burial or 
funeral fund exemption for each eligible household member" is 
permitted only if these funds "are separately identified and not 
commingled with other funds. They must be clearly designated so 
that an outside observer can see that these funds are 
specifically for the client's burial expense." Utah Code Admin. 
P. R810-304«411(9)(e)(1) (1991). 
on nooi-n* 
Allen's administrative hearing. The DHCF did not receive the 
will until June 10, 19912, after the hearing officer's 
Recommended Decision, the DHCF's Final Agency Action and Order on 
Review, and the DHCF's Response to Request for Reconsideration 
had already been signed and dated. Because there is no 
indication that Allen's will was ever included as evidence before 
the DHCF, it is not properly a part of Allen's record on appeal. 
However, even if we were to consider the general language in 
Allen's will, the result would not be different. Allen clearly 
and unequivocally testified the account was to pay for insurance 
premiums, not burial expenses. Allen did not specify the account 
as a burial fund on his original Medicaid application. During 
his formal administrative hearing, Allen did not argue or present 
any evidence indicating his savings account was designated for 
burial expenses. In fact, when the hearing officer specifically 
asked if the savings account might be a burial fund, Allen 
replied that "we earned it last summer for our insurance 
premiums, and they didn't go through, so we had this money for a 
nest egg, you might say. You have to have a little bit of 
something in case--.,t3 Therefore, considering only the savings 
2. Allen argues the will "was submitted at a time when the 
record was still open," pointing out that the letter to which the 
will was attached was mailed on June 3, 1991. The letter, 
nevertheless, clearly bears a "Received June 10, 1991" stamp. 
3. Allen testified that, after the DHCF denied Medicaid 
benefits, Allen, in fact, did not maintain the account as a 
burial fund. The following exchange occurred at the 
administrative hearing: 
HEARING OFFICER: What did you do with the 
$3,000 in February which you pulled out of 
the savings account? 
MR. ALLEN: Well, we paid bills that was 
accrued during our heart attack deal here, 
and transportation to and from. 
HEARING OFFICER: So, that money was spent on 
medical things? 
MR. ALLEN: Bills again. 
Contrary to his argument, Allen apparently neither 
considered nor used the savings account as a fund "separately 
identifiable" which was set aside "specifically" for burial 
expenses. 
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account for purposes of affirming on appeal4, Allen's savings 
account alone surpassed the $3,000.00 Medicaid limit. 
II. MEDICAID "SPEND DOWN11 
A. An Overview of the Medicaid Program 
Allen alternatively argues that he should have been 
permitted to spend his assets on medical bills in order to 
qualify for Medicaid. We look to both federal and Utah Medicaid 
regulations to resolve this question. 
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program as Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act.3 Medicaid is a cooperative 
federal-state program providing federal funds to assist 
individuals "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet 
the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C, § 1396 
(1992). States choosing to participate in this optional program 
are reimbursed for a portion of their costs in providing medical 
treatment to needy persons. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 
156-57, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1986); Weber Memorial Care Ctr,, 
Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Health, 751 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Participating states must develop a plan that complies with 
all federal Medicaid regulations. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396; Atkins, 
477 U.S. at 157, 106 S. Ct. at 2458; Weber Memorial, 751 P.2d at 
832. Each state must also select a single agency "to administer 
or to supervise the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(5) (1992). In determining eligibility for its 
program, a state must provide benefits to the "categorically 
4. Allen also argues that his travel trailer, equipped with 
oxygen, and his truck, both used to transport Allen and his wife 
to a warmer climate during winter because of his wife's ill 
health, should be excluded from Medicaid eligibility 
consideration because they are exempt either as personal effects 
or medical necessities. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411(4), 
(5)(b) to (d) (1991). Furthermore, Allen asserts that, because 
his wife requires the truck and travel trailer for health 
reasons, neither vehicle is "available" to him, as contemplated 
by federal statutory Medicaid requirements. See 42 U.S.C. S 
1396a(a)(17)(B) (1992). We find it unnecessary to reach these 
issues in view of our determination that Allen/s savings account 
alone exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit. 
5. Pub. L. No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. SS 1396, et seq. (1992)). 
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needy"6 but may provide benefits to the "medically needy"7 at its 
discretion.8 
B. The Concept of "Spend Down" in Federal Medicaid Statutes 
When a "medically needy" applicant's income or resources 
exceed the applicable state's Medicaid eligibility limits, the 
"spend down" rule may apply. Under this rule, the applicant may 
be able to "spend down" excess income or assets, by applying them 
to outstanding medical bills, to become eligible for Medicaid. 
In determining whether the federal Medicaid program requires 
states to adopt the "spend down" rule, courts have focused on the 
following portion of the Medicaid statutes: 
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must 
(17) . • . include reasonable standards 
• • . for determining eligibility for and the 
extent of medical assistance under the plan 
which (A) are consistent with the objectives 
of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking 
into account only such income and resources 
as are . . . available to the applicant or 
recipient . . . (C) provide for reasonable 
evaluation of any such income or resources, 
6. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i). 
7. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii). 
8. The United States Supreme Court explained this distinction in 
Schweiker v. Hocran, 457 U.S. 569, 102 S. Ct. 2597 (1982): 
Congress has differentiated between the 
categorically needy—a class of aged, blind, 
disabled, or dependent persons who have very 
little income—and other persons with similar 
characteristics who are self-supporting. 
Members of the former class are automatically 
entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter 
class are not eligible unless a State elects 
to provide benefits to the medically needy 
and unless their income, after consideration 
of medical expenses, is below state standards 
of eligibility. 
I£., 457 U.S. at 590, 102 S. Ct. at 2609. 
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and (D) . . . provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with respect to 
income by taking into account . . . the costs 
. . . incurred for medical care or for anv 
other type of remedial care recognized under 
State lav. 
42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17) (1992)(emphasis added). Courts 
recognize section 17(D) as the "income spend down rule," finding 
that state plans must permit a Medicaid applicant to "spend down" 
or deplete excess income to comply with a state's eligibility 
standards•9 
The question in the present case, however, is whether the 
federal Medicaid regulations also require states to allow an 
applicant to "spend down" excess resources in the same manner. 
Allen contends that the federal Medicaid program requires states 
to implement "resource spend down" because it is necessary to 
fulfill the purpose of the Medicaid program and is reasonable. 
The DHCF responds that federal Medicaid regulations mandate 
"income spend down" but merely permit states to incorporate 
"resource spend down" within their plans at their discretion. 
9. See, e.g., Atkins. 477 U.S. at 158, 106 S. Ct. at 2459 ("the 
spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17)" allows the 
medically needy to spend down "the amount by which their income 
exceeds" the eligibility level); Foley v. Coler, No. 83-C-4736, 
1986 WL 20891 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1986)("42 U.S.C. 
§ I396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down"); 
Harriman v. Commissioner. No. 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 284515 (D. Me. 
Nov. 9, 1990)(42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17)(D) "specifically requires 
the state to have an income spend-down rule"); Walter 0. Boswell 
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Yavapai County. 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d 
878, 881 (Ct. App. 1986)("Federal regulations implementing [42 
U.S.C. S 1396a(17)] expressly require deduction of incurred 
medical bills from income for purposes of determining 
eligibility."); Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs.. 301 Ark. 
285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1990)("Under the ^medically needy' 
procedure, applicants are permitted to *spend down' their excess 
income for medical expenses."); Haley v. Commissioner of Pub. 
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985)(42 U.S.C. 
S 1396a(a)(17) "provide[s] for application of the spend down 
principle to income eligibility determinations"); Kempson v. 
North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources. 100 N.C. App. 482, 397 
S.E.2d 314, 316 (1990)(The "explicit reference to income [in 42 
U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17)(D)] has been interpreted by the courts to 
mean that %income spend-down' is allowed by the statute."), 
aff'd, 328 N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 (1991). 
Courts considering the issue agree with the DHCF, finding 
the express statutory mandate is limited to "income spend 
down."'0 Courts conclude that federal Medicaid regulations 
permit, but do not require, states to employ "resource spend 
down."11 We agree and conclude "resource spend down" is not 
mandated by federal law. 
10. Legislative history accompanying section 1396a(a)(17) points 
to only "income spend down" as a mandatory federal requirement. 
See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943. 
11. See, e.g., Foley. 1986 WL 20891 ("42 U.S.C. 
S 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down but is 
silent regarding resource spend-down . . . . Resource spend-down 
is thus permitted, but not required, by the Medicaid statute and 
regulations"); Harriman. 1990 WL 284515 ("The federal statute 
specifically requires the state to have an income spend-down 
rule. • • • But there is no similar requirement in the federal 
statute for a resource spend-down rule."); Hession v. Illinois 
Deot. of Pub. Aid. 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751, 757 
(1989)("Simply stated, we perceive nothing in section 
1396a(a)(17) which precludes a State that participates in the 
Medicaid program from using the resource spend down methodology 
if it chooses to do so."); Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Pub, Aid. 
163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987)("section 
1396a(a)(17) of the Act permits a state plan to utilize resource 
spend down in determining an applicant's eligibility for medical 
assistance benefits"), aff'd. 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 
(1989); Harriman v. Commissioner. 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Me. 
1991)(court adopts prior holding of district court in this case 
that federal Medicaid statute "only permits, and does not 
require, a state to use an asset spend-down"); Bemowski v. 
Department of Pub. Welfare. 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 A.2d 103, 106 
(1990)(the provision of medical benefits "to the medically needy 
by participating States is optional and may be excluded entirely 
from a Stated Medicaid program"). 
But see Ramsey. 783 S.W.2d at 364 (court finds "no authority 
in any category for a *spend-down' of excess resources that is 
similar or identical to the expressly authorized *spend-down' of 
excess income"); Kempson. 397 S.E.2d at 317 (court stops short of 
holding "resource spend down" discretionary, stating that, 
although "S 1396a(a)(17)(D) only mentions income in instructing 
states to provide flexibility in their program application 
standards, we note that S 1396(a)(17)(C) instructs that a state's 
plan must *provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income 
or resources'"). 
C. Utah's Medicaid Program 
Since Utah may implement f,resource spend down" at its 
discretion, we must determine whether the Utah Medicaid plan has, 
in fact, adopted "resource spend down11 in determining Medicaid 
eligibility. Utah courts have never addressed Medicaid "spend 
down" issues. 
Utah chose to participate in the Medicaid program with the 
adoption of the Medical Assistance Act in 1981. *2 Utah has 
complied with federal requirements by creating a state plan13, 
which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, and designating the DHCF as the agency responsible for 
Medicaid administration.14 Utah's statutes describe the DHCF's 
responsibilities, in pertinent part, as follows: 
[T]he division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of , 
this chapter in an efficient, economical 
manner. The division shall establish, on a 
statewide basis, a program to safeguard 
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of 
Medicaid services, excessive payments, and 
unnecessary or inappropriate hospital 
admissions or lengths of stay. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989). 
12. See Utah Code Ann. SS 26-18-1 to -11 (1989 and Supp. 1991). 
13. See Utah Code Admin. P. RR455-1 to -48 (1991). Utah has 
elected to provide assistance to the "medically needy." See Utah 
Code Admin. P. R455-1-17 and R455-1-20 (1991). Assets Utah has 
designated as exempt from Medicaid eligibility determination, 
including the burial fund discussed earlier, are listed at Utah 
Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991). 
14. "[T]he Division of Health Care Financing . • . shall be 
responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the 
Medicaid program . . . in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and applicable federal law." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 
(1989)(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. S 26-18-3(1) 
(Supp. 1991)("The department shall be the single state agency 
responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in 
connection with the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act.")(emphasis added). 
(2) The department shall develop implementing 
policy in conformity with this chapter, the 
requirements of Title XIX. and applicable 
federal regulations. 
Utah Code Ann. S 26-18-3 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added). 
The department may develop standards and 
administer policies relating to eligibility 
under the Medicaid program. 
Utah Code Ann. S 26-18-4(1) (1989). 
Allen points to no Medicaid statute, regulation, or rule 
indicating that the Utah legislature has adopted "resource spend 
down" in determining Medicaid eligibility. Rather, Allen posits 
a more delicate argument which goes beyond literal statutory 
language. Specifically, Allen contends that Utah will not be 
following the federal requirement to use "reasonable standards•• 
in determining Medicaid eligibility unless it applies "resource 
spend down." 
Furthermore, Allen observes that Utah's Medicaid plan 
designates certain assets as exempt in determining eligibility 
for the "medically needy."15 Allen, thus, argues that Utah has 
tacitly adopted a policy of allowing "medically needy" Medicaid 
applicants to maintain a level of income and resources for the 
necessities of life while still qualifying for Medicaid. 
In support of these claims, Allen cites cases from other 
jurisdictions which, he argues, require "resource spend down" 
because, like Utah, they exempt certain assets from Medicaid 
eligibility determination. We read these cases differently. 
Courts in these jurisdictions have found a state mandate for 
"resource spend down" based on a specific legislative directive 
within their Medicaid plans, not just on the practice of allowing 
exemptions. 
In Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare. 394 Mass. 466, 
476 N.E.2d 572 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts closely examined both federal and its own state 
Medicaid laws to determine if "resource spend down" was mandated 
or simply permitted. The court, first, determined that, although 
the federal statutes did not require "resource spend down," it 
was a reasonable method of calculating resources and "consistent 
with the goals of Title XIX." I£., 476 N.E.2d at 578. 
Therefore, the court concluded that it "must determine 
15. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991). 
independently whether the Legislature intended to require the use 
of a resource spend down." Id. at 579. The court found a 
statute "explicitly applfying] a resource spend down/1 id. n.9, 
as evidence of "the legislature's determination to ensure an 
individual's retention of a certain level of resources." Id. at 
579. The court, thus, held that the Massachusetts Medicaid plan 
required "resource spend down." 
The Supreme Court of Illinois performed an analysis similar 
to that of the Haley court in Hession v. Illinois Department of 
Public Aid. 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989). After 
concluding that the federal Medicaid statutes permit, but do not 
require, "resource spend down," the court turned its attention to 
the Illinois Medicaid plan. The court recognized that the plan 
included a provision whereby $1,500 in assets is exempt from 
Medicaid eligibility determination. However, the court, relying 
upon a specific Illinois statute, also stated: "In establishing 
an assistance program for these individuals, the legislature has 
noted that it is of special importance that their incentives for 
continued independence be maintained and that their limited 
resources be preserved." Id., 544 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 111. 
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 5-1). Based on this clear 
manifestation of legislative intent, the court held that the 
Illinois Medicaid plan required "resource spend down." 
Utah does not have such a saving, "resource spend down" 
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of policy 
expressing a desire to preserve the resources of potential 
beneficiaries.16 Utah's statutes, particularly those outlining 
16. In fact, one commentator states: 
It is not only conceivable, but a fact that 
some unprepared applicants' assets are 
reduced beyond the poverty level to 
bankruptcy because medical bills in that 
month exceed those resources which the 
applicant cannot preserve under the Utah 
Exemptions Act. It [is] to the applicant's 
advantage to put forth any plausible argument 
that a particular value should be counted as 
income rather than asset, if the reverse 
would result in excess assets. Excess assets 
mean a denial of Medicaid eligibility; excess 
income means that the applicant will be 
required to shoulder more of [his or] her 
health care costs for that month. 
Ken Bresin, Utah's Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility 
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp. L. 1, 9 (1988) 
(emphasis added)(footnote omitted). 
the DHCF's authority17, seem to evince a legislative concern for 
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid program# not the 
preservation of applicants' assets. Jurisdictions requiring 
"resource spend down,11 on the contrary, appear concerned about 
preserving the limited assets of Medicaid applicants. 
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot say it was 
unreasonable for the DHCF to choose not to adopt "resource spend 
down11 in an otherwise completely optional state benefit plan. 
The expressed legislative concern is for economy and efficiency 
in implementing a Medicaid program, and we cannot see how this 
line-drawing offends the legislative delegation of power. 
Utah's statutory scheme is more similar to that of Maine, 
recently reviewed in Harriman v. Commissioner. 595 A.2d 1053 (Me. 
1991). In Harriman. the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
recognized that its state plan does not include "resource spend 
down." "If the assets of applicants exceed the specified dollar 
limit, they are ineligible for assistance under the medically 
needy program, regardless of the amount of their medical 
expenses." Id. at 1056. Noting that "[t]he overall effect was 
to restrict as much as possible the number of eligible Medicaid 
recipients," the court stated: "For whatever reason—whether to 
achieve cost containment or to comply only with the federal 
mandate or through simple oversight—the legislature stopped 
short of enacting an asset spend-down." !£. at 1057 (footnote 
omitted). 
We, therefore, conclude there is nothing in the Utah 
Medicaid plan or its regulations that requires the utilization of 
"resource spend down."u Allen had $3,029.86 in his savings 
17. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) quoted above. 
18. We agree with most courts which have considered the issue 
and believe the adoption of "resource spend down" is good public 
policy. See e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 (a state resource spend-
down provision furthers the general purpose of the Medicaid 
program); Harriman, 1990 WL 284515 ("Clearly, if the goal of 
Medicaid is to assist individuals who are medically needy— 
defined as having insufficient income or resources to meet the 
cost of necessary medical services—the sensible solution is the 
spend-down rule."); Hession, 516 N.E.2d at 823 (a state's 
adoption of resource spend down "would be in conformity with the 
purpose and spirit of the Act"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 318 ("Our 
review of the case law reveals a pattern where Medicaid 
applicants are blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply 
because it is so illogical. Applicants who otherwise qualify are 
(continued...) 
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account at the time he applied for Medicaid. The DHCF, thus, 
correctly determined he was ineligible for Medicaid benefits as 
Utah has not adopted a "resource spend down" system. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in 
part): 
I concur with part I of the main opinion and dissent from 
part II. 
Whether a "medically needy" applicant may have been eligible 
for Medicaid by spending down his or her assets is a policy 
decision delegated in Utah to DHCF by Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) 
(1989). We review for reasonableness an agency's policy based on 
a legislative grant of discretion to interpret a statute. See 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 
581 (Utah 1991).' 
18.(...continued) 
denied coverage because they have several hundred dollars above 
the reserve asset limit while at the same time they are liable 
for tens of thousands of dollars worth of medical bills."). 
Nevertheless, a determination of the eligibility criteria 
for Medicaid benefits is not one for the courts to make. 
1. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989) as an expression of intent to limit 
coverage. The Legislature's concern for economy and efficiency 
in the administration of the program simply does not have any 
logical relationship to the intended coverage of the program. 
910287-CA n 
I do not believe the policy adopted by DHCF is reasonable 
since eligibility is determined by when the medically needy 
applicant applies for benefits. Under DHCF's policy, the 
applicant who is savvy enough to spend down his or her assets 
before applying for medicaid would be eligible, while the 
applicant who applies for benefits before spending down is not 
eligible. Because that agency policy is not reasonable, I would 
allow Allen to spend down his assets before his eligibility is 
determined. 
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
7 4 SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1965 
Federnl medical assistance percentage to 105 percent of the Federal 
*hare of medical expenditures for 1965 will obviate certain inequities 
in the \jirious formulas and will enable a few States which might not 
otherwise do so to receive some additional Federal funds as an in-
centive for an improved program. 
Provisions relating to the availability of Federal sharing in the cost 
of medical assistance for persons C>5 years of age or older who are 
patients in mental or tuberculosis hospitals specify that the States will 
receive additional Federal funds only to the extent that a showing is 
made to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the additional funds 
being received are being used to extend and improve the mental health 
program of the States. Comparable provisions appear in title II , part 
l\ of the bill, and are explained more fully in that part of this report 
relntingtotitle II. 
The provisions of title IV, section 405 of the bill, described else-
where in this report are designed to assure that the additional Federal 
funds which are to accrue to the States under the operation of the 
formula described above, shall l>e used directly in the public assistance 
program and may not be withdrawn from the program by the States. 
The bill sets forth provisions comparable to those which are in other 
of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act describing 
the procedure by which the State submits its estimates of the funds it 
will need and receives payments under its approved plan, and the 
procedures to be followed in the event it should become necessary to 
question the continued receipt of Federal funds under the new title. 
There is also a new provision limiting payments made under 
the new title toAStates making a satisfactory showing of efForts 
toward broadening the scope of care ami services made available under 
the plan. This showing must be such that the Secretary is reason-
ably convinced the program of medical assistance will have such 
liberalized eligibility requirements and comprehensive care and serv-
ices, including needed social services to achieve independence or setf-
care that by July 1, 1075, assistance and services needed will be avail-
able to substantially all individuals who meet the State's eligibility 
standards with respect to income and resources. This provision wn« 
included in order to encourage the continued development in the States 
of a broadened and more liberalized medical assistance program so 
that all persons who meet the State's test of need, whose own resources, 
and the resources available to them under other programs for medical 
care, including those established for Federal matching under this bill, 
are insufficient, will receive the medical care which they need by 1075. 
(h ) M isrcHi iwovx pror h icm M 
Title X I X would under the provisions'^ ynur rnnmnlhM* bill Iteconif 
effective January 1, 10(U>. No payments may be made to a State under 
title I, IV, X, X I V , or X V I with respect to aid or assistance in the 
form of medical or other types of remedial care for any period for 
which such State receives payment under title X I X or for any |>eriod 
after June W), 10C>7. Thus, under the provisions of your committee bill, 
a State is permitted to implement title X I X at any time it wishes 
commencing January 1, 19C>f>, but must do so by July 1, 1007, if it 
wishes to receive Federal participation in vendor payments for medi-
cal care. When a title X I X plan has gone into ri\vv\ pursuant to the 
bill, all vendor medical payments made on or after the effective date 
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(nnd administrative costs on or after the effective date, which are 
related to vendor medical payments) will IM» accounted for under title 
X I X , nnd not under the of her titles. 
The hill also makes technical nnd conforming amendments. 
(/) Cost of msdical a^nistance 
As the accompanying table shows, if all States took full advantage 
of provisions of the proposed title X I X , the additional Federal par-
ticipation would amount to $238 million. However, because all States 
cannot he expected to act immediately to establish programs under the 
new title ana because of provisions in the bill which permit States to 
receive the additional funds only to the extent that they increase their 
total expenditures, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
estimates that additional Federal costs in the first year of operation 
will not exceed $200 million. Since the new title woidd be effective 
only for the last (» months of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1060, ex-
pendituies in that fiscal year are not expected to exceed $100 million. 
Public a**i*tancc: Increased Federal fund8 available for medical payment* 
under title XIX x 
fin thousands of dollar*) 
Alabama 
*!••*•.;;; 
**1«ona_. 
Arkansai" 
CaWurnla 
Coiormdo.: 
Connecticut £*•*»*- — 
{ £ * * * of Columbia. 
0«nri« "; 
Havall. 
Mabo 
Missouri 
M o n t a n a . . 
Nebraska . 
Nevada 
Now Hampshire 
New 'entry 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina." 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma. . 
Oregon 
r-onnayvlanla" ' " 
Rhode Inland 
South Carolina " 
Bouth Dakota """ 
Tennessee 
Texas. 
Utah_._.*\~~ 
Vermont 
Virginia. "" 
Washington. . . ' 
w
r fs t Virginia... ~ 
Wisconsin.. 
Wyoming ~.lll~_ 
1
 ••**!on expenditures for vendor medical payment* from State and loeal funds for all programs combined 
> January 1064. 1/ Htate and local expenditures were reduced, the Federal expenditure would l>e cor 
napnfidlngl) lower, while Increases In Alafe and locul exi»endltures would also result In Increases in the 
H. CHILD HEALTH AMENDMENTS 
1. S U M M A R Y O F C O M M I T T E E A C T I O N 
Your committee he lie yes that the proposals embodied in part 1, title 
IIof its bill will help to improve the health care of many low-income jrwehool and school a^e children and youth. 
Your committee's hi 11 won hi— 
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under the age of 21—whether or not they are attending school 
or taking a program of vocational training—who would other-
wise he within the scope of eligibility of a dependent child as 
defined under title IV of the Social Security Act. This provision was 
included in order to provide assurance that children under the age 
of 21 will have their medical needs met if they are either a member 
of a family receiving a money payment under title IV of the Social 
Security Act or a member of a family which has the need and other 
characteristics described under title IV. 
The Secretary woidd be prohibited from approving any plan which 
imposed a residence or citizenship requirement that ^oes beyond those 
now in title I and title X V I as they relate to the medical assistance for 
the aged program. In addition, the Secretary is directed not to ap-
prove any State plan for medical assistance if he linds that the ap-
proval and operation of the plan will result in a reduction in the level 
of aid or assistance provided for eligible individuals under title 1, IV, 
X , X I V , or X V I . An exception is provided allowing States to reduce 
such aid to the extent that assistance now provided under titles I, IV , 
I X , X I V , and X V I is to be provided under title X I X . The reason 
your committee recommends the inclusion of this provision is to make 
certain that States do not divert funds from the provision of basic 
maintenance to the provision of medical care. If the Secretary should 
find that his approval of a title X I X plan would result in a reduction 
of aid or assistance for persons receiving basic maintenance under the 
public assistance titles of the Social Security Act (except as specified 
alnwe) he may not approve such a plan under title X I X . Your com-
mittee recognizes the need and urgency for States to maintain, if not 
improve, the level of basic maintenance provided for needy people 
under the public assistance programs. The provision is intended to 
prevent any unwarranted diversion of funds from basic maintenance 
to medical cure. 
((/) Financing of medical axnixtaiice 
Your committee bill provides for payments under title X I X , begin-
ning with the quarter commencing January 1, 19(>f>. States with ap-
proved plans would receive an amount equal to the Federal medical as-
sistance percentage of the total amount expended during a quarter as 
medical assistance under the State plan. This percentage is described 
below. The amount expended as medical assistance for purposes of 
Federal matching include expenditures for premiums under part B 
of title X V I I I for individuals who are recipients of money payments 
under one of the Federal-State public assistance programs. This 
may include payment of premiums for those individuals covered under 
agreements between the State and the Secretary, and also for other 
money pavment recipients who are eligible under part B of title 
X V I I I . In addition, expenditures for other insurance premiums for 
medical or any other type of remedial care or the cost thereof are 
malehable as medical assistance. (The definitions of assistance in the 
public assistance titles of the Social Security Act would also be 
amended to include similar provisions.) 
In addition, the States are to receive 75 percent of so much of 
the sums expended during the quarter as found necessary by the Secre-
tary for the proper and efficient administration of the State plan as are 
attributable to the compensation of skilled professional medical person-
SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1065 
73 
nel and staff directly supporting such personnel of the State agency or 
the local agency administering the plan in the political subdiv ision. 
This provision was included in order to provide adequate Federal 
financial support for the stalling of the Slate and local public welfare 
departments by such skilled professional medical personnel and si nil 
directly supporting such personnel as may be necessary. Such statf 
will include physicians, medical administrators, medical social work 
personnel, and other specialized personnel necessary to assure an ade-
quate number of persons to do a quality job as well us the clerical statf, 
directly associated with the professional statf, and the necessary travel 
and other closely related expenditures. It is very likely that some peo-
ple in need of medical assistance will need related social services in 
order to receive the full benefits of the program. Under the 196^ pub-
lic welfare amendments, States may receive 75 percent Federal sharing 
in the cost of services provided to persons receiving aid under titles I, 
IV, X, X I V , and X V I to former recipients of assistance under these 
titles and persons likely to become recipients of aid under these titles. 
Thus adequate provisions are already available to help the States fi-
nance the provision of social services to those receiving medical assist-
ance or the cost of training stuff to provide such services and no such 
provision is included in the new title. 
In addition, the States ane to receive one-half of all other expendi-
tures found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and effi-
cient, administ rat ion of the State plan. 
The Federal medical assistance percentage is determined in accord-
ance with a formula described in the bill. It provides that a State 
whose per capita income is equal to the national average per capita 
income shall receive 55 percent Federal matching. States whose per 
capita income is 1H»IOW the national average shall receive correspond-
ingly higher proportions of Federal funds up to a maximum of 83 
percent. States whose per capita income is above the national average 
shall receive correspondingly lower percentages but not less than 50 
percent. The medical assistance percentages for Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, and Guam shall be 55 percent. The method of de-
termining the Federal medical assistance percentage and the frequency 
of its determination and promulgation are (after the initial promulga-
tion for the period January 1, 19<>(>, to June 30,19(57) already specified 
in the law. 
There is a special provision for adjustment of the Federal medical 
assistance percentage for any State which might not otherwise receive 
full advantage from the title X I X formula. It is provided that 
during the period from January 1, 1000, through June 30, 1909, the 
Federal medical assistance percentage under title X I X for any State 
ahull not be less than 105 percent of the Federal share of medical 
cinenditures by the State during fiscal year 1905. The computation 
iamade by determining the amount of Federal payments made to each 
State for fiscal year 1905 under all of the public assistance titles, which 
would not have been payable except for ine making of vendor medical 
payments. This amount of Federal payments is compared with the 
Mai amount of vendor medical expenditures under the public 
•awstance plans (whether below or above the matching ceilings under 
tfea Federal statutory formulas) to give the Federal share of medical 
expenditures by the State during fiscal year 1965. The raising of the 
t M M 
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mittee bill, has l>ecn broadened so that snch an adjustment or recovery 
would lie made only at a lime when there is no surviving child who is 
under the age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
(e) Scope <ind dcfinif wn of medical xcwires 
"Medical assistance'1 is defined under the bill to mean payment of 
all or part of the care and services for individuals who would if 
needy, l>e dependent under title IV, except for section 400(a) (2 ) , and 
are under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 400 
(b) ( I ) w itli whom the child is living, or who are 05 years of age and 
older, blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income 
and resources are insuflirient to meet all their medical care costs. 
The bill, as do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in 
the cost of medical care provided up to *\ months before the month 
in which the individual makes application for assistance. Thus, the 
scope of the program includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and 
dependent children as defined in State plans, but also children under 
the age of 21 (and their caretaker relatives) who come within the scope 
of title IV, except for need and age, even though they may not be 
defined as eligible under a particular State plan. 
Your committee bill contains a list of services, the first, (\ve of which 
the States are required to include in their plans, if they elect to im-
plement title X I X , and the remainder of winch are optional with the 
States. The required services are: 
Inpatient hospital services. 
Outpatient hospital services 
Other laboratory and X-ray servicer*. 
Skilled nursing home servicers. 
Physicians' services, whether furnished in the office, the pa-
tient's home, a hospital, or a skilled nursing home or elsewhere. 
In the opinion of your committee, these are the most essential items 
of service which should be included as rt. minimum if the medical assist-
ance program is to be of significant help to the individual. These min-
imum items of service are to become effective July 1, 1907; until then, 
the State plan must include—as now provided in titles I and X V I — 
for some institutional and some noninstitutional services. 
Other items of medical service which the States may, if they wish 
include in their plans are: 
Medical care, or any other type of remedial care recognized 
under State law, furnished bv licensed practitioners within the 
scope of their pract ice as defined by State law. 
Home health care services. 
Clinic service. 
Private dut v nursing service. 
Dental service. 
Physical therapy and related services. 
Prescribed drugs, dentures, prosthetic devices, and eyeglasses 
prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of the eye or by an 
optometrist, whichever the individual may select. 
Other diagnostic, screening, preventive, and rehabilitative 
services. 
Any other medical care, and any other ty|>e of remedial care 
recognized under State law, specified by the Secretary. 
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The States must pay the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services 
for the number of days of care provided under the plan. 
Among the items of medical services which the States may include 
is medical care, or any other type of remedial care recognized under 
State law, furnished by licensed practitioners within the scope of 
their practice as defined by State law. Under this provision, a State 
may if it wishes, include medical and remedial services provided by 
osteopaths, chiropractors, optometrists and podiatrists, and Christian 
Science practitioners, if such practitioners and services are licensed 
by the State. 
If a State chooses to provide eyeglasses as a service under the plan, 
your committee believes that the individual recipient should be free 
to select either a physician skilled in diseases of the eye or an opto-
metristto provide these glasses. Many small communities do not have 
qualified ophthalmologists but do have optometrists who are com-
petent to provide, f}t^ or change eyeglasses. 
In addition to the items specifically listed, the Secretary is author-
ized to define any other medical care or any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law which he believes might be provided by the 
States and in which the Federal Government will participate 
financially. 
The State plan may not include any individual who is an inmate of 
a public institution, except as a patient in a medical institution; nor 
may it include any individual under the ace of 05 who is a patient 
in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases. 
Under title X I X , it will l>e possible for States to give medical as-
sistance to persons 05 years of age and older who are in mental and 
tuberculosis institutions and to otherwise eligible persons of any age 
with a diagnosis of psychosis or tuberculosis and who are receiving 
care in other medical institutions. Under the bill, if the plan includes 
medical assistance for patients in institutions for mental diseases or 
tuberculosis, various requirements are specified for inclusion in the 
State plan with respect to these individuals and various other fiscal 
and other provisions are included. These are identical with those in-
cluded in title II, part 3 of the bill and are explained elsewhere in 
this report. 
Medical assistance provided under the bill may include payment for 
care and services provided at any time within the month in which an 
individual becomes eligible or ineligible for assistance, e.g., by attain-
ing a specified age. This avoids the administrative inconvenience of 
having to segregate bills by the day of the month on which care or serv-
ices were provided and is consistent with the monthly pattern of bene-
fits under the other public assistance titles. 
(f) Other conditions for plan ap/rro val 
Title X I X requires that the Secretary approve any plan which ful-
fills the plan requirements specified and described above and which 
«loes not contain certain other conditions. Under these provisions, a 
Shite plan may not include an age requirement of more than 05 years. 
Effective Julv 1, 1!)07, States mav not. under the provisions of 
your committee bill, exclude any individual who has not attained 
the age of 21 and is, or would, except for the provisions of 
Hection 400(a)(2) be a dependent child under title IV. Thus, 
States will include within the scope of their plan all children 
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that income may be set aside for the future needs of the children. 
Other pertinent provisions for the disregard of income are found in 
the Kconomic Opportunity Act and the Food Stamp Act of 11H>4. 
Your committee has heard of hardships on certain individuals 
by requiring them to provide support -and to pay for the medical care 
needed by relatives. Youv committee believes it is proper to expect 
spouses to support each other and parents to be held accountable for 
the support or their minor children and their blind or permanently 
and totally disabled children even though 421 years of age or older. 
Such requirements for support may reasonably include the payment 
by such relat ive, if able, for medical care, Beyond such degree of rela-
tionship, however, requirements imposed are often destructive and 
harmful to the relationships among members of the family group. 
Thus, States may not include in their plans provisions for requiring 
contributions from relatives other than a spouse or the parent of a 
minor child or children over 21 who are blind or permanently and 
totally disabled. Any contributions actually made by relatives or 
friends, or from other sources will l>e taken into account by the State 
in determining whether the individual applying for medical assistance 
is, in fact, in need of such assistance. 
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the 
weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. 
lTnder the current provisions of Federal law, some States have en-
acted programs which contain a cutoff point on income which deter-
mines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual 
w i111 an income just under the specified limit may qualify for all of 
the aid provided under the State plan. Individuals, however, whose 
income exceeds the limitation adopted bv the State are found ineligible 
for the medical assistance provided under the State plan even though 
the excess of the individual's income may be small when compared 
with the cost of the medical care needed. In order that all State? 
shall be flexible in the consideration of an individual's income, your 
commit tee bill requires that the States standards for determining eligi-
bility for and extent of medical assistance shall take into account, ex-
cept (o the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the cost—whether in the 
form of insurance'premiums or otherwise—incurred for medical care 
or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law. Thus, 
before an individual is found ineligible for all or part of the cost of his 
medical needs, the State must be sure that the income of the individual 
has been measured in terms of both the State's allowance for basic 
maintenance needs and the cost of the medical care he requires. 
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the in-
dividual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that 
amount. In no event, however, with respect to either this provision 
or that described below with reference to the use of deductibles for 
certain items of medical service, may a State require the use of income 
or resources which would bring the individual Ixdow the test of eli-
gibility under the State plan. If the test of eligibilitv should be 
$2,000 a year, an individual with income in excess of that amount 
shall not l>e required to use his income to the extent he has remaining 
less than $2,000. This action would reduce the individual below the 
level determined by the State as necessary for his maintenance. 
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or 
limit the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similiar charge, 
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nor of any enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan. 
No deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with 
respect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This 
provision is related to another provision in the bill which requires 
States to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital services provided 
under the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that 
the hospital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full 
under the provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered 
and that States may not expect or require the individual to use his 
income or resources (except such income as exceeds the State's main-
tenance level) toward that bill. Tl»*» reasonable cost of inpatient 
hospital j-ervices shall be determined in accordance with standards 
approved by the Secretary and included in the State plan. 
JFor any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, 
a charge of any kind may l>e imposed only if the State so chooses, and 
the charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his 
income and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any 
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to 
inpatient hospital services. The Secretary is given authority to issue 
standards under this provision^ which it is expected will protect the 
income and resources an individual has which are necessary for his 
nonmedical needs. 
The hospital insurance Iwmefit program included under other pro-
visions of the bill provides for a deductible which must be paid in 
connection with the individual's claim for hospitalization l>enefits. 
Your committee is concerned that hospitalization be readily available 
to needy iwrsons and that the necessity of their paying deductibles 
shall not be a hardship on them or a factor which may prevent their 
receiving the hospitalization they need. For this reason, your com-
mittee's bill provides that the States make provisions, for individuals 
C5 years or older, of the cost of any deduct b*e imposed with respect 
to individuals under the program established by the hospital insur-
ance provisions of the bill. 
A State medical assistance plan may provide for the payment in 
full of any deductibles or cost sharing under the insurance program 
established by pail B of title X V I I I . In the event, however, the 
State plan provides for the individual to assume a portion of such 
costs, such portion shall be determined on a basis reasonably related 
to the individual's income or income and resources and in conformity 
with standards issued by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized 
to issue standards—under this provision which, it is expected, will 
protect the income and resources of the individual needed for his 
maintenance—to guide the States. Such standards shall protect the 
income and lvsouives of the individual needed for his maintenance and 
provide assurance that the responsibility placed on individuals to 
share in the cost shall not bean undue burden on them. 
Titles J and X V I authorizing the medical assistance for the aged 
program now provide that the States may not impose a lien against 
the property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical 
assistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning 
incorrect payments, and prohibits adjustment or recovery for amounts 
correctly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death 
and that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under your com-
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uals. In such ca<=c, the portion of the title XTX plnn administered or 
supervised hy each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan. 
Current provisions of law requiring States to nave an agency or 
agencies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for 
the types of institutions included under the State plan have l>een con-
tinued under the bill. Your committee, expects that these provisions 
will be used to bring about progressive improvement in the level of 
institutional care and services provided to recipients of medical as-
sistance. Standards of care in many medical institutions are not now 
at a satisfactory level and it is expected that current standards appli-
cable to medical institutions will l>e improved by the State's standard-
setting agency and that these standards will be enforced by the appro-
priate State body. 
Under provisions of your committee bill, the State plnn must include 
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care 
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and 
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of 
administration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision 
was included in order to provide some assurance that the States will 
not use unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which 
have the etTcet of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on 
eligibility for medical assistance or that the States will not administer 
the provisions for services in a way which adversely affects the avail-
ability or the quality of the care to be provided. Your committee 
expects that under this provision, the States will be eliminating unre-
warding and unproductive policies and methods of investigation and 
that they will develop such procedures as will assure the most effective 
working relationships with medical facilities, practitioners, and sup-
pliers of care and service in order to encourage their full cooperation 
and participation in the provision of services under the State plan. 
(r) FligibiJity fo medical assistance 
Under your committee bill, a State plan to be approved must in-
clude provision for medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid 
or assistance under State plans approved under titles I, TV, X , XTV, 
and X VT. These people are the most needv in the country and it is ap-
propriate for med'cal care costs to be met, first, for these people. Thus, 
under the provisions of the bill, these people will have the first call 
upon the resources of the States to provide medical care. Tt is only 
if this group is provided for that States may include medical assistance 
to the loss needy than those who would l>e eligible for aid under the 
various other categories of public assistance. 
. Under vour committee bill, medical assistance made available to per-
sons receiving assistance under title I, IV, X , X I V , or X V I must not 
be less in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons 
receiving aid under any other of tho*e titles. In other words, the 
amount, duration, and scope of medical assistance made available 
must be the same for all such persons. This will assure comparable 
treatment for all of the needy aided under the federally aided cate-
gories of assistance and will eliminate some of the unevenness which 
has been apparent in the treatment of the medical needs of various 
groups of the needy. 
The bill provides furthermore that as States extend their programs 
to include assistance for persons who come within the various cate-
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gories of assistance except that their income and resources are s 
cienttomeet their needs for maintenance, the medical assistance gi 
such individuals shall not be greater in amount, duration, or S( 
than that made available for persons who are recipients of money ] 
ments. This was included in order to make sure that the most no 
in a State receive no less comprehensive care than those who are 
as needy. 
Under the bill, if a State, extends the program to those persons 
receiving assistance under titles I, IV, X , X I V , and X V I , the de 
mination of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is compari 
as among th«* people who, except for their income and resources, wc 
be recipients of money for maintenance under the other public as? 
ance programs. Thus, the income and resources limitation for 
aged must bo comparable to that set for the disabled and blind 
must also have a comparability for that set for families with child 
who, excent for their income and resources, would be eligible 
AFDC. The scope, amount, and duration of medical assistance av 
able to each of these groups must be equal. 
(d) Determ ination of need for medical assistance 
Your committee bill would make more specific a provision now 
the law that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid tin 
the plan, States must use reasonable standards consistent with 
objectives of the titles. Although States mav set a limitation on 
come and resources which indi\ iduals may hold and be eligible for r 
they must do so by maintaining a comparability among the vari< 
categorical groups of needy people. Whatever level of finaw 
eligibility the State determines to be that which is applicable for 
eligibility of the needy <aged, for example, shall be comparable to tl 
which the State sets to determine the eligibility for the needy blind a 
disabled; and must also have a comparability to the standards u« 
fo determine the eligibility of those who are to receive medical assj 
nnce as needy children and the parents or other relatives oaring 
them. 
Another provision is included that requires States to take into i 
count only such income and resources a,s (determined in accordar 
with standards prescribed by the Secretary) are actuallv availal 
to the applicant or recipient and as would not be disregarded (or 
aside for future needs) in determining the eligibility for and t 
amount of the aid or assistance in the form of money pavments i 
any such applicant or recipient under the title of the Social Secnr 
Act most appropriately applicable to him. Tncome and resources tak 
into icronnt, furthermore, must be reasonablv evaluated by the Stat 
These provisions are designed so that the States will not assume t 
availability of income which mav not, in fact, be available or ov< 
evaluate income and resources which are available Example^ of i 
come assumed include support orders from absent fathers, which ha 
not been paid or contributions from relatives which are not in reali 
received by the needy individual. The provisions also are designed 
assure that whatever is applicable under titles T, IV, X, X I V , ai 
XVI for the disregarding of income or for set ting aside of income si if 
ateo he applicable in evaluating the income of the individual who 
applying for medical assistance under title X I X . Titles T and X no 
provide for the disregarding of certain income and title IV provid 
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have enough income for their basic maintenance but not enough for 
medical rare costs. This program has grown to the point where 40 
States and 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and 227,000 aged 
were aided in December 19<>4. Furthermore, medical care as a part of 
the cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the 
years until, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments 
for some items of medical care for at least some of the needy. 
Your committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under 
which States operate their medical assistance programs so as to make 
medical services for the needy more generally available. T o accom-
plish this objective, your committee bill would establish, effective 
January 1, 19G6, a new title in the Social Security Act—"Title X I X : 
frrants to the States for Medical Assistance Programs." After an 
interim period ending June 30, 1967, all vendor payments for medical 
rare, including medical assistance for the aged, would be administered 
under the provisions of the new title. Dntil June 30,1067, States might 
continue operating under the vendor payment provisions of title 1 
(old-age assistance and medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid 
to families with dependent children), title X (aid to the blind), title 
X I V (aid to the permanently and totally disabled), and title X V I 
(the combined adult program), or if they wish, they might move as 
early as January 1, 1966, to the new title. Programs of vendor pay-
ments for medical care will continue, as now, to be optional with the 
States. 
(b) State plan requirements 
(I) Standard provisions 
The provisions in the proposed title X I X contain a number of re-
quirements for State plans which are either identical to the existing 
provisions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are: 
That a plan shall lie in effect in all political subdivisions of the 
State. 
That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing 
for any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted 
upon with reasonable promptness. 
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary 
mav from time to time require. 
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict, the use 
or disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients 
to purposes directly connected with the administration of the 
plan. 
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance 
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such 
assistance shall be furnished witn reasonable promptness. 
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall 
be an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the 
eye or by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select. 
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who 
are residents of the State but who are absent therefrom. 
(2) Additions to standard provision* 
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, 
your committee bill contains several other plan requirements which 
are either new or changed over provisions currently in the law. 
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The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the 
State equal to not less than 10 percent of the non-Federal share of the 
expenditures under the plan and that effective July 1, U>70, the financial 
participation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This 
provision was included to make certain.that the lack of availability of 
local funds for financing of any part of the program not affect the 
amount, scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration 
set by the State. Prior to the 1970 date, your committee will be w i 11— 
ing to consider other legislative alternatives to the provisions making 
the entire non-Federal share a responsibility of the State so long as 
these alternatives, in maintaining the concept of local participation, 
assure a consistent statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy. 
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance 
titles of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such 
methods of administration as are found by the Secretary to be neces-
sary for the proper and efficient operat ion of the plan, with the addit ion 
of the requirement that such methods must include provisions for 
utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration of 
the plan. It is important that State utilize a sufficient number of 
trained and qualified personnel in the administration of the program 
including both medical and other professional staff. 
Your committee bill provides that the State or local agency admin-
istering the State plan under title X I X shall be the same agency which 
is currently administering either title I (old-age assistance) or 
that part of title X V I (assistance for the aged, blind, ami the disabled, 
and medical assistance for the aged) relating to the aged. Where the 
program relating to the aged is State-supervised, the same State agency 
shall supervise the administration of title X I X . This provision was 
included because of the U(HH\ to have the same agency which is most 
familiar with the administration of assistance (including medical care) 
to various groups of needy or nearly needy people also administer the 
medical assistance program. This is an agency with long experience 
and skill in determination of eligibility. Responsibility can be ar-
ranged by a welfare agency for actual provision of medical care by or 
through a health agency under suitable contractual relationships as 
some States have done under the MA A program. 
Moreover, your committee recognizes that there are other Slate agen-
cies with responsibilities for the provision of medical care or for var-
ious types of rehabilitative services in the States. In order to make 
certain that there is no duplication of effort and that maximum utiliza-
tion will be made of the resources available from such other agencies, 
your committee bill provides that the State's plan must include provi-
sions for entering into cooperative arrangements with State agencies 
responsible for administering or supervising the administration of 
health services and vocational rehabilitation services in the States. 
Your committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1005, and 
on the date a State submits its title X I X plan, the State agency ad-
ministering or supervising the administration of the State plan for the 
blind under title X or title X V I of the Social Security Act is dliferent 
from the State agency administering or supervising* the administration 
of the plan relating to the aged under title I or title X V I , such blind 
agency may be designated to administer or supervise* the administra-
tion of the port ion of the title X I X plan which relates to blind individ-
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along with the matching Government contribution, have utilized 
data from the experience under the Federal Kmployees Health Benefits 
Act of 1959 for persons aged 65 and over, the experience under the 
Connecticut 05 program, and various information obtained by the Na-
tional Health Survey conducted on a periodic basis by the Public 
Health Service of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
The cost estimates have been made on a conservative basis—as 
seems essential in a newly established program of this typo for persons 
aged 65 and over, most of whom have not previously had such insur-
ance. It is believed that the $6 total per capita income of the system 
(from the premiums'of the individuals and the matching Government 
contributions) will be fully adequate to meet the costs of administra-
tion and the benefit payments incurred, as well as to build up a rela-
tively small contingency reserve. It is believed that there will be no 
need to draw upon the advance appropriation that is provided from 
general revenues. 
Two cost estimates have been presented in regard to the possible 
per capita cost. Under the low-cost estimate, the benefits and 
administrative expenses will, on an accrual basis, represent about 75 
percent of the contribution income, whereas under the high-cost 
estimate, the corresponding ratio will be almost 100 percent. 
In an individual voluntary-election program such as this, it is 
impossible to predict accurately in advance what proportion of those 
eligible to participate in the program will actually do so. Accordingly, 
the cost estimates have been presented on two bases—an assumed 80 
percent participation and an assumed 95 percent participation. Both 
of these estimates assume that virtually all State public assistance 
agencies will "buy in" for their old-age assistance recipients. 
(2) Short-range operatwnx of supplementary health insurance 
benefits trust jund 
Table D presents estimates of the operation of the supplementary 
health insurance benefits trust fund for the first 2 years of operation, 
1966 67. As indicated previously, four sets of estimates are given, 
under different assumptions as to low-cost and high-cost estimates 
and low and high participation. A significant balance in the trust 
fund develops in 1966, because of the lag involved in making benefit 
payments, since there are the factors of administrative processing and 
of the deductible that must be met first before any benefits are pay-
able. In this respect, it will be noted that the income from premium 
payments by individuals will go into the trust fund beginning in the 
early part of July 1966, and the matching Government contributions 
will go into the trust fund simultaneously. 
Under the low-cost estimates, the trust fund is estimated to have a 
balance of about $300 to $350 million at the end of 1966, and between 
$6(10 and $700 million at the end of 1967. On the other hand, under 
the high-cost estimates, the balance in the trust fund at the end of 
1966 will be between $200 and $250 million, and will remain at sub-
stantially this level during 19.67. 
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TABLE T).—Estimated progress of supplementary health insurance benefits trust fw 
(In millions] 
Calendar year 
10661 
I9J7 . . . . . 
1966» 
1967 
I96fli 
1967 
19661 
1007 
Contributions 
Partici-
pants 
$275 
560 
$.125 
66T> 
$275 
600 
$326 
665 
Govern-
ment 
Benefit 
payments 
Adminis-
trative ex-
penses 
Interest 
on fund 
Low cost estimate, 80-percent participation 
$275 
660 
$195 
765 
$65 
76 
$6 
15 
Low-cost estimate, 05-percent participation 
$325 
665 
$230 
905 
$80 
90 
$5 
20 
High-cost estimate, RO-percent participation 
$275 
660 
$260 
1,025 
$86 
95 
$5 
10 
High-cost estimate, 95-percent participation 
$325 
665 
$310 
1,220 
$100 $5 
no in 
Halanco 
fund at c 
of year 
$ 
i 
$. 
$'-
$2 
2 
• Contributions would be collected only during the last 6 months of 1966, and benefit payments won 
likewise lw» payable only during that period Administrative eipcnses shown Include both those for t 
full year 1966 and such ex|>en.ses as Incurred In 1965 
NOTE —Not included aliove Is the advance appropriation from general revenues that Is to provide a cc 
Ungency reserve during fiscal year 1966-67 (to be used only If needed and to be repayable). 
6. IMPROVEMENT A N P EXTENSION OF KERR-MILLS TROGRAM 
(a) Background 
The provision of medical rare for the needy has long been a responsi 
bility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent year? 
the Federal Government lias assisted the States and localities in carry 
ing this responsibility by participating in the cost of thecatv provider 
Under the original Social Security Act, it was possible for the State? 
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they coul 
buy the medical care they needed. Since 1DM), the Social Securit 
Act has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provide 
in behalf of the needy aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children-
the so-called vendor payments. This method of providing care ha 
proved popular with the suppliers of medical care, the agencies admin 
isteringtlie prograirift, and the recipients themselves. 
Several times since 11)50, the Congress has lilternlized the provision 
of law under which the States administer t he State-Federal program o 
medical assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment wa 
in 1{)(U) when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged progran 
was authorized. This legislation oilers generous Federal matching b 
enable the States to provide medical care in behalf of aged persons win 
ADDENDUM C 
FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION R810-304-431 
Per A, B, and D Medicaid, exclude cash payments 
loo federal, state, or local government programs if 
the purpose of the payment is so the client can pay for 
pedical or social services. This includes payments for 
national rehabilitation. Exclude these payments 
^]j for one calendar month following receipt. Do not 
gofuae this exemption with reimbursements for 
pedie&l or social services; money received as reim-
tanement must be counted as a resource the first 
aooth following receipt. 
1810404-419. When to Deem Assets. 
Spouses have a legal responsibility to financially 
lopport one another. Parents have a legal responsi-
bility to financially support their children until they 
tre emancipated*. Because of this legal responsibil-
*j, assets from a spouse or parent are counted as 
milable to the eligible spouse or child. This process 
» called deeming. Because the asset is available, in-
clude it in the countable assets. 
419.1 Non-Nursing Home Cases 
Deem only from spouse to spouse or parent to un-
aninripated child. Deem only among people who live 
together. 
419.12 F and C Cases 
Do not deem from a parent or spouse who gets SSI. 
419.2 Clients Who Are Residents of Medical Insti-
tutions 
Do not deem to a resident of a medical institution. 
However, there may be persons in medical institu-
tions who are not treated as medical institution cases. 
Itee cases will be set up using policy for clients who 
are not residents of medical institutions: deeming 
miy apply. Examples are: 
1. F or C Cases — Persons who are temporarily 
living apart from their parents or children are not 
considered residents of medical institutions. 
2. All Cases — Persons are not considered resi-
dents for the month they enter the medical institu-
tion 
419.3 All Cases 
Exemptions for deemed assets are applied based on 
the type of asset (home, burial funds, tribal funds, 
certain lump sum payments etc.), and the category of 
assistance to which it is being applied. Emancipated: 
A child is emancipated by: 
1. turning 18 years old, or 
2 getting married, or 
3. getting a court order which says that the child is 
emancipated. 
R810-304-421. Lump Sum Payments — All Cases. 
Remember that most lump sums count as income in 
the month they are received. Count as an asset any 
balance which remains the month alter receipt. All 
SSA and SSI lump sums are exempt for 6 months 
after receipt. 
421.1 Lump Sum Received on Sales Contract 
1. Exempt lump sum payments received on a sales 
contract for the sale of an exempt home if the money 
it committed to replacement of the property sold 
within thirty days and the purchase is completed 
within ninety days. 
a. If a period longer than ninety days is required to 
complete the actual purchase, the District Director 
aay grant an extension in writing, using Form 689, 
Micy Decision. 
2. If the property is not replaced within 90 days 
tod no extension has been granted, consider the total 
Payment received as an asset. 
421.2 Proceeds Other Than or In Addition to a 
Lump Sum 
1. Proceeds of a sales contract other than or in ad-
dition to a lump sum shall be exempt if applied to the 
purchase of replacement property. The same condi-
tions of time and commitment as for a lump sum ap-
ply (see Sec. 421.1). 
2. If proceeds from the contract are not to be used 
to replace property, consider the balance remaining 
on the sales contract as an asset. 
3. Availability (at any amount which would result 
in excess assets) is a factor. This means that if the 
balance remaining on a sales contract can be dis-
counted to an amount which (in conjunction with any 
other countable assets) exceeds the asset level, the 
client is ineligible. 
Example: 
Assume a single individual has no other countable 
assets, but has a balance remaining on a sales con-
tract of $5,000. We would ask a financial institution 
or other knowledgeable source if a market exists to 
assign the balance remaining to a buyer for the one-
person asset limit. If the market exists, then the bal-
ance remaining on the sales contract would make the 
client ineligible. 
421.3 Insurance Settlements for Destroyed Prop-
erty 
Exempt lump sum insurance payments for de-
stroyed property if the available money is used 
within ninety days to replace the destroyed property, 
and the destroyed property was exempt at the time of 
loss. 
1. The District Director may grant an extension 
beyond ninety days, using Form 689, Policy Decision. 
RS10-304-425. Income Producing Property. 
425.1 F And C Cases 
When a client owns property and has the legal 
right to sell it without interference, the property is 
available and we will count it in determining eligibil-
ity. 
425.2 A. B and D Cases 
1. Exempt income producing property when: 
a. The equity in the property is less than $6,000 
and 
b. The property produces a net annual return of at 
least 6 percent of the equity. 
Equity value more than $6,000 counts as an asset 
only if the 6 percent net annual return is met. If it is 
not, then the entire equity amount shall count. 
2. If the client has the legal right to sell his share 
of the property, and if such equity is includable as an 
asset, and this results in the asset level being ex-
ceeded, close the case or deny the application. 
3. The actual availability (whether a market exists 
to sell the property) is not a factor in counting the 
property as an asset. 
R810-304-431. Transfer of Excess Assets. 
431.1 F and C Medicaid 
Take no sanction on the transfer of any asset. 
431.2 A, B, and D Medicaid — Clients Who Are 
Not Residents of Medical Institutions 
Take no sanction on the transfer of any asset if the 
client is not a resident of a medical institution. 
431.3 A, B, and D Medicaid — Clients Who Are 
Residents of Medical Institutions 
431.31 Apply no sanction for the transfer of the 
following assets: 
1. If the property was transferred prior to July 1, 
1988 and the property was transferred more than 24 
months prior to the date of application. Also, apply no 
sanction for the transfer of an asset which would have 
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these types of contracts are merely promising these 
items when needed (a plot, a casket, a marker, etc.) 
and are considered to be a part of the contract or plan. 
They are not evaluated separately. They are consid-
ered for exemption under Section 411, (9). 
9. Burial/Funeral Fund — All Cases 
Allow a $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption for 
each eligible household member. Compute this burial 
or funeral fund exemption as follows: 
a. First, subtract the value of any irrevocable bur-
ial trust from the $1,500 burial or funeral fund ex-
emption. If the irrevocable burial trust is valued at 
$1,500 or more, it will reduce the burial or funeral 
fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go 
on to steps b. and c. The amount of the irrevocable 
burial trust which exceeds $1,500 is not counted as an 
asset. 
b. Second, for A, B and D categories only, reduce 
the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption by 
the total face value of any exempt whole life insur-
ance policies. If the face value of these policies ex-
ceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemp-
tion, it will reduce the burial or funeral fund exemp-
tion to zero. If that is the case, do not go on to step c. 
The amount of face value which exceeds the remain-
ing burial or funeral fund exemption level is not 
counted as an asset. This step does not apply to F and 
C categories as life insurance is already counted. 
c. If after subtracting the value of the irrevocable 
burial trusts and face value of exempt whole life in-
surance policies there is still a balance in the burial 
or funeral fund exemption, reduce the remaining ex-
emption level by the cash value of any burial con-
tract, funeral plan, and/or funds set aside for burial. 
d. In A, B, and D cases only, subtract the cash 
value of non-exempt life insurance policies. 
e. If these reductions result in an exemption 
greater than $1,500 then the difference is to be added 
to the other countable assets. 
(1) Any interest which is accrued on an exempt 
burial contract, funeral plan, or on funds set aside for 
burial are exempt from consideration as an asset or 
as income. 
Funds set aside for burial: funds which are sepa-
rately identified and not commingled with other 
funds. They must be clearly designated so that an 
outside observer can see that these funds are specifi-
cally for the client's burial expense. 
(2) If a person ever removes the principle or inter-
est from an exempt burial contract, funeral plan, 
funds set aside for burial, or a life insurance policy 
and uses the money for a purpose other than for their 
burial expenses, the amount withdrawn from the ac-
count must be counted as income. The amount re-
maining in the fund is still exempt. 
If a client has a previously unreported resource 
which he claims is to be used for burial: 
(a) and the resource is clearly designated as being 
for burial, evaluate it for exemption back to when it 
was either designated or intended for burial. How-
ever, the date cannot be before November 1,1982 and 
cannot be any earlier than 2 years prior to the date of 
application. 
(b) and if the case is A, B, or D case and the re-
source is not clearly designated as being for burial, it 
can be designated for burial retroactively back to the 
first day of the month the client intended to set it 
aside for burial. However, the date cannot be before 
November 1, 1982 and cannot be any earlier than 2 
years prior to the date of application. 
10. Land or Accounts Held in Trust — All Cases 
Exclude ownership of beneficial interest in any 
land or account which is held in trust by the United 
States, a state, or in a tribal account. 
11. Per Capita Tribal Payments 
ExJude all per capita payments or any asset pur-
chased with per capita payments made to a tribal 
member by the Secretary of the Interior or the tribe 
12. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act — All 
Cases 
Exclude shares received as payment under the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (Public Law 
92-203). 
13. Income Producing Property — A 3 , and D 
Cases 
Exclude income producing property from asset* 
when the individual's equity in the property does not 
exceed $6,000 and the property produces a net annual 
return of at least 6 percent of the equity. Count any 
equity value in excess of $6,000 only if the 6 percent 
net annual return* is met. If it is not then count the 
entire equity amount. 
Net annual return: The income produced after 
subtracting mortgage payments or other payment* 
necessary to generate income. 
14. Retroactive Social Security Benefits — All 
Cases 
Exempt lump sum retroactive benefits received 
from the Social Security Administration (SSA and 
SSI) for 6 months after the month of receipt. 
15. Student Benefits 
All Cases 
Do not count monies from certain sources to under-
graduate students as assets These sources include 
a. Educational loans, grants or scholarships that 
have funds guaranteed by the U.S Commissioner of 
Education, including. 
— Pell Grants (Formerly BEOG) 
— Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant 
(SEOG) 
— National Direct Student Loans (NDSL) 
— Guaranteed Student Loains 
— State Student Incentive Grants (SSIG) 
b. Payments to participants of a service learning 
program, such as College Work Study or University 
Year for Action (UYA). 
A, B, and D Cases 
Count any monies which remain after the school 
period covered from an educational grant, loan, or 
scholarship as an asset. 
16. Pension Funds — A, B and D Cases 
Do not count money held in a retirement fund un-
der a plan administered by an employer or union, an 
individual retirement account (IRA), or Keogh ac-
count owned by a spouse or parent ineligible for A, B, 
or D medical. 
a. Count as an asset any available money with-
drawn from the pension starting the month after it is 
withdrawn. 
17. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) — All 
Cases 
Do not count any asset, or the interest from the 
asset, which is held within the rules of the Uniform 
Gift to Minor's Act (UGMA). Count any money from 
the asset given to the child as unearned income 
Uniform Gift to Minors Act: An irrevocable gift of 
money or property to a child under the age of 21. The 
gift can be made to only one child, with only one 
custodian. The gift is verified on a specific form which 
includes a statement that the custodian holds the as-
set for the child under the Utah UGMA rules 
18. Cash Payments Given to Help Pay for Medical 
or Social Services. 
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When it appears that a trust has been established 
to allow the beneficiary to qualify for Medicaid, sub-
mit the trust document and all other pertinent infor-
Bition to the State APA Office for a decision on the 
availability of the trust. 
Restricted Access: Only the court or the trustee, 
vfeo is not the beneficiary, or the beneficiary's spouse 
or parent, can invade the principle of the trust. 
409.67 Trusts Set Up to Pay For Medical Expenses 
Belated to Organ Transplants 
Send a copy of all trust set up to pay expenses re-
lated to organ transplants to the State APA Office for 
a decision regarding the availability of the trust. 
409.68 When Availability is Not Clear 
When you cannot determine whether all or part of 
i trust is available, submit it and all other pertinent 
documents to the State APA Office for a decision. 
R810404-411. Exempt Assets. 
Allow the following exemptions for medical assis-
tance cases other than Indigent Medical cases. See 
Section 807 for exemptions specific to Indigent Medi-
cal cases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use 
the F or C policy. 
1. One Home and Lot — All Cases 
Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and 
lot owned or being purchased and occupied by the 
client. 
a. F and C Cases — The lot on which the home 
it&nds shall not exceed the average size of residential 
lot* in the community where it is. Count the equity 
nlue of property exceeding an average size lot. 
b. A, B and D Cases — Exempt the home and all 
contiguous property. 
Exempt a life estate in a home if the owner of the 
life estate continues to live in the home. 
2. One Home and Lot of a Person Who is A Resi-
dent of a Medical Institution — All Cases 
When a person who owns a home, or life estate in a 
borne, becomes a resident of a medical institution, the 
borne or life estate becomes countable unless: 
a The person's stay in the medical institution will 
be short term. A stay is short term if a doctor says 
that the client is likely to return home within 6 
months of admission. Anyone in a medical institution 
more than 6 months after admission is long term, or 
b. The person states that he intends to return 
borne. It does not matter whether the person actually 
returns home within 6 months. There is no time limit 
to this exemption. The statement of intent must be in 
writing from the client or his representative, or 
c. The person has a spouse, dependent child, or rel-
ative* who lives in the home. 
3. Water Rights — All Cases 
Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot. 
Relative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, 
tfepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, step-
mother, stepfather, half-sister, half-brother, niece, 
nephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sis-
ter, brother, stepbrother, or stepsister 
1 Household Goods and Personal Effects 
F and C Cases 
Exclude the contents of the home that are essential 
to daily living. However, individual items with an 
nlue over $1,000 must be counted against the asset 
limit. 
A, B, and D Cases 
Exclude household goods and personal effects only 
to the extent they do not exceed $2,000. 
*. In developing this $2,000 limit, if there are no 
fingle items with a value (as can be currently sold) of 
$500 or more, then do not consider the $2,000 exempt 
amount to be exceeded. 
b. If there are single items with a value of $500 or 
more, then consider all other household goods and 
personal effects to have a value of $1,000. Add the 
single item(s) of $500 or greater value to $1,000, and 
then count the amount in excess of $2,000 towards 
the household's asset level. 
5. Vehicles 
F and C Cases — Exclude the equity value up to 
$1,500 of one car or other motor vehicle used to pro-
vide transportation for the assistance unit. Count any 
equity value in excess of this amount towards the 
household's asset limitation. 
A, B, and D Cases — Exclude one vehicle, regard-
less of value if: 
a. It is necessary for employment; or 
b. It is used at least four times per calendar year 
for obtaining medical treatment; or 
c. It is modified for use by a handicapped person. 
d. It is needed due to climate, terrain, distance or 
other such factors to provide transportation for essen-
tial daily activities. 
If no vehicle is excludable for one of the above rea-
sons, one vehicle may be exempt if its fair market 
value does not exceed $4,500. If its fair market value 
exceeds $4,500, then count the amount in excess to-
wards the asset limit. 
Count the equity value of all other vehicles towards 
asset limits. 
6. Irrevocable Burial Trust — All Cases 
a. Exempt the value of an irrevocable burial trust 
fund such as a pre-arranged funeral plan. 
b. Additionally, only the value of an irrevocable 
burial trust is used to reduce the burial/funeral fund 
exemption (see Sec. 411, (9)). 
7. Life Insurance 
A, B, and D Cases 
a. Whole life insurance policies are exempt if the 
total face value of all such policies does not exceed 
$1,500 per individual. If their total face value exceeds 
$1500 for any individual, count the cash value of all 
that individual's policies against the asset limit. Up 
to $1,500 of the cash value can be exempt if it is used 
as a burial/funeral fund (See 411-9 below). Term in-
surance policies have no cash value, are not re-
sources, and are not used in any way in determining 
countable assets. 
b. Whole life insurance which is exempt must be 
deducted from the exemption level of burial/funeral 
funds (see Sec. 411, (9)). 
Note: The cash value shown on the insurance policy 
table includes some interest. Often the interest paid 
on the cash value is greater than that used to com-
pute the table. Therefore, the table may not show the 
true cash value. This is especially likely in cases of 
policies that have been held for a long time. When 
there is countable cash value that, combined with 
other assets, puts the assets close to the limit, you 
should obtain a current statement of the cash value. 
F and C Cases 
Count the cash value of life insurance policies. 
8. Burial Spaces — All Cases 
a. Exempt burial spaces and any items related to 
repositories used for the remains of the deceased, for 
any member of the client's immediate family. This 
includes caskets, concrete vaults, crypts, urns, grave 
markers, etc. Also, if a client owns a grave site, the 
value of which includes opening and closing, the 
value of these services is also excluded. 
b. A burial contract or funeral plan may include 
many of the items exempted in this section. However, 
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b. The likely cost of making the asset available 
exceeds its value. 
If 2a or 2b applies, explain this in the case log and 
do not count the asset. Otherwise, require the client 
to take all reasonable steps to make the asset avail-
able. The asset is exempt while these steps are being 
taken. 
For applicants, such steps must begin before the 
application is approved. For ongoing cases, such steps 
must begin before any more assistance is issued, pro-
vided 10 day notice can be given. If such steps are not 
taken, or if the client does not follow through with 
the process, close or deny the case. 
409.4 Transfer of Title 
1. Vehicles — including motor vehicles, trailers, 
etc. 
Unless you have reason to question ownership of a 
vehicle, accept the bill of sale or other legal document 
as proof of ownership. When questioning ownership, 
remember that until the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles issues a new certificate of registration and certif-
icate of ownership, the transfer of title is incomplete. 
If transfer is incomplete, legal ownership is re-
tained by the original owner and the vehicle is avail-
able to him alone, and not to the new owner. 
If transfer is complete, legal ownership is with the 
new owner. 
2. All Other Property with a Title Document. 
When the client states property has been sold, but 
the title document has not been transferred, contact 
the State APA Office to determine the availability of 
the property. Send all documents related to the prop-
erty and the transfer. Be sure to include any condi-
tions attached to the transfer. 
If the State APA Office determines that the asset is 
not available because title has not been transferred, 
follow the rules in Sec. 409.3. 
409.5 Divorce Decrees 
Review divorce decrees on a case-by-case basis. 
1. Before a divorce is final: 
The filing of a divorce petition does not change the 
ownership or availability of assets unless there is a 
court order specifically dealing with the assets. Un-
. less there is such a court order, base availability on 
the ownership prior to the filing of the divorce peti-
tion. 
If there is a question of an asset's availability after 
viewing the court order, contact the State APA Of-
fice. 
2. After a divorce is final: 
a. When there is no title document, a divorce de-
cree can transfer legal title of personal property. But 
be sure to check for conditions attached to the trans-
fer liens, conditions concerning remarriage, etc. 
These conditions may restrict the sale of the asset. If 
to, see Sec. 409.2-2. 
b. In cases of property where there is a title docu-
ment, be sure the title has been transferred. Again, 
be sure to check for conditions attached to the trans-
fer. If title has not been transferred, see Sec. 409.4. 
409.6 Trusts 
The rules which follow are guidelines to help you 
determine the availability of trust funds. Sometimes 
you will have to get more information or a legal opin-
ion about trust funds. This can occur even when you 
have complete documentation. In these cases, be sure 
to send a copy of the trust agreement to the State 
APA Office for a decision about the availability of the 
trust. 
409.61 Definitions 
1. Trust: A right of property held by one party for 
another. 
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%. Trustee: The person who holds the legal title to 
property for the benefit or use of another. 
3. Beneficiary: The person for whose benefit the 
trust is created. Although this person does not bold 
legal title, he does have an ownership interest 
The beneficiary can receive money from the trt» 
directly or through the trustee. 
409.62 Availability to the Trustee 
1. The entire trust is available as an asset if the 
client is the trustee and has the legal ability to 
a. Revoke the trust, and 
b. Use the money for his own benefit. 
2. The entire trust is available if: 
a. The trust was created by the client or his spouse, 
and 
b. The client or his spouse has the right to diseolr* 
the trust, and 
c. He can use the money for his own benefit 
3. In all other cases, the trust is not available to" 
the trustee. 
409.63 Availability to the Beneficiary — All Cases 
If the client is the beneficiary and access to the 
trust is not restricted, the full value of the trust is an 
available asset. If access is restricted, see 409.64 and 
409.65 below. 
409.64 Trusts Set Up for Purposes Other Than to 
Qualify for Medicaid — Created by the Client or His 
Spouse — All Cases 
1. With the exception of burial trusts, these rule* 
apply to all trusty including irrevocable trust*. 
2. Potential payments m the budget month from 
the trust are an availab je asset if the client or his 
spouse set up the trust. The value of the asset is the 
maximum amount that the trustee can disburse to 
the client when exercising his full discretion under 
the terms of the trust. It does not matter whether 
disbursement is actually made. The potential dis-
bursement can include both income and principle of 
the trust. 
409.65 Trusts Set Up for Purposes Other Than to 
Qualify for Medicaid — Created by Someone Other 
Than the Client or His Spouse 
For A, B, and D Cases 
If the client's access to the trust principle is re-
stricted*, the principle is not an available asset. This 
is true even when the trust: 
1. Can be revoked by someone other than the bene-
ficiary, and 
2. Provides a regular payment from the principle 
to the beneficiary. 
Payments made to the client from the trust are 
income. 
For F and C Cases 
The principle is an available asset if there is access 
to the principle to meet the needs of a household 
member. It does not matter if access is restricted TS 
the only way to access the trust is by approval of the 
court, require the client to petition the court to re-
lease the funds in the trust. Follow the procedures in 
Sec. 409.3. 
When disbursement is limited to specific and lim-
ited needs or the principle cannot be invaded, the 
trust may not be available. (See 409.68.) 
For example, when disbursement of funds of a trust 
set up from an insurance settlement is legally limited 
to payment of medical bills arising from an accident, 
the trust is not available. However, forward informa-
tion about the trust to ORS. In this case, there is TPL 
coverage ORS must pursue. 
409.66 Trusts Set Up for the Purpose of Qualifying 
for Medicaid 
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An SSI recipient must meet Medicaid asset limits. 
When these limits are exceeded, close the case or 
feny the application. 
403.3 Deeming of Parental Assets to D and B Chil-
dren 
When a D or B unemancipated child is a Medicaid 
recipient and lives with his parents, count his par-
ent*' assets. It does not matter whether either parent 
M eligible. In this situation, follow the rules below: 
1. Apply all asset exclusions of the D or B program 
to the parent's assets. 
2. From the value of the parent's countable assets, 
deduct the one person $1,900 or two person $2,850 
tiset limit depending on whether there are 1 or 2 
parents in the home. Do not allow the $25.00 exemp-
tion for each additional household member. 
3. When more than one child is D or B, divide the 
parents' countable assets equally between each eligi-
ble child. 
4 Allow each eligible B or D child the $1,900 limit 
ID total countable assets. 
Example: 
The Blakes have five children living at home. Tom 
(age 17) and Tim (age 16) are SSI recipients. Neither 
Tom nor Tim have any assets of his own. Mr. and 
Mrs Blake have a $5,000.00 savings account. Of this 
$2,850.00 is exempt as a parental asset exclusion. 
Ink leaves a countable asset of $2,150.00 ($5,000.00 
- $2,850.00 = $2,150.00). Of this $1,075.00 is 
deemed to each eligible D or B child ($2,150.00 di-
nded by 2 equals $1,075.00). In this example neither 
child's assets exceed $1,900.00. Both are eligibile 
based on their assets. 
R810-3O4-4O5. Real Property. 
Real property includes items which may be fixed or 
permanent, such as land, houses, buildings, and 
trailer homes. 
R810-3O4-4O7. Personal Property. 
Personal property is an item other than real prop-
erty. Some examples are: 
1. Liquid assets such as savings and checking ac-
counts, stocks, water stock, bonds, mutual fund 
shares, promissory notes, mortgages, insurance poli-
cies, trust funds, and agreements in escrow. 
2. Motor vehicles, including automobiles, trucks, 
motorbikes, snowmobiles, etc. 
3. Boats, campers and trailers. 
4. Implements, instruments, and tools. 
5. Livestock. 
6. Merchandise and inventory. 
7. Time shares and time share agreements. 
Liquid Assets: Assets in cash or payable in cash on 
demand. 
B810-304-4O9. Availability of Assets. 
409.1 Joint Accounts 
1 When an account is jointly held by a client and 
tomeone who is not eligible, count all the funds as an 
•Beet for the client if he can legally withdraw funds 
from the account. If more than one of the account 
bolders is eligible, divide the funds equally among 
them. 
If the client claims that the asset does not belong to 
him, allow him to refute it. He can refute it by provid-
ing 2 things: 
a His statement about the ownership of the funds. 
The statement should include the reason the joint 
account was set up and who made the deposits to and 
withdrawals from the account, and 
b. Supporting statements from the other account 
holders. 
If the asset belongs to someone else, the money 
must be removed or access must be restricted. If this 
is not done, count all the funds as an asset for the 
entire time access was not restricted. If access is re-
stricted, do not count the asset back through the en-
tire period the client is able to refute his ownership. 
Example: In October you discover Mr. Jones had a 
savings account in his name and that of his father. 
Mr. Jones has been a joint owner of this account since 
January when first started receiving assistance. He 
proves that all deposits and withdrawals have been 
made by his father and are his father's money. Mr. 
Jones has his name removed from the account in Oc-
tober. Exempt the asset back to January. 
2. When the assets of an A, B, or D SSI recipient 
are combined with those of an F or C family unit, 
such as in a savings account, decide the portion of the 
asset available to the F or C household as follows: 
a. If the asset is jointly owned, divide the value 
equally among the owners. 
Account: A contract of deposit of funds between de-
positors and a financial institution. This includes 
checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, 
share accounts, etc. 
b. If you can identify exempt funds, such as a lump 
sum SSI payment which is exempt for 6 months after 
receipt, do not count them until after the exempt pe-
riod has expired. 
409.2 Joint Ownership of Assets 
If property is owned by more than one person, de-
termine the client's share. Plural ownership can exist 
in different forms. 
In Utah these are: 
1. Joint-tenancy. 
2. Tenancy-in-common. 
3. Not specified. The property is simply recorded in 
the names of 2 or more persons. Ownership is ten-
ancy-in-common unless stated to be otherwise. 
In all 3 cases, each owner has the legal right to sell 
only his share of the property. Unless there is a condi-
tion of ownership specifically prohibiting sale of any 
part of the asset without permission of the other 
owners, the client's share is an available asset. If 
there is such a condition, see Sec. 409.3. 
However, when other owners refuse to sell the 
property, the fair market value of the client'6 share 
may be reduced. In such a case, allow the client to 
refute the determination of hi6 equity by providing a 
statement from a knowledgeable source documenting 
the fair market value of the client's share based on 
the particular circumstances of the case. 
The laws on plural ownership may differ for prop-
erty located in other states. If you have a case with 
property in another state under plural ownership, 
contact the State APA Office. 
409.3 When Legal Factors Hinder Making an As-
set Available 
1. If legal factors hinder making the asset avail-
able, it is exempt until it can be made available. (See 
2 below). For example, a condition of ownership may 
prohibit selling the asset without the consent of both 
parties. In this case, the asset is exempt until the 
condition of ownership is changed or both parties con-
sent to the sale. 
2. If an asset is not legally available but can be 
made available by client action, the client must take 
steps to make it available. There are 2 exceptions. 
These are: 
a. It is doubtful that reasonable actions will suc-
ceed. This should be confirmed by a knowledgeable 
source, such as a lawyer or financial institution. 
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5. Subtract medical insurance premiums and pay-
ments for medical services, see section 309.32. 
6. If the client is a resident of a nursing home, the 
client must pay the rest of the income to the nursing 
home. If the client is a resident of another kind of 
medical institution, the client must spend down to 
the district office. 
R810-303*375. Changes In Circumstances — Res-
idents of Medical Institutions. 
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institu-
tion See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a 
medical institution. 
375.1 Client Responsibility 
The client is responsible to report within 10 days 
any change in income or circumstances which may 
affect eligibility. 
375.2 Date of Income Change 
Consider the date of receipt of income as the date of 
change. 
R810-303-377. Residents of Medical Institutions 
and Veteran's Administration (VA) Benefits. 
A VA benefit recipient may be eligible for in-
creased benefits when they enter a medical institu-
tion. These increased benefits are called Aid and At-
tendance. Also, potential VA recipients may become 
eligible for VA benefits when they enter a medical 
institution. Potential recipients include a veteran, or 
the spouse, parent, or child of a veteran. 
When you identify a recipient or potential recipient 
who has entered a medical institution, take one of 
these actions: 
1. Notify ORS. 
2. If the client or his family wishes to apply di-
rectly to the VA, they may do so. Notify ORS. 
3. If the OCO worker wishes to apply directly with 
the VA, you may do so. Notify ORS. 
To notify ORS, use VA Form 21-8416a (Request for 
Information Concerning Unreimbursed Family Medi-
cal Expenses). This form is the minimum that you 
must send to ORS. If you have more information or a 
copy of the complete application, send it too. Send the 
form as soon as possible after application. The VA 
will pay only from the date this form is received by 
them. 
If the client is in a nursing home, tell the nursing 
home operator to immediately report any increased 
benefits. Control for the increased benefits on Form 
62 or Form 69. 
If you have any questions about application for in-
creased veteran's benefits, you may call the ORS Vet-
eran's Benefits Coordinator at 538-4534. 
377.1 Treatment of Lump Sum VA Benefits 
Break any lump sum payment into Aid and Atten-
dance and regular pension 
1. Tell ORS of the Aid and Attendance amount. 
ORS will collect any Aid and Attendance for the time 
period that the client recieved Medicaid. 
2. Consider the remainder of a VA lump sum pay-
ment as income in the month received. If the client is 
a resident of a nursing home and it is too late to be 
correctly reflected on the APA file, use the Form 
417A to notify the nursing home and HCF. 
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R810-304. Medicaid: Asset Standards. 
R810-304-400. Asset Standards. 
R810-304-403. Asset Limits. 
R810-304-405. Real Property. 
RS10-304-407 PerannAl Pmnorfv 
R810-304-409. Availability of Assets. 
R810-304-411. Exempt Assets. 
R810-304-419. When to Deem Assets. 
R810-304-421. Lump Sum Payments — All Cases 
R810-304-425. Income Producing Property. 
R810-304-431. Transfer of Excess Assets. 
R810-304-441. Third Party Liability (TPL) - AH 
Cases. 
R810-304-443. Eligible Aliens and Counting The As-
sets of Sponsors — All Cases. 
R810-304-461. Whose Assets to Count — Clients 
Who Are Not Residents of Medical Institutions 
R810-304-465. Whose Assets to Count — Clients 
Who Are Residents of Medical Institutions. 
R810-304-400. Asset Standards. 
1. This section describes asset* standards for all 
Medicaid clients. 
2. An Asset is available when the client owns it, or 
has the legal right to sell it or dispose of it for his own 
benefit. (See Sec. 409.) 
3. The assets of a ward controlled by a legal guard-
ian are available to the ward. This is true even if the 
ward is not living with the guardian. If the asset is a 
trust, follow the rules on trusts. (See Sec. 409.6.) 
4. Do not count money as an asset in the same 
month it is counted as income. 
BS10-304-403. Asset limits. 
Base asset levels on the same number of persons 
included in the Basic Maintenance Standard (BMSt 
Number In BMS Asset Level 
1 person BMS $2,000 
2 person BMS $3,000 
Each additional person in add $25 
the BMS 
Use section 329 to set the number of persons in the 
BMS. 
Close the case or deny the application when the 
countable value of all assets is more than the asset 
limits. 
403.1 The Value of Assets 
Judge assets by their equity value. An exception is 
made for vehicles in A, B and D cases. (See Sec 
411-5.) 
1. Equity value is the current market value less 
any debts owing on the iLSset. 
2. Current market value is the item's selling pnce 
on the open market as set by current standards of 
appraisal. 
Assets: Any real or personal property that has 
money value. (See Sec. 405 and 407) 
403.11 F and C Cases 
For both applications and open cases, if asset levels 
are met at any time in a month, they are met for the 
entire month. 
403.12 A,B, and D Cases 
For both applicants and open' cases, use assets held 
on the first moment of a calendar month to compute 
eligibility for that month. The case is ineligible for 
the entire month if countable assets exceed limita on 
the first moment of the month. 
1. However, when the asset level is exceeded and a 
checking account is part of it, look at checks written 
prior to the first moment of the month which had not 
cleared as of the first moment. 
2. Do not count such checks in the asset computa-
tion. 
Subtract these checks from the checking balance 
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with the requirements of 42 CFR 435 940 through 
435 960 
(b) Attachment 4 32A describes, in accordance 
with 42 CFR 435 948 (a)(6), the information that will 
be requested in order to verify eligibility or the cor-
rect payment amount and the agencies and the 
State(s) from which that information will be re-
quested 
R455-1-80. Section 5: Personnel Administration. 
5 1 Standards of Personnel Administration 
(a) The Medicaid agency has established and will 
maintain methods of personnel administration in 
conformity with standards prescribed by the U S 
Civil Service Commission in accordance with Section 
208 of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 
and the regulations on Administration of the Stan-
dards for a Merit System of Personnel Administra-
tion, 5 CFR Part 900, Subpart F All requirements of 
42 CFR 432 10 are met 
(b) Affirmative Action Plan 
The Medicaid agency has in effect an affirmative 
action plan for equal employment opportunity that 
includes specific action steps and timetables and 
meets all other requirements of 5 CFR Part 900, Sub-
part F 
R455-1-82 
5 3 Training Programs, Subprofessional and Vol-
unteer Programs 
The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42 
CFR Part 432, Subpart B, with respect to a training 
program for agency personnel and the training and 
use of subprofessional staff and volunteers 
R455-1-83 Section 6. Financial Administration. 
6 1 Fiscal Policies and Accountability 
The Medicaid agency and, where applicable, local 
agencies administering the plan, maintains an ac-
counting system and supporting fiscal records ade-
quate to assure that claims for Federal funds are in 
accord with applicable Federal requirements The re-
quirements of 42 CFR 433 32 are met 
R455-1-84 
6 2 Cost Allocation 
The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42 
CFR 433 34, paragraphs (c) through (e) with respect 
to the submittal and content of a cost allocation plan 
R455-1-85 
6 3 State Financial Participation 
(a) State funds are used in both assistance and ad-
ministration 
X State funds are used to pay all of the non-Federal 
share of total expenditures under the plan Effective 
Date April 12, 1974 
(b) State and Federal funds are apportioned among 
the political subdivisions of the State on a basis con-
sistent with equitable treatment of individuals in 
similar circumstances throughout the State 
R455-1-86. Section 7: General Provisions. 
7 1 Plan Amendments 
The plan will be amended whenever necessary to 
reflect new or revised Federal statutes or regulations 
or material change in any phase of State law, organi-
sation, policy or State agency operations 
R45M-87 
7 2 Nondiscrimination 
In accordance with title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (42 U S C 2000d et seq), Section 504 of the 
RehabihUtion Act of 1973 (29 U S C 70b), and the 
regulations at 45 CFR Parts 80 and 84, the Medicaid 
agency assures that no individual shall be subjects 
to discrimination under this plan on the grounds of 
race, color, national origin, or handicap 
The Medicaid agency has methods of admirugtra 
tion to assure that each program or activity for which 
it receives Federal financial assistance will be oper 
ated in accordance with title VI regulations These 
methods for title VI are described in Attachment 
7 2A 
R455-1-88 
7 3 State Governor's Review 
The Medicaid agency will provide opportunity for 
the Office of the Governor to review amendment* 
any new State plan and subsequent amendments and 
long-range program planning projections or other pe-
riodic reports thereon Any comments made will be 
transmitted to the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration with such documents 
I hereby certify that I am authorized to submit this 
plan on behalf of UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, dated August 20, 1980, signature by 
James O Mason, M D , Dr P H 
1967 D-U 
R455-1A. Utah State Medicaid Plan At-
tachments. 
R455-1A-100 Attachments Utah State Medicaid 
Plan 
R455'1A-102 State Agency 
R455-1A-200 Attachments Utah State Medicaid 
Plan Coverage and Eligibility 
R455-1A-300 Attachments 
R455-1A-400 Attachments Utah State Medicaid 
Plan Standards for Institutions 
R455-1A-700 Attachments Utah State Medicaid 
Plan Nondiscrimination 
R455-1A-100. Attachments: Utah State Medicaid 
Plan. 
1A Attorney General's Certification 
I certify that THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH is the single State agency responsible 
for 
X Administering the plan 
The legal authonty under which the agency admin 
isters the plan on a Statewide basis is Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-35-10, Section 55-15a-3 and 
Senate Bill 332 (1979 General SessionXstatutory a 
tation) dated May 21, 1980, signed by Utah State 
Attorney General Robert B Hanson 
1A1 State of Utah Office of the Governor 
May 2, 1979 SUBJECT Single State Agency -
Title XIX Program 
Effective May 8, 1979, the Utah Health Agency IB 
hereby designated as the single State Agency for the 
Title XIX program As the single State Agency they 
will be responsible for the total Title XIX program 
including certification of facilities, utilization review 
and payment of claims Eligibility for Title XDC pro-
grams will continue to be a responsibility of the De-
partment of Social Services Scott M Matheson, Gov 
ernor 
1A2 Reorganization of State Health Functions 
1979 General Session — Enrolled Copy S B No 332 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE ORGANIZATION 
OF A STATE HEALTH AGENCY BY THE GOVER 
NOR WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONS 
Attachment 4 19E specifies, for each type of ser-
fice the definition of a claim for purposes of meeting 
these requirements 
R455-1-62 
419(f) The Medicaid agency limits participation to 
providers who meet the requirements of 42 CFR 
44715 
No provider participating under this plan may 
deny services to any individual eligible under the 
plan on account of the individual's inability to pay a 
cost sharing amount imposed by the plan in accor-
dance with 42 CFR 447 53 
R455-1-63 
4 19(g) The Medicaid agency assures appropriate 
audit of records when payment is based on costs of 
services or on a fee plus cost of materials 
R455-1-64 
419(h) The Medicaid agency meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR 447 203 for documentation and 
availability of payment rates 
R455-1-65 
4 19(i) The Medicaid agency's payments are suffi-
cient to enlist enough providers so that services un-
der the plan are available to recipients at least to the 
extent that those services are available to the general 
population 
R455-1-66 
4 19(j) The Medicaid agency meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR 447 205 for public notice of any sig-
nificant changes in Statewide method or standards 
for setting payment rates 
R45M-66a 
4 19(k) Payments to Physicians for Clinical Labo-
ratory Services 
For services performed by an outside laboratory for 
a physician who bills for the service, payment does 
not exceed the amount that would be authorized un-
der Medicare in accordance with 42 CFR 405 515 (b), 
(c) and (d) 
X Not applicable The Medicaid agency does not 
allow payment under the plan to physicians for out-
aide laboratory services 
R455-1-67 
4 20 Direct Payments to Certain Recipients for 
Physicians' or Dentists' Services 
X Not applicable No direct payments are made to 
recipients 
R455-1-68 
4 21 Prohibition Against Reassignment of Pro-
vider Claims 
Payment for Medicaid services furnished by any 
provider under this plan is made only in accordance 
with the requirements of 42 CFR 447 10 
R455-1-69 
4 22 Third Party Liability 
(a) The Medicaid agency meets all requirements of 
42 CFR 433 138 and 433 139 
Attachment 4 22A specifies the threshold amount 
or other guideline used in determining whether to 
aeek reimbursement from a liable third party, or de-
scribes the process by which the agency determines 
that seeking reimbursement would not be cost effec-
tive It also specifies the dollar amount or time penod 
the State uses to accumulate billings from a particu-
lar liable third party for this purpose 
R455-1-70 
(c) The Medicaid agency has written cooperative 
agreements for the enforcement of rights to and col-
lection of third party benefits assigned to the State as 
a condition of eligibility for medical assistance with 
at least one of the following (Check as appropriate) 
X State title IV-D agency The requirements of 42 
CFR 433 152 (b) are met 
(d) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 
42 CFR 433-153 and 433 154 for making mcentive 
payments and for distributing third party collections 
R455-1-71 
4 23 Use of Contracts 
The Medicaid agency has contracts of the type(s) 
listed in 42 CFR Part 434 All contracts meet the 
requirements of 42 CFR Part 434 
R455-1-72 
4 24 Standards for Payments for Skilled Nursing 
and Intermediate Care Facility Services 
With respect to skilled nursing and intermediate 
care facilities, all applicable requirements of 42 CFR 
Part 442, Subparts B and C are met 
R455-1-73 
4 25 Program for Licensing Administrators of 
Nursing Homes 
The State has a program that, except with respect 
to Christian Science sanatoria, meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR Part 431, Subpart N, for the licens-
ing of nursing home administrators 
R45M-75 
4 27 Disclosure of Survey Information and Pro-
vider or Contractor Evaluation 
The Medicaid agency has established procedures 
for disclosing pertinent findings obtained from sur-
veys and provider and contractor evaluations that 
meet all the requirements in 42 CFR 431115 
R455-1.76 
4 28 Appeals Process for Skilled Nursing Facilities 
and Intermediate Care Facilities 
The Medicaid agency has established appeals pro-
cedures for skilled nursing facilities and intermediate 
care facilities as specified in 42 CFR 431153 and 
431154 
R455-1-77 
4 29 Conflict of Interest Provisions 
The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 
Section 1902 (a) (4) (C) of the Act concerning the pro-
hibition against acts, with respect to any activity un-
der the plan, that are prohibited by Section 207 or 
208 of title 18, United States Code 
R455-1-78 
4 30 Exclusion of Providers and Suspension of 
Practitioners and other Individuals 
All requirements of 42 CFR Part 455, Subpart C 
are met 
R455-1-79 
4 31 Disclosure of Information by Providers and 
Fiscal Agents 
The Medicaid agency has established procedures 
for the disclosure of information by providers and fis-
cal agents as specified in 42 CFR 455 104 through 
455 106 
4 32 Income and Eligibility Verification System 
(a) The Medicaid agency has established a system 
for income and eligibility verification in accordance 
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•titution, to spend for medical care costs all but a 
minimal amount of his or her income required for 
personal needs. 
(v) Emergency services if the services meet the re-
quirements in 42 CFR 447.53(b)(4). 
(vi) Family planning services and supplies fur-
nished to individuals of childbearing age. 
(vii) Services furnished by a health maintenance 
organization in which the individual is enrolled. 
(viii) Services furnished to an individual receiving 
hospice care, as defined in section 1905(o) of the Act. 
R455-1-56 
(3) Unless a waiver under 42 CFR 431.55(g) ap-
plies, nominal deductible, coinsurance, copayment, or 
similar charges are imposed for services that are not 
excluded from such charges under item (b)(2) above. 
X Not applicable. No such charges are imposed. 
R455-l~56a 
(iii) Attachment 4.18A specifies the: 
(A) Services(s) for which a charge(s) is applied; 
(B) Nature of the charge imposed on each service; 
(C) Amount(s) of and basis for determining the 
charge(s); 
(D) Method used to collect the charge(s); 
(£) Basis for determining whether an individual is 
unable to pay the charge and the means by which 
such an individual is identified to providers; 
(F) Procedures for implementing and enforcing the 
exclusions from cost sharing contained in 42 CFR 
447.53(b); and 
(G) Cumulative maximum that applies to all de-
ductible, coinsurance or copayment charges imposed 
on a specified time period. 
X Not applicable. There is no maximum. 
R455-l-56b 
(c) Individuals are covered as medically needy un-
der the plan. 
X Yes. With respect to them: 
(1) An enrollment fee, premium or similar charge 
is imposed. 
X Not applicable. No such charge is imposed. 
R455-1-56C 
(2) No deductible, coinsurance, copayment, or simi-
lar charge is imposed under the plan. 
(ii) Services to pregnant women related to the 
pregnancy or any other medical condition that may 
complicate the pregnancy. 
R455-l-56d 
(iii) All services furnished to pregnant women. 
(iv) Services furnished to any individual who is an 
inpatient in a hospital, long-term care facility, or 
other medical institution, if the individual is re-
quired, as a condition of receiving services in the in-
stitution, to spend for medical care costs all but a 
minimal amount of his income required for personal 
needs. 
(v) Emergency services if the services meet the re-
quirements in 42 CFR 447.53(b)(4). 
(vi) Family planning services and supplies fur-
nished to individuals of childbearing age. 
(vii) Services furnished to an individual receiving 
hospice care, as defined in section 1905(o) of the Act. 
R455-l-56e 
(viii) Services provided by a health maintenance 
organization (HMO) to enrolled individuals. 
(3) Unless a waiver under 42 CFR 431.55(g) ap-
plies, nominal deductible, coinsurance, copayment, or 
similar charges are imposed on services that are not 
excluded from such charges under item (b)(2) above 
X Not applicable. No such charges are imposed 
R455-l-56f 
(iii) Attachment 4.18C specifies the: 
(A) Service(s) for which charge(s) is applied; 
(B) Nature of the charge imposed on each service, 
(C) Amount(s) of and basis for determining the 
charge(s); 
(D) Method used to collect the charge(s); 
(E) Basis for determining whether an individual u 
unable to pay the charge(s) and the means by which 
such an individual is identified to providers; 
(F) Procedures for implementing and enforcing the 
exclusions from cost sharing contained in 42 CFR 
447.53(b); and 
(G) Cumulative maximum that applies to all de-
ductible, coinsurance or copayment charges imposed 
on a family during a specified time period. 
X Not applicable. There is no maximum. 
R455-1-57 
4.19 Payment for Services 
(a) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 
42 CFR Part 447, Subpart C, with respect to payment 
for inpatient hospital services. Attachment 4.19A de-
scribes the methods and standards used to determine 
rates for payment for inpatient hospital services 
R455-1-58 
4.19(b) In addition to the services specified in para-
graphs 4.19(a) and (d), the Medicaid agency meets the 
requirements of 42 CFR Part 447, Subpart C, with 
respect to payment for all other types of services pro-
vided under the plan. 
Attachment 4.19B describes the methods and stan-
dards used for the payment of each of these services 
except for inpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility 
and intermediate care facility services that are de-
scribed in other attachments. 
R455-1-59 
4.19(c) Payment is made to reserve a bed during a 
recipient's temporary absence from an inpatient facil-
ity. 
X yes. The State's policy is described in Attach-
ment 4.19C. 
R45M-60 
4.19(d) X 1. The Medicaid agency meets the re-
quirements of 42 CFR Part 447 Subpart C, with re-
spect to payments for skilled nursing and intermedi-
ate care facility services. 
Attachment 4.19D describes the methods and stan-
dards used to determine rates for payment for skilled 
nursing and intermediate care facility services 
X 2. The Medicaid agency provides payment for 
routine skilled nursing facility services furnished by 
a swing-bed hospital at the average rate per patient 
day for routine SNF services furnished during the 
previous calendar year. 
X 3. The Medicaid agency provides payment for 
routine intermediate care facility services furnished 
by a swing-bed hospital at the average rate per pa-
tient day for ICF services other that ICFs for the 
mentally retarded furnished during the previous cal-
endar year. 
R455-1-61 
4.19(e) The Medicaid agency meets all require-
ments of 42 CFR 447.45 for timely payment of claims. 
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(a) The State agency utilized by the Secretary to 
determine qualifications of institutions and suppliers 
gf services to participate in Medicare is responsible 
for establishing and maintaining health standards 
for private or public institutions (exclusive of Chris-
tian Science sanatoria) that provide services to Medi-
caid recipients This agency is UTAH STATE DE-
PARTMENT OF HEALTH 
(b) The State authonty(ies) responsible for estab-
lishing and maintaining standards, other than those 
relating to health, for public or private institutions 
that provide services to Medicaid recipients is (are) 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
(c) Attachment 4 11A describes the standards spec-
ified in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, that are kept on 
file and made available to the Health Care Financing 
Administration on request 
R455-1-43 
411(d) The UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH (agency) which is the State agency respon-
nble for licensing health institutions, determines if 
institutions and agencies meet the requirements for 
participation in the Medicaid program The require-
ments in 42 CFR 431 610(e), (f) and (g) are met 
R455-1-44 
4 12 Consultation to Medical Facilities 
(a) Consultative services are provided by health 
and other appropriate State agencies to hospitals, 
nursing facilities home health agencies, clinics and 
laboratories in accordance with 42 CFR 431105(b) 
X Not applicable Similar services are not provided 
to other types of medical facilities 
R45M-45 
4 13 Required Provider Agreement 
All requirements of 42 CFR 431 107 are met with 
respect to agreements between the Medicaid agency 
and each provider furnishing services under the plan 
R455-1-46 
4 14 Utilization Control 
(a) A Statewide program of surveillance and utili-
zation control has been implemented tha t safeguards 
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid 
services available under thi6 plan and against excess 
payments and that assesses the quality of services 
The requirements of 42 CFR Par t 456 are met 
X Directly 
R45M-47 
4 14(b) The Medicaid agency meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR Par t 456, Subpart C, for control of 
the utilization of inpatient hospital services 
X Utilization review is performed in accordance 
with 42 CFR Par t 456, Subpart H, tha t specifies the 
conditions of a waiver of the requirements of Subpart 
Cfor 
X All hospitals (other than mental hospitals) 
R455-1-48 
4 14(c) The Medicaid agency meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR Part 456, Subpart D, for control of 
utilization of inpatient services in mental hospitals 
X No waivers have been granted 
R45M-49 
4 14(d) The Medicaid agency meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR Par t 456, Subpart E, for the control 
of utilization of skilled nursing facility services 
X Utilization review is performed in accordance 
with 42 CFR Par t 456, Subpart H, tha t specifies the 
POLICY AND PLANNING R455-1-55 
conditions of a waiver of the requirements of Subpart 
E for 
X All skilled nursing facilities 
R45M-50 
4 14 X (e) The Medicaid agency meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR Par t 456, Subpart F, for control of 
the utilization of intermediate care facility services 
Utilization review in facilities is provided through 
X Direct review by personnel of the medical assis-
tance unit of the State agency 
R455-1-51 
4 15 Inspections of Care in Skilled Nursing and In-
termediate Care Facilities and Institutions for Men-
tal Diseases 
All applicable requirements of 42 CFR Par t 456, 
Subpart I, are met with respect to periodic inspec-
tions of care and services 
R455-1-52 
4 16 Relations with State Health and Vocational 
Rehabilitation Agencies and Title V Grantees 
The Medicaid agency has cooperative arrange-
ments with State health and vocational rehabilita-
tion agencies and with Title V grantees, tha t meet 
the requirements of 42 CFR 431 615 
Attachment 4 16A describes the cooperative ar-
rangements with the health and vocational rehabili-
tation agencies 
R455-1-53 
4 17 Liens and Recoveries 
Liens are imposed against an individual's property 
X Yes 
(a) Liens are imposed against an individual's prop 
erty before his or her death because of Medicaid 
claims paid or to be paid on behalf of that individual 
following a court judgment which determined that 
benefits were incorrectly paid for tha t individual 
X Item (a) applies only to an individual's real prop 
erty, 
(b) Liens are placed against the real property of an 
individual before his or her death because of Medi-
caid claims paid or to be paid for tha t individual in 
accordance with 42 CFR 433 36(g) (2) 
X Item (b) is not applicable No such hen is lm 
posed 
(c) Adjustments or recoveries for Medicaid claims 
correctly paid are imposed only in accordance with 
section 433 36(h) 
(d) No money payments under another program 
are reduced as a means of recovering Medicaid claims 
incorrectly paid 
(e) Attachment 4 17A 
R455-1-54 
(a) Specifies the process for determining tha t an 
institutionalized individual cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to be discharged from the medical institution 
and return home The description of the process 
meets the requirements of 42 CFR 433 36(d) 
(b) Defines the terms specified in 42 CFR 
433 36(e) 
(c) Specifies the criteria by which a son or daugh-
ter can establish tha t he or she has been providing 
care, as specified under 42 CFR 433 36(f) 
R455-1-55 
(in) All services furnished to pregnant women 
(IV) Services furnished to any individual who is an 
inpatient in a hospital, long-term care facility, or 
other medical institution, if the individual is re-
quired, as a condition of receiving services in the in-
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services" under this plan and are reimbursed whether 
furnished by a physician or an optometrist. 
X Not applicable. The conditions in the first sen-
tence do not apply. 
R45M-28 
3.1(g) Participation by Indian Health Service Facil-
ities 
Indian Health Service facilities are accepted as pro-
viders, in accordance with 42 CFR 431.110(b), on the 
same basis as other qualified providers. 
R45M-29 
3.2 Coordination of Medicaid with Medicare Part B 
X The Medicaid agency makes the entire range of 
benefits under Part B of title XVIH available as part 
of the plan to certain eligible individuals under a 
buy-in agreement, through payment of the premium 
charges on behalf of such individuals, or by meeting 
all or part of the cost of the deductible, cost sharing or 
similar charges under Part B. 
Attachment 3.2A describes the method by which 
such benefits are made available. The agency makes 
the same services available to recipients not covered 
by Medicare. 
X No. 
R455-1-30 
3.3 Medicaid for Individuals Age 65 or Over in in-
stitutions for Mental Diseases 
Medicaid is provided for individuals 65 years of age 
or older who are patients in institutions for mental 
diseases. 
X Yes. The requirements of 42 CFR Part 441, Sub-
part C, and 42 CFR 431.620(c) and (d) are met. 
R455-1-31 
3.4 Special Requirements Applicable to Steriliza-
tion Procedures 
All requirements of 42 CFR Part 441, Subpart F 
are met. 
R455-1-32. Section 4: General Program Adminis-
tration. 
4.1 Methods of Administration 
The Medicaid agency employs methods of adminis-
tration found by the Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare to be necessary for the proper and effi-
cient operation of the plan. 
R45M-33 
4.2 Hearings for Applicants and Recipients 
The Medicaid agency has a system of hearings that 
meets all the requirements of 42 CFR Part 431, Sub-
part £. 
R455-1-34 
4.3 Safeguarding Information on Applicants and 
Recipients 
Under State statute which imposes legal sanctions, 
safeguards are provided that restrict the use or dis-
closure of information concerning applicants and re-
cipients to purposes directly connected with the ad-
ministration of the plan. 
All other requirements of 42 CFR Part 431, Sub-
part F are met. 
R455-1-35 
4.4 Medicaid Quality Control 
(a) A system of eligibility quality control is imple-
mented that meets the requirements of 42 CFR 
431,800(d), (f), (h), (i) and (k). 
(b) The agency operates a claims processing as** 
ment system that meets the requirements of Section 
431.800 (e), (g), (h), (j), and (k). 
X Not applicable. The agency has a Medicaid Man. 
agement Information System (MMIS) approved uncW 
42 CFR Part 433, Subpart C. 
R455-1-36 
4.5 Medicaid Agency Fraud Detection and Invest 
gation Program 
The Medicaid agency has established and will 
maintain methods, criteria, and procedures that meet 
all requirements of 42 CFR 455.13-455.21 for preven-
tion and control of program fraud and abuse. 
R455-1-37 
4.6 Reports 
The Medicaid agency will submit all reports in the 
form and with the content required by the Secretary, 
and will comply with any provisions that the Seer* 
tary finds necessary to verify and assure the correct-
ness of the reports. All requirements of 42 CFR 
431.16 are met. 
R45M-38 
4.7 Maintenance of Records 
The Medicaid agency maintains or supervises the 
maintenance of records necessary for the proper and 
efficient operation of the plan, including records re-
garding applications, determination of eligibility, the 
provisions of medical assistance, and administrative 
costs, and statistical, fiscal and other records nee**-
aary for reporting and accountability, and retains 
these records in accordance with Federal require-
ments. All requirements of 42 CFR 431.17 are met 
R455-1-39 
4.8 Availability of Agency Program Manuals 
Program manuals and other policy issuances that 
affect the public, including the Medicaid agency's 
rules and regulations governing eligibility, need and 
amount of assistance, recipient rights and responsi-
bilities, and services offered by the agency are main-
tained in the State office and in each local and dis-
trict office for examination, upon request, by individ-
uals for review, study, or reproduction. All require-
ments of 42 CFR 431.18 are met. 
R455-1-40 
4.9 Reporting Provider Payments to Internal Reve-
nue Service 
There are procedures implemented in accordance 
with 42 CFR 433.37 for identification of providers of 
services by social security number or by employer 
identification number and for reporting the informa-
tion required by the Internal Revenue Code (26 
U.S.C. 6041) with respect to payment for services un-
der the plan. 
R455-1-41 
4.10 Free Choice of Providers 
Unless an exception under 42 CFR 431.55 applies, 
the Medicaid agency assures that any individual eli-
gible under the plan may obtain Medicaid services 
from any institution, agency, pharmacy, person, or 
organization that is qualified to perform the services, 
including an organization that provides these ser-
vices or arranges for their availability on a prepay-
ment basis. 
R455-1-42 
4.11 Relations with Standard-Setting and Survey 
Agencies 
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a^t nurse-mid wives are authorized to practice under 
§ute law or regulation 
Norse-mid wives are permitted to enter into inde-
pendent provider agreements with the Medicaid 
e^ncy without regard to whether the nurse-midwife 
ponder the supervision of, or associated with, a phy-
aoan or other health care provider 
(m) For any women who, while pregnant, were eli-
gible for, applied for, and received medical assistance 
under the approved State Plan, all pregnancy-related 
ind postpartum services will continue to be provided, 
is though the women were pregnant, for 60 days after 
the pregnancy ends, beginning on the last date of 
pregnancy 
X (iv) For pregnant women, services for any other 
pedical condition that may complicate the preg-
nancy 
(v) Home health services are provided to 
categorically needy recipients entitled to skilled 
nursing facility services as indicated in item 3 1(b) of 
this plan 
Attachment 3 1A identifies the medical and reme-
dial services provided to the categorically needy and 
specifies all limitations on the amount, duration and 
rope of those services 
B455-1-20 
31(a)(2) This State Plan covers the medically 
needy 
X Yes The services described below and in Attach-
ment 3 IB are provided 
Services for the medically needy include 
d) Prenatal care and delivery services for pregnant 
women 
(u) For women who, while pregnant, were eligible 
for applied for, and received medical assistance un-
der the approved State Plan, all pregnancy-related 
and postpartum services will continue to be provided, 
is though the women were pregnant, for 60 days after 
the pregnancy ends, beginning on the last day of 
pregnancy 
X (m) For pregnant women, services for any other 
medical condition that may complicate the preg 
nancy 
(iv) Ambulatory services, as defined in Attachment 
3 IB for recipients under age 18 and recipients enti-
tled to institutional services 
(v) Home health services to recipients entitled to 
nursing facility services as indicated in item 3 1(b) of 
this plan 
X (vi) Services in an institution for mental dis-
eases 
X Services in an intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded 
Each medically needy group is provided either the 
•ervices listed in section 1905(a)(1) through (5) and 
(17) of the Act, or seven of the services listed in sec-
tion 1905(a)(1) through (18) The services are pro-
vided as defined in 42 CFR Part 440, Subpart A and 
ID section 1905(o) of the Act 
Attachment 3 IB identifies the services provided to 
each covered group of the medically needy, specifies 
til limitations on the amount, duration, and scope of 
those items, and specifies the ambulatory services 
provided under this plan and any limitations on 
them 
R45M-21 
3 1(a)(3) Except for those items or services for 
which section 1902(a)(10) of the Act and 42 CFR 
440 250 permit exceptions 
d) Services made available to the categorically 
needy are equal in amount, duration, and scope for 
each categorically needy person 
(n) The amount, duration, and scope of services 
made available to the categorically needy are equal 
to or greater than those made available to the medi-
cally needy 
X Yes 
(in) Services made available to the medically 
needy are equal in amount, duration, and scope for 
each person in a medically needy coverage group 
X Yes 
R455-1-22 
3 1(a)(5) The Medicaid agency meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR 441 56 — 441 62 with respect to 
early and periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment 
(EPSDT) services 
X The Medicaid agency has in effect agreements 
with continuing care providers Described below are 
the methods employed to assure the providers' com-
pliance with their agreements 
Methods employed to assure provider's compliance 
are identified in the respective contractus) with each 
continuing care provider (e g, sample recipient 
audits, and SURS Reports) 
R455-1-23 
3 1(b) Home health services are provided in accor-
dance with the requirements of 42 CFR 44 L 15 
(1) Home health services are provided to all 
categorically needy individuals 21 years of age or 
over 
(2) Home health services are provided to all 
categorically need individuals under 21 years of age 
X Yes 
(3) Home health services are provided to the medi-
cally needy 
X Yes, to all 
X Yes, to individuals age 21 or over, SNF services 
are provided 
X Yes, to individuals under age 21, SNF services 
are provided 
R455-1-24 
3 1(c) Assurance of Transportation 
Provision is made for assuring necessary transpor-
tation of recipients to and from providers Methods 
used to assure such transportation are described in 
Attachment 3 ID Methods of Providing Transporta-
tion 
R45M-25 
3 1(d) Methods and Standards to Assure Quality of 
Services 
The standards established and the methods used to 
assure high quality care are described in Attachment 
31C 
R455-1-26 
3 1(e) Family Planning Services 
The requirements of 42 CFR 441 20 are met re-
garding freedom from coercion or pressure of mind 
and conscience, and freedom of choice of method to be 
used for family planning 
R455-1-27 
3 1(f) Optometnc Services 
Optometnc services (other than those provided un-
der Sections 435 531 and 436 531) are not now but 
were previously provided under the plan Services of 
the type an optometrist is legally authorized to per-
form are specifically included in the term "physicians' 
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X Determinations of eligibility for Medicaid under 
this plan are made by the agencyties) specified in 
Attachment 2.2A. There is a written agreement be-
tween the agency named in paragraph 1.1(a) and 
other agency(ies) making such determinations for 
specific groups covered under this plan. The agree-
ment defines the relationships and respective respon-
sibilities of the agencies. 
R455-1-6 
1.1(e) All other provisions of this plan are adminis-
tered by the Medicaid agency except for those func-
tions for which final authority has been granted to a 
Professional Standards Review Organization under 
title XI of the Act. 
(f) All other requirements of 42 CFR 431.10 are 
met. 
R45M-7 
1.2 Organization for Administration 
(a) Attachment 1.2A contains a description of the 
organization and functions of the Medicaid agency 
and organization chart of the agency. 
(b) Within the State agency, the DIVISION OF 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND STANDARDS 
has been designated as the medical assistance unit. 
Attachment 1.2B contains a description of the organi-
zation and functions of the medical assistance unit 
and an organization chart of the unit. 
(c) Attachment 1.2C contains a description of the 
kinds and numbers of professional medical personnel 
and supporting staff used in the administration of the 
plan and their responsibilities. 
(d) Eligibility determinations are made by State or 
local staff of an agency other than the agency named 
in paragraph 1.1(a). Attachment 1.2D contains a de-
scription of the staff designated to make such deter-
mination and the functions they will perform. 
R455-1-8 
1.3 Statewide Operation 
The plan is in operation on a Statewide basis in 
accordance with all requirements of 42 CFR 431.50. 
X The plan is state administered. 
R45M-9 
1.4 State Medical Care Advisory Committee 
There is an advisory committee to the Medicaid 
agency director on health and medical care services 
established in accordance with and meeting all the 
requirements of 42 CFR 431.12. 
R455-M0. Section 2: Coverage and Eligibility. 
2.1 Application, Determination of Eligibility and 
Furnishing Medicaid 
(a) The Medicaid agency meets all requirements of 
42 CFR Part 435, Subpart J for processing applica-
tions, determining eligibility and furnishing Medi-
caid. 
R455-M1 
2.1(b) Individuals are entitled to Medicaid services 
under the plan during the three month? preceding 
the month of application, if they were, or on applica-
tion would have been, eligible. The effective date of 
prospective and retroactive eligibility is specified in 
Attachment 2.6A. 
2.1(c) The Medicaid agency electa to enter into a 
risk contract with an HMO that is 
X Not Federally qualified, but meets the require-
ments of 42 CFR 434.20(c) and is defined in Attach-
ment 2.1A. 
R455-M2 
2.2 Coverage and Conditions of Eligibility 
Medicaid is available to groups specified in Attach 
ment 2.2A. 
X Both categorically needy and medically needy 
The conditions of eligibility that must be met are 
specified in Attachment 2.6A. 
All applicable requirements of 42 CFR Part 435 are 
met. 
R455-M3 
2.3 Residence 
Medicaid is furnished to eligible individuals who 
are residents of the State under 42 CFR 435.403. 
R455-M4 
2.4 Blindness 
(a) The definition of blindness in terms of ophthal-
mic measurement used in this plan is specified in 
Attachment 2.6A. 
(b) All other requirements of 42 CFR 435.530 and 
42 CFR 435.531 are met. 
R455-M5 
2.5 Disability 
(a) The definition of disability that is used in this 
plan is specified in Attachment 2.6A. 
(b) All other requirements of 42 CFR 435.540 and 
435.541 are met. 
R455-M6 
2.6 Financial Eligibility 
(a) Categorically needy 
(1) With respect to AFDC-related families and in-
dividuals under age 21 (not otherwise eligible under 
this plan), the financial eligibility conditions of the 
State's approved AFDC plan apply. 
(2) With respect to aged, blind and disabled indi-
viduals, the financial eligibility conditions described 
in Attachment 2.6A apply. 
(3) All requirements of 42 CFR Part 435; Subpart* 
G and H are met with respect to the families and 
individuals to whom the requirements apply. 
R455-M7 
2.6(b) Medically needy 
All requirements of 42 CFR Part 435, Subparts G 
and I are met with respect to the families and individ-
uals to whom the requirements apply. The level of 
income and resources, expressed in total dollar 
amounts, that are used as a basis for establishing 
eligibility under the plan are as described in Attach-
ment 2.6A. 
R455-M8 
2.7 Medicaid Furnished out of State 
Medicaid is furnished under the conditions speci-
fied in 42 CFR 431.52 to an eligible individual who is 
a resident of the State while the individual is in an-
other state, to the same extent that Medicaid is fur-
nished to residents in the State. 
R455-M9 
3.1 Amount, Duration and Scope of Services 
(a) Medicaid is provided in accordance with the re-
quirements of 42 CFR Part 440, Subpart B. 
(l)(i) Each item of service listed in section 1905 
(a)(1) through (5) of the Act, as defined in 42 CFR 
Part 440, Subpart A is provided for the categorically 
needy. 
(ii) Nurse-midwife services listed in section 
1905(a)(17) of the Act, as defined in 42 CFR 440.165 
are provided for the categorically needy to the extent 
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26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by depart-
ment — Disciplinary measures and sanctions — 
Funds collected. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regula-
tions. 
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of 
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permit-
ted by law and quality control services. 
(4) The department shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and sanc-
tions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures 
of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively may not 
extend beyond: 
(a) termination from the program; 
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and 
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social 
Security Act. 
(5) Funds collected as a result of a sanction imposed under Section 1919 of 
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the General 
Fund as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance 
with the requirements of that section. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5; 1989, 
ch. 165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added the (a) 
and (b) designations in Subsection (4); substi-
tuted "shall provide, by rule" for "may provide 
by rule for" and "may not extend" for "shall not 
extend" in the introductory language of Sub-
section (4); deleted "or" from the end of Subsec-
tion (4)(a); added "and" to the end of Subsec-
tion (4)(b); added Subsection (4)(c); made punc-
tuation changes throughout Subsection (4); 
and added Subsection (5). 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Sub-
section (3). 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r. 
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The 1987 amendment, effective July 1,1987, 
in Subsection (1), substituted "Medicare under 
Title XVm of that act" for "Medicare under 
Title XVII of said act," deleted former Subsec-
tion (6), which provided for relief of the obliga-
tion of counties to provide medical care to the 
indigent, and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy and punctuation throughout the section 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988, 
substituted "division" for "department*' in Sub-
sections (1) and (4) and in Subsection (1) in-
serted "which shall be known as the Utah Med-
ical Assistance Program" 
Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fed-
eral Social Security Act, cited in Subsection 
(1), appears as 42 U.S C §§ 1396 to 1396s Ti-
tle XVIQ of the act appears as 42 U.SC 
§§ 1395 to 1395ccc 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Utah's 
Medicaid Program A Senior's Eligibility 
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J Contemp 
L 1 (1988) 
26-18-11. Rural hospitals. 
(1) For purposes of this section "rural hospital" means a hospital located 
outside of a standard metropolitan statistical area, as designated by the 
United States Bureau of the Census. 
(2) For purposes of the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program, the Division of Health Care Financing shall not discriminate among 
rural hospitals on the basis of size. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-11, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 12, i 1. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 12, § 2 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988 
CHAPTER 19 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 
Section 
26-19-1 
26-19-2 
26-19-3 
26-19-4 
26-19-5 
26-19-6 
26-19-7. 
26-19-8 
Section 
Short title 
Definitions 
Program established by depart- 26-19-9 to 
ment —- Promulgation of rules 26-19-13 
Repealed 
Recovery of medical assistance 
from third party liable for pay-
ment — Notice — Action — 26-19-14 
Compromise or waiver — Re-
cipient's right to action pro-
tected — Limit on payment for 
liability 26-19-15 
Action by department — Notice to 
recipient 26-19-16 
Action or claim by recipient — 
Consent of department required 26-19-17. 
— Department's nght to inter-
vene — Department's interests 26-19-18 
protected — Attorney's fees and 
costs 
Statute of limitations — Survival 
of right of action — Insurance 
policy not to limit time allowed 
for recovery 
26-19-12 Repealed 
Recovery of medical assistance 
payments from recipient — 
Lien against estate — Recovery 
of incorrectly paid amounts 
Insurance policies not to deny or 
reduce benefits of persons eligi-
ble for state medical assistance 
— Exemptions 
Attorney general or county attor-
ney to represent department 
Department's right to attorney's 
fees and costs 
Application of provisions contrary 
to federal law prohibited 
Release of medical billing infor-
mation by provider restricted — 
Liability for violation 
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26-18-9. Prohibited acts of state or local employees of 
Medicaid program — Violation a misdemeanor. 
Each state or local employee responsible for the expenditure of funds under 
the state Medicaid program, each individual who formerly was such an officer 
or employee, and each partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited for 
a period of one year after termination of such responsibility from committing 
any act, the commission of which by an officer or employee of the United 
States Government, an individual who was such an officer or employee, or a 
partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited by Section 207 or Section 
208 of Title 18, United States Code. Violation of this section is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1053, 26-18-9, enacted by L. ment by federal officers or employees in their 
1981, ch. 126, § 17. official capacity in matters in which they have 
Compiler's Notes. — 18 U.S.C. §§ 207 and a personal financial interest. 
208 deal respectively with participation by for- Cross-References. — Penalty for misde-
mer federal officers or employees in matters meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
involving the government and with involve-
26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies 
and standards. 
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be 
known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income persons; who 
are not eligible under the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that act. 
(2) Persons in the custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses, and other non-
medical government institutions are not eligible for services provided under 
this section. 
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relat-
ing to eligibility requirements for participation in the program, and for pay-
ment of medical claims for eligible persons. 
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before assistance is ren-
dered the division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the 
spouse, father, mother, and adult children of the person making application. 
(5) The department shall determine what medically necessary care or ser-
vices are covered under the program, including duration of care, and method 
of payment, which may be partial or in full. 
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for medical, hospi-
tal, or other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible 
persons where the purpose of the assistance is for the performance of an 
abortion, unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an abortion 
were not performed. 
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. { 17), relating to duties of the department, and 
1982, ch. 26, i 1; 1985, ch. 165, t 38; 1987, enacted present § 26-18-10. 
ch. 181, i 3; 1988, ch. 21, § 9. Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1982, ment substituted "equivalent of .00005" for 
ch 26, § 1 repealed former § 26-18-10 (C. "equivalent of V4 mill" in two places in Subsec-
1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126, tion (6). 
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26-18-6. Federal aid — Authority of executive director. 
The executive director, with the approval of the governor, may bind the 
state to any executive or legislative provisions promulgated or enacted by the 
federal government which invite the state to participate in the distribution, 
disbursement or administration of any fund or service advanced, offered or 
contributed in whole or in part by the federal government for purposes consis-
tent with the powers and duties of the department. Such funds shall be used 
as provided in this chapter and be administered by the department for pur-
poses related to medical assistance programs. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-6, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17. 
26-18-7. Medical vendor rates. 
Medical vendor payments made to providers of services for and in behalf of 
recipient households shall be based upon predetermined rates from standards 
developed by the division in cooperation with providers of services for each 
type of service purchased by the division. As far as possible, the rates paid for 
services shall be established in advance of the fiscal year for which funds are 
to be requested. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-7, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sen-
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 7. tence twice substituted "division" for "depart-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- ment." 
26-18-8. Enforcement of public assistance statutes — Con-
tract with Office of Recovery Services. 
(1) The department shall enforce or contract for the enforcement of the 
provisions of Sections 62A-9-121, 62A-9-129, 62A-9-131 through 62A-9-133, 
and 62A-9-135 insofar as these sections pertain to benefits conferred or ad-
ministered by the division under this chapter. 
(2) The department may contract for services covered in Part 1, Chapter 11, 
Title 62A insofar as that chapter pertains to benefits conferred or adminis-
tered by the division under this chapter. 
Higtory: C 1953, 26-18-8, enacted by L. The 1988 amendment by Chapter 21, effec-
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 1, 5 2; 1988, ch. tive July 1, 1988, substituted "division" for 
21, § 8. "department" throughout the section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- This section has been reconciled by the Of-
ment by Chapter 1, effective January 19,1988, fice o f Legislative Research and General Coun-
substituted the present statutory references for ***-
"Sections 55-15a-24, and 55-15a-29 through 
55-15a-33" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter 15c 
of Title 55" in Subsection (2). 
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(3) Any employee of the department who authorizes payment for an abor-
tion contrary to the provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor and subject to forfeiture of office. 
(4) Any person or organization that, under the guise of other medical treat-
ment, provides an abortion under auspices of the Medicaid program is guilty 
of a third degree felony and subject to forfeiture of license to practice medicine 
or authority to provide medical services and treatment. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-4, enacted by L. minor changes in phraseology throughout the 
1981, ch. 126, S 17; 1987, ch. 181, { 2. section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Cross-References. — Penalties for misde-
ment deleted former Subsection (1), relating to meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
the responsibility of counties, redesignated the Sentencing for felonies, §§76-3-201, 
subsequent subsections accordingly and made 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
26-18-5. Contracts for provision of medical services — 
Federal provisions modifying department rules 
— Compliance with Social Security Act. 
(1) The department may contract with other public or private agencies to 
purchase or provide medical services in connection with the programs of the 
division. Where these programs are used by other state agencies, contracts 
shall provide that other state agencies transfer the state matching funds to 
the department in amounts sufficient to satisfy needs of the specified pro-
gram. 
(2) All contracts for the provision or purchase of medical services shall be 
established on the basis of the state's fiscal year and shall remain uniform 
during the fiscal year insofar as possible. Contract terms shall include provi-
sions for maintenance, administration, and service costs. 
(3) If a federal legislative or executive provision requires modifications or 
revisions in an eligibility factor established under this chapter as a condition 
for participation in medical assistance, the department may modify or change 
its rules as necessary to qualify for participation; providing, the provisions of 
this section shall not apply to department rules governing abortion. 
(4) The department shall comply with all pertinent requirements of the 
Social Security Act and all orders, rules, and regulations adopted thereunder 
when required as a condition of participation in benefits under the Social 
Security Act. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-5, enacted by L. tuted "its rules as necessary" for "department 
1981, ch. 126, { 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 6. rules necessary." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- Social Security Act — The federal Social 
ment, efifective July 1, 1988, in the first sen- Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 301 et 
tence of Subsection (1) substituted "division"
 aeqt 
for "department" and in Subsection (3) substi-
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(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of 
Social Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permit-
ted by law and quality control services. 
(4) The department may provide by rule for disciplinary measures and 
sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and proce-
dures of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively shall 
not extend beyond termination from the program or recovery of claim reim-
bursements incorrectly paid. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L. regulations adopted pursuant thereto by the 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5. federal agency" and made various minor phra-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- geology and stylistic changes, 
ment, effective July 1, 1988, in Subsection (2) Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fed-
substituted 'this chapter, the requirements of
 e r a i Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations" U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
for "the requirements of Title XIX and with 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Pub-
lic Welfare § 126. 
Key Numbers. — Social Security *=» 241. 
26-18-3.5. Copayments by health service recipients, 
spouses, and parents. 
The department shall selectively provide for enrollment fees, premiums, 
deductions, cost sharing or other similar charges to be paid by recipients, their 
spouses, and parents, within the limitations of federal law and regulation. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 135, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative 
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 169. 
26-18-4. Department standards for eligibility under Medi-
caid — Funds for abortions. 
(1) The department may develop standards and administer policies relating 
to eligibility under the Medicaid program. An applicant receiving Medicaid 
assistance may be limited to particular types of care or services or to payment 
of part or all costs of care determined to be medically necessary. 
(2) The department shall not provide any funds for medical, hospital, or 
other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible persons 
where the purpose of the assistance is to perform an abortion, unless the life of 
the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not performed. 
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History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 3. makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Peri-
odic assessment. 
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economi-
cal manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to 
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, ex-
cessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or 
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that 
fail to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity 
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to 
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with 
regard to both publicly and privately provided services. 
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods, 
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to: 
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utili-
zation is reasonable and necessary; 
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions; 
(c) mandatory outpatient, rather than inpatient, surgery in appropri-
ate cases; 
(d) second surgical opinions; 
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services; 
(f) coordination of benefits; and 
(g) review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who 
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures 
and provisions of federal law and regulation. 
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effective-
ness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider 
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services 
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreason-
able utilization. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 4. makes the act effective July 1, 1988. 
Social Security Act — Title XDC of the fed-
eral Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by depart-
ment. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regula-
tions. 
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by § 17 of the act. For present provisions relat-
ing to confidential information, see Chapter 25 
of this title. 
26-18-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the 
medical programs of the state. 
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the 
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1. 
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be 
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical 
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assis-
tance for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant 
to Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act. 
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or pay-
ments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance 
under state medical programs. 
(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital 
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L. Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assis-
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1. tance Program established under Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- 26-18-10" for '"the department has determined 
ment, effective July 1, 1988, added present to be eligible for medical or hospital assistance 
Subsections (2) and (3), designated former Sub- under the medical programs of the state " 
sections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6), Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fed-
and, in Subsection (6), substituted "has re- eral Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
ceived medical or hospital assistance under the U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
26-18-2.1. Division — Creation. 
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care Fi-
nancing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and main-
taining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program 
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and applicable federal law. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18*2.1, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 2. makes the act effective on July 1, 1988 
26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities. 
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of 
the department. The director of the division may employ other employees as 
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall: 
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this 
chapter; 
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and 
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in 
compliance with federal law and regulations. 
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ARTICLE 3 
TESTS OF NEWBORN INFANTS 
26-17-21. PKU tests of newborn infants — Board of Health 
to establish rules and regulations. 
The Board of Health shall establish rules and regulations requiring each 
newborn infant to be tested for the presence of phenylketonuria (PKU) and 
other metabolic diseases which may result in mental retardation or brain 
damage and for which a preventive measure or treatment is available and for 
which a laboratory diagnostic test method has been found reliable. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 49, ft 1; 1967, ch. 174, 
136 
26-17-22. Repealed. 
Repeals — Section 26-17-22 (L 1965, ch 
49, § 2), relating to the penalty for violations 
Cross-References. —- Fees for and restric-
tion on testing, § 26-10-6 
of regulations relating to PKU tests, was re-
pealed by Laws 1967, ch 174, § 162 
CHAPTER 18 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT 
Sunset Act — See Section 63-55-7 for the termination date of the Medical Assistance Act 
Section Section 
26-18-1 Short title 
26-18-2 Definitions 
26-18-2 1 Division — Creation 
26-18-2 2 Director — Appointment — Re- 26-18-6 
spo risibilities 
26-18-2 3 Division responsibilities — Em- 26-18-7 
phasis — Periodic assessment 26-18-8 
26-18-3 Administration of Medicaid pro-
gram by department 
26-18-3 5 Copayments by health service re- 26-18-9 
cipients, spouses, and parents 
26-18-4 Department standards for eligi-
bility under Medicaid — Funds 26-18-10 
for abortions 
26-18-5 Contracts for provision of medical 26-18-11 
services — Federal provisions 
modifying department rules — 
Compliance with Social Secu-
rity Act 
Federal aid — Authority of execu-
tive director 
Medical vendor rates 
Enforcement of public assistance 
statutes — Contract with Office 
of Recovery Services 
Prohibited acts of state or local 
employees of Medicaid program 
— Violation a misdemeanor 
Utah Medical Assistance Pro-
gram — Policies and standards 
Rural hospitals 
26-18-1. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance 
Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, ft 17. 
Repeals and Reenactmenta. — Laws 1981, 
ch 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1 to 
26-18-4 (L 1963, ch 38, §§ 1 to 4, 1969, ch 
197, §§ 64, 65, 1971, ch 53, § 1), relating to 
use of confidential information in research 
Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted 
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1435.852 Treatment of income and re-
sources: State plan requirements. 
(a) The State's plan must specify the 
methodology used to treat the income 
and resources for each covered medi-
cally needy group. 
(b) If the agency uses a methodology 
that is not presumed to be reasonable 
under {435.851, the State plan must 
describe that methodology. 
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30,1981] 
Subpart J—Eligibility in the States 
and District of Columbia 
SOUKCT. 44 FR 17937, Mar. 23, 1979, unless 
otherwise noted. 
§435.900 Scope. 
This subpart sets forth requirements 
for processing applications, determin-
ing eligibility, and furnishing Medic-
aid. 
GENERAL METHODS OF ADMINISTRATION 
§435.902 Consistency with objectives and 
statutes. 
The Medicaid agency's standards 
and methods for determining eligibil-
ity must be consistent with the objec-
tives of the program and with the 
rights of individuals under the United 
States Constitution, the Social Securi-
ty Act, title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, and all other relevant 
provisions of Federal and State laws. 
§ 435.903 Simplicity of administration. 
The agency's policies and procedures 
must ensure that eligibility is deter-
mined in a mariner consistent with 
simplicity of administration and the 
best interests of the applicant or recip-
ient. 
§435.904 Adherence of local agencies to 
State plan requirements. 
The agency must— 
(a) Have methods to keep itself cur-
rently informed of the adherence of 
local agencies to the State plan provi-
sions and the agency's procedures for 
determining eligibility; and 
(b) Take corrective action to ensure 
their adherence. 
APPLICATIONS 
§ 435.905 Availability of program informa-
tion. 
(a) The agency must furnish the fol-
lowing information in written form, 
and orally as appropriate, to all appli-
cants and to all other individuals who 
request it: 
(1) The eligibility requirements. 
(2) Available Medicaid services. 
(3) The rights and responsibilities of 
applicants and recipients. 
(b) The agency must publish in 
quantity and make available bulletins 
or pamphlets that explain the rules 
governing eligibility and appeals in 
simple and understandable terms. 
[44 FR 17937, Mar. 23, 1979, as amended at 
45 FR 24887, Apr. 11. 1980] 
§ 435.906 Opportunity to apply. 
The agency must afford an individ-
ual wishing to do so the opportunity 
to apply for Medicaid without delay. 
§ 435.907 Written application. 
The agency must require a written 
application from the applicant, an au-
thorized representative or, if the appli-
cant is incompetent or incapacitated, 
someone acting responsibly for the ap-
plicant. The application must be on a 
form prescribed by the agency and 
signed under a penalty of perjury. 
§ 435.908 Assistance with application. 
The agency must allow an individual 
or individuals of the applicant's choice 
to accompany, assist, and represent 
the applicant in the application proc-
ess or a redetermination of eligibility. 
§ 435.909 Automatic entitlement to Medic-
aid following a determination of eligi-
bility under other programs. 
The agency must not require a sepa-
rate application for Medicaid from an 
individual, if— 
(a) The individual receives AFDC; or 
(b) The agency has an agreement 
with the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) under section 1634 of the 
Act for determining Medicaid eligibil-
ity; and— 
(1) The individual receives SSI; 
(2) The individual receives a manda-
tory State supplement under either a 
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(d) If the agency uses a medically 
needy resource standard not specified 
in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this sec-
tion— 
(1) That standard is not presumed to 
be reasonable; and 
(2) HCPA must approve the stand-
ard. 
C46 FR 47988, Sept SO, 1981; 46 FR 54743, 
Nov. 11,1981] 
0435.843 Medically needy resource stand-
ards: State plan requirements. 
(a) The State plan must specify the 
resource standard for each covered 
medically needy group. 
(b) If the agency uses a resource 
standard that is not presumed to be 
reasonable under (435.841, the State 
plan must describe that standard. 
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30, 1981] 
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY ON THE BASIS 
or RESOURCES 
6435.845 Medically needy resource eligi-
bility. 
To determine eligibility on the basis 
of resources for medically needy indi-
viduals, the agency must— 
(a) Consider only the individual's re-
sources and those that are considered 
available to him under the financial 
responsibility requirements for rela-
tives in §435.821, {435.822, or 
i 435.823; 
(b) Consider only resources available 
during the period for which income is 
computed under § 435.831(a); 
(c) For individuals under age 21 and 
caretaker relatives, deduct the value of 
resources that would be deducted in 
determining eligibility under the 
State's AFDC plan; 
(d) For aged, blind, or disabled indi-
viduals in States covering all SSI re-
cipients, deduct the value of resources 
that would be deducted in determining 
eligibility under SSI; 
(e)(1) For aged, blind, or disabled in-
dividuals in States using requirements 
more restrictive than SSI, deduct the 
value of resources in an amount no 
more restrictive than those deducted 
under the Medicaid plan on January 1, 
1972 and no more liberal than those 
deducted in determining eligibility 
under SSI. 
(2) However, the amounts specified 
in paragraph (e)(1) of this section 
must be the same as those that would 
be deducted in determining, under 
{ 435.121, the eligibility of the categor-
ically needy; and 
(f) Apply the resource standards es-
tablished under { 435.843. 
[43 FR 45204, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at 
45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980; 46 FR 47989, 
Sept. 30,1981] 
TREATMENT OF INCOME AND RESOURCES 
6 435.850 Treatment of income and re-
sources: General requirements. 
To determine eligibility of medically 
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency 
must use a methodology for the treat-
ment of income and resources that is-
(a) Uniform for all individuals in a 
covered group; and 
(b) Reasonable (see § 435.851). 
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30,1981] 
§435.851 Treatment of income and re-
sources: Reasonableness. 
(a) The agency must use a methodol-
ogy for the treatment of income and 
resources, to determine eligibility of 
the medically needy, that is reasona-
ble. 
(b) The methodology used to deter-
mine eligibility of individuals in the 
cash assistance program related to the 
covered medically needy group is pre-
sumed to be reasonable. 
(c) If the agency provides Medicaid 
for the aged, blind, or disabled individ-
uals who meet more restrictive re-
quirements than used under SSI, the 
methodology for the treatment of 
income and resources of those aged, 
blind, or disabled individuals under 
the State's plan on January 1, 1972, is 
presumed to be reasonable. 
(d) If the agency uses a methodology 
not described in paragraphs (b) and (c) 
of this section— 
(1) The methodology is not pre-
sumed to be reasonable; and 
(2) HCFA must approve that meth-
odology. 
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30,1981] 
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(d) Optional deduction: Allowance for home maintenance. For single indi-
viduals and couples, an amount (in ad-
dition to the personal needs allow-
ance) for maintenance of the individ-
ual's or couple's home if— 
(1) The amount is deducted for not 
more than a 6-month period; and 
(2) A physician has certified that 
either of the individuals is likely to 
return to the home within that period. 
(e) Determination of income—il) 
Option, In determining the amount of 
an individual's income to be used to 
reduce the agency's payment to the in-
stitution, the agency may use total 
income received or it may project total 
monthly income for a prospective 
period not to exceed 6 months. 
(2) Basis for projection. The agency 
must base the projection on income re-
ceived in the preceding period, not to 
exceed 6 months, and on income ex-
pected to be received. 
(3) Adjustments. At the end of the 
prospective period specified in para-
graph (e)(1) of this section, or when 
any significant change occurs, the 
agency must reconcile estimates with 
income received. 
(f) Determination of medical ex-
penses—(I) Option. In determining the 
amount of medical expenses to be de-
ducted from an individual's income, 
the agency may deduct incurred medi-
cal expenses, or it may project medical 
expenses for a prospective period not 
to exceed 6 months. 
(2) Basis for projection. The agency 
must base the estimate on medical ex-
penses incurred in the preceding 
period, not to exceed 6 months, and 
medical expenses expected to be in-
curred. 
(3) Adjustments. At the end of the 
prospective period specified in para-
graph (f)(1) of this section, or when 
any significant change occurs, the 
agency must reconcile estimates with 
incurred medical expenses. 
[45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980, as amended at 
46 FR 47988, Sept. 80, 1981; 48 FR 5735, 
Feb. 8, 1983, 53 FR 3596, Feb. 8, 1988; 53 FR 
5344, Feb. 23,1988, 56 FR 8850, 8854, Mar, 1, 
1991] 
MEDICALLY NEEDY RESOURCE STANDARDS 
§435.840 Medically needy resource stand-
ards: General requirements. 
To determine eligibility of medically 
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency 
must use a resource standard under 
this subpart that is— 
(a) Based on family size; (b) Uniform for all individuals in a 
group; and (c) Reasonable. (See { 435.841) 
[46 FR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981, 46 FR 54734, 
Nov. 11,1981] 
§435.841 Medically needy resource stand-
ards: Reasonableness. 
(a) The agency must use a medically 
needy resource standard that is rea-
sonable, according to the provisions of 
this section. (b) The following medlically needy 
resource standards are presumed to be 
reasonable: (1) The agency provides one medical-
ly needy resource standard for all cov-
ered medically needy groups. Except 
as provided in paragraph (c) of this 
section, the standard must at least 
equal the highest resource standard 
used to determine eligibility in the 
cash assistance programs related to 
the covered medically needy groups. 
(2) The agency provides a different 
medically needy resource standard for 
each covered medically needy group. 
Except as provided in paragraph (c) of 
this section, the standard for each cov-
ered group must at least equal the 
highest resource standard used to de-
termine eligibility in the cash assist-
ance program related to that covered 
medically needy group. 
(c) In the case of an agency that pro-
vides Medicaid for the aged, blind, or 
disabled individuals only if they meet 
more restrictive requirements than 
used under SSI, the following provi-
sions apply: 
(1) The agency may use a resource 
standard for those individuals that is 
lower than the standard specified in 
paragraph (b) of this section. 
(2) The lower standard must at least 
equal the medically needy resource 
standard for those aged, blind, or dis-
abled individuals under the State's 
plan on January 1,1972. 
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(d) Eligibility based on incurred 
medical expenses. Once deduction of 
incurred medical expenses reduces 
income to the income standard, the In-
dividual is eligible for Medicaid. 
[43 FR 45204, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at 
45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980; 46 FR 42067, 
Aug. 19. 1981; 46 FR 47988. Sept. 30, 1981] 
§435.832 Post-eligibility treatment of 
income and resources of institutional-
ized individuals: Application of patient 
income to the cost of care. 
(a) Basic rules. (1) The agency must 
reduce its payment to an institution, 
for services provided to an Individual 
specified In paragraph (b) of this sec-
tion, by the amount that remains after 
deducting the amounts specified in 
paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, 
from the individual's total income. 
(2) The individual's Income must be 
determined in accordance with para-
graph (e) of this section. 
(3) Medical expenses must be deter-
mined in accordance with paragraph 
(f) of this section. 
(b) Applicability. This section ap-
plies to medically needy individuals In 
medical institutions and intermediate 
care facilities. 
(c) Required deductions. The agency 
must deduct the following amounts, in 
the following order, from the individ-
ual's total income, as determined 
under paragraph (e) of this section. 
Income that was disregarded in deter-
mining eligibility must be considered 
in this process. 
(1) Personal needs allowance. A per-
sonal needs allowance that is reasona-
ble in amount for clothing and other 
personal needs of the individual while 
in the institution. This protected per-
sonal needs allowance must be at 
least-
CD $30 a month for an aged, blind, or 
disabled individual, including a child 
applying for Medicaid on the basis of 
blindness or dlability. 
(ii) $60 a month for an institutional-
ized couple if both spouses are aged, 
blind, or disabled and their income is 
considered available to each other in 
determining eligibility; and 
(Hi) For other individuals, a reasona-
ble amount set by the agency, based 
on a reasonable difference in their 
personal needs from those of the aged, 
blind, and disabled. 
(2) Maintenance needs of spouse. For 
an individual with only a spouse at 
home, an additional amount for the 
maintenance needs of the spouse. This 
amount must be based on a reasonable 
assessment of need but must not 
exceed the highest of— 
(i) The amount of the income stand-
ard used to determine eligibility for 
SSI for an individual living in his own 
home; 
(ii) The amount of the highest 
income standard, in the appropriate 
category of age, blindness, or disabil-
ity, used to determine eligibility for an 
optional State supplement for an indi-
vidual in his own home, if the agency 
provides Medicaid to optional State 
supplement recipients under {435.230; 
or 
(iii) The amount of the highest 
medically needy income standards for 
one person established under 
S 435.814. 
(3) Maintenance needs of family. For 
an individual with a family at home, 
an additional amount for the mainte-
nance needs of the family. This 
amount must— 
(1) Be based on a reasonable assess-
ment of their financial need; 
(ii) Be adjusted for the number of 
family members living in the home; 
and 
(lii) Not exceed the highest of the 
following need standards for a family 
of the same size: 
(A) The standard used to determine 
eligibility under the State's approved 
AFDC plan. 
(B) The standards used to determine 
eligibility under the State's Medicaid 
plan, as provided for in § 435.814. 
(4) Expenses not subject to third 
party payment. Amounts for incurred 
expenses for medical or remedial care 
that are not subject to payment by a 
third party, including— 
(i) Medicare and other health insur-
ance permiums, deductibles, or coin-
surance charges; and 
(ii) Necessary medical or remedial 
care recognized under State law but 
not covered under the State's Medic-
aid plan, subject to reasonable limits 
the agency may establish on amounts 
of these expenses. 
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[46 FR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 46 FR 54743, 
Nov. 4, 19813 
6435.823 Financial responsibility of rela-
tives of aged, blind, or disabled individ-
uals in States using more restrictive re-
quirements than SSI. 
(a) The agency must meet the re-
quirements of this section in determin-
ing eligibility under § 435.330 of medi-
cally needy aged, blind, and disabled 
individuals. 
(b) For aged, blind, or disabled indi-
viduals with spouses, the agency— 
(1) Must consider income and re-
sources as available if they are actual-
ly contributed by one spouse tfo the 
other; and 
(2) May consider income and re-
sources of spouses as available to each 
other even if they are not actually 
contributed. 
(c) For blind or disabled individuals 
under age 21, the agency-
CD Must consider the parent's or 
spouse's income and resources as avail-
able if they are actually contributed to 
the individual; and 
(2) May consider the parent's or 
spouse's income and resources as avail-
able even if they are not actually con-
tributed. 
[46 FR 47988, Sept. 30,1981] 
MEDICALLY NEEDY INCOME ELIGIBILITY 
§ 435.831 Income eligibility. 
The agency must determine income 
eligibility of medically needy individ-
uals in accordance with this section. 
The agency must use a prospective 
period of not more than 6 months to 
compute income. 
(a) Determining countable income. 
The agency must deduct the following 
amounts from income to determine 
the individual's countable income. 
(1) For individuals under age 21 and 
caretaker relatives, the agency must 
deduct amounts that would be deduct-
ed in determining eligibility under the 
State's AFDC plan. 
(2) For aged, blind, or disabled indi-
viduals in States covering all SSI re-
cipients, the agency must deduct 
amounts that would be deducted in de-
termining eligibility under SSI. How-
ever, the agency must also deduct the 
highest amounts from income that 
would be deducted in determining eli-
gibility for optional State supplements 
if these supplements are paid to all in-
dividuals who are receiving SSI or 
would be eligible for SSI except for 
their income. 
(3) For aged, blind, or disabled indi-
viduals in States using income require-
ments more restrictive than SSI, the 
agency must deduct amounts that are 
no more restrictive than those used 
under the Medicaid plan on January 1, 
1972 and no more liberal than those 
deducted in determining eligibility 
under SSI or an optional State supple-
ment. However, the amounts must be 
at least the same as those that would 
be deducted in determining eligibility, 
under § 435.121, of the categorically 
needy. 
(b) Eligibility based on countable 
income. If countable income deter-
mined under paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion is equal to or less than the appli-
cable income standard under § 435.814, 
the individual or family is eligible for 
Medicaid. 
(c) Deduction of incurred medical 
expenses. (1) If countable income ex-
ceeds the income standard, the agency 
must deduct from income, in the fol-
lowing order, incurred medical ex-
penses that are not subject to pay-
ment by a third party: 
(i) Medicare and other health insur-
ance premiums, deductibles, or coin-
surance charges, incurred by the indi-
vidual or family or financially respon-
sible relatives, including enrollment 
fees, copayments, or deductibles im-
posed under § 447.51 or § 447.53 of this 
subchapter. 
(ii) Expenses incurred by the individ-
ual or family or financially responsible 
relatives for necessary medical and re-
medial services that are recognized 
under State law but not included in 
the plan. 
(iii) Expenses incurred by the indi-
vidual or family or by financially re-
sponsible relatives for necessary medi-
cal and remedial services that aire in-
cluded in the plan. 
(2) The agency may set reasonable 
limits on the amounts of incurred 
medical expenses to be deducted from 
income under paragraphs (c)(1) (i) and 
(ii) of this section. 
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§ 416.1212 Exclusion of the home. 
(a) Defined. A home is any property 
in which an individual (and spouse, if 
any) has an ownership interest and 
which serves as the individual's princi-
pal place of residence. This property 
includes the shelter in which an indi-
vidual resides, the land on which the 
shelter is located and related outbuild-
ings. 
(b) Home not counted We do not 
count a home regardless of its value. 
However, see §§416.1220 through 
416.1224 when there is an income-pro-
ducing property located on the home 
property that does not qualify under 
the home exclusion. 
(c) / / an individual changes princi-
pal place of residence. If an individual 
(and spouse, if any) moves out of his 
or her home without the intent to 
return, the home becomes a countable 
resource because it is no longer the in-
dividual's principal place of residence. 
If an individual leaves his or her home 
to live in an institution, we still consid-
er the home to be the individual's 
principal place of residence, irrespec-
tive of the individual's intent to 
return, as long as a spouse or depend-
ent relative of the eligible individual 
continues to live there. The individ-
ual's equity in the former home be-
comes a countable resource effective 
with the first day of the month follow-
ing the month it is no longer his or 
her principal place of residence. 
(d) Proceeds from the sale of an ex-
cluded home. The proceeds from the 
sale of a home which is excluded from 
the individual's resources will also be 
excluded from resources to the extent 
they are intended to be used and are, 
in fact, used to purchase another 
home, which is similarly excluded, 
within 3 months of the date of receipt 
of the proceeds. 
[50 FR 42686, Oct. 22. 1985, as amended at 
51 FR 7437, Mar. 4. 19863 
8 416.1216 Exclusion of household goods 
and personal effects. 
(a) Household goods and personal ef-
fects; defined. Household goods are de-
fined as including household furni-
ture, furnishings and equipment 
which are commonly found in or about 
a house and are used in connection 
with the operation, maintenance tad 
occupancy of the home. Household 
goods would also include the furni-
ture, furnishings and equipment 
which are used in the functions and 
activities of home and family life ai 
well as those items which are for com-
fort and accommodation. Personal ef-
fects are defined as including clothing, 
jewelry, items of personal care, indi-
vidual education and 
(b) Limitation on household gooix 
and personal effects. In determining 
the resources of an individual (and 
spouse, if any), household goods and 
personal effects are excluded if their 
total equity value is $2,000 or less. If 
the total equity value of household 
goods and personal effects is in excess 
of $2,000, the excess is counted against 
the resource limitation. 
(c) Additional exclusions of house-
hold goods and personal effects. In de-
termining the resources of an individ-
ual (and spouse, if any) and in deter-
mining the value of the household 
goods and personal effects of such in-
dividual (and spouse), there shall be 
excluded a wedding ring and an en-
gagement ring and household goods 
and personal effects such as prosthetic 
devices, dialysis machines, hospital 
beds, wheel chairs and similar equip-
ment required because of a person's 
physical condition. The exclusion of 
items required because of a person's 
physical condition is not applicable to 
items which are used extensively and 
primarily by members of the house-
hold in addition to the person whose 
physical condition requires the item. 
[40 FR 48915, Oct. 20,1975, as amended at 
44 FR 43266, July 24,19793 
§ 416.1218 Exclusion of the automobile. 
(a) Automobile; defined. As used in 
this section, the term automobile in-
cludes, in addition to passenger cars, 
other vehicles used to provide neces-
sary transportation. 
(b) Limitation on automobiles. In 
determining the resources of an indi-
vidual (and spouse, if any), automo-
biles are excluded or counted as fol-
lows: 
(1) Total exclusion. One automobile 
is totally excluded regardless of its 
value if, for the individual or a 
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of the month. A resource determina-
tion is based on what assets an individ-
ual has, what their values are, and 
whether or not they are excluded as of 
the first moment of the month. 
(b) Increase in value of resources. If, 
during a month, a resource increases 
to value or an individual acquires an 
additional resource or replaces an ex-
cluded resource with one that is not 
excluded, the increase in the value of 
the resources is counted as of the first 
moment of the next month 
(c) Decrease in value of resources. If, 
during a month, a resource decreases 
in value or an individual spends a re-
source or replaces a resource that is 
not excluded with one that is ex-
cluded, the decrease in the value of 
the resources is counted as of the first 
moment of the next month. 
(d) Treatment of items under income 
and resource counting rules. Items re-
ceived in cash or in kind during a 
month are evaluated first under the 
income counting rules and, if retained 
until the first moment of the follow-
ing month, are subject to the rules for 
counting resources at that time. 
(e) Receipts from the sale, exchange, 
or replacement of a resource. If an in-
dividual sells, exchanges or replaces a 
resource, the receipts are not income. 
They are still considered to be a re-
source. This rule includes resources 
that have never been counted as such 
because they were sold, exchanged or 
replaced in the month in which they 
were received. See § 416.1246 for the 
rule on resources disposed of for less 
than fair market value (including 
those disposed of during the month of 
receipt). 
Example: Miss L., a disabled individual, re-
ceives a $350 unemployment insurance ben-
efit on January 10, 1986. The benefit is un-
earned income to Miss L. when she receives 
'* On January 14, Miss L. uses the $350 pay-
ment to purchase shares of stock. Miss L. 
tos exchanged one item (cash) for another 
am (stock). The $350 payment is never 
sunted as a resource to Miss L. because she 
c^hanged it in the same month she re-
sted it. The stock is not income; it is a dif-
«rent form of a resource exchanged for the 
ash. Since a resource is not countable until 
•be first moment of the month foUowing its 
"weipt, the stock is not a countable re-
source to Miss L. until February 1. 
$2 FR 4283, Feb. 11.19873 
6 416.1210 Exclusions from resources; gen-
eral. 
In determining the resources of an 
individual (and spouse, If any) the fol-
lowing items shall be excluded: 
(a) The home (including the land ap-
pertaining thereto) to the extent its 
value does not exceed the amount set 
forth in § 416.1212; 
(b) Household goods and personal ef-
fects to the extent that their total 
value does not exceed the amount pro-
vided in § 416.1216; 
(c) An automobile to the extent that 
its value does not exceed the amount 
provided in f 416.1218; 
(d) Property of a trade or business 
which is essential to the means of self-
support as provided in § 416.1222; 
(e) Nonbusiness property which is 
essential to the means of self-support 
as provided in § 416.1224; 
(f) Resources of a blind or disabled 
individual which are necessary to ful-
fill an approved plan for achieving 
self-support as provided in § 416.1226; 
(g) Stock in regional or village corpo-
rations held by natives of Alaska 
during the twenty-year period in 
which the stock is inalienable pursu-
ant to the Alaska Native Claims Set-
tlement Act (see § 416.1228); 
(h) Life insurance owned by an indi-
vidual (and spouse, if any) to the 
extent provided in § 416.1230; and 
(i) Restricted allotted land owned by 
an enrolled member of an Indian tribe 
as provided in § 416.1234; 
(j) Payments or benefits provided 
under a Federal statute other than 
title XVI of the Social Security Act 
where exclusion is required by such 
statute; 
(k) Disaster relief assistance as pro-
vided in § 416.1237; 
(1) Burial spaces and certain funds 
up to $1,500 for burial expenses as pro-
vided in § 416.1231. 
(m) Title XVI or title II retroactive 
payments as provided in § 416.1233. 
(n) Housing assistance as provided in 
i 416.1238. 
[40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, as amended at 
41 FR 13338. Mar. 30, 1976; 44 FR 15664. 
Mar. 15, 1979; 48 FR 57127, Dec. 28, 1983; 51 
FR 34464, Sept. 29, 1986; 55 FR 28378, July 
11.1990] 
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applicable exclusions from resources 
are explained in {§416.1210 (para-
graphs (a) through (i) and (k» 
through 416.1237. For resources ex-
cluded by Federal statutes other than 
the Social Security Act, as applicable 
to the resources of sponsors deemed to 
aliens, see the appendix to subpart K, 
Income. We next allocate for the spon-
sor or for the sponsor and spouse (if 
living together). (The amount of the 
allocation is the applicable resource 
limit described in § 416.1205 for an eli-
gible individual and an individual and 
spouse.) 
(b) An alien sponsored by more than 
one sponsor. The resources of an alien 
who has been sponsored by more than 
one person are deemed to include the 
resources of each sponsor. 
(c) More than one alien sponsored by 
one individual If more than one alien 
is sponsored by one individual the 
deemed resources are deemed to each 
alien as if he or she were the only one 
sponsored by the individual. 
(d) Alien has a sponsor and a parent 
or a spouse with deemable resources. 
Resources may be deemed to an alien 
from both a sponsor and a spouse or 
parent (if the alien is a child) provided 
that the sponsor and the spouse or 
parent are not the same person and 
the conditions for each rule are met. 
(e) Alien's sponsor is also the alien's 
ineligible spouse or parent If the 
sponsor is also the alien's ineligible 
spouse or parent who lives in the same 
household, the spouse-to-spouse or 
parent-to-child deeming rules apply in-
stead of the sponsor-to-alien deeming 
rules. If the spouse or parent deeming 
rules cease to apply, the sponsor deem-
ing rules will begin to apply. The 
spouse or parent rules may cease to 
apply if an alien child reaches age 18 
or if either the sponsor who is the in-
eligible spouse or parent, or the alien 
moves to a separate household. 
(f) Alien's sponsor also is the ineligi-
ble spouse or parent of another SSI 
beneficiary. If the sponsor is also the 
ineligible spouse or ineligible parent of 
an SSI beneficiary other than the 
alien, the sponsor's resources are 
deemed to the alien under the rules in 
paragraph (a), and to the eligible 
spouse or child under the rules in 
§§ 416.1202, 1205, 1234, 1236, and 1237. 
[52 FR 8888. Mar. 20,1987] 
§ 416.1204a Deeming of resources where 
Medicaid! eligibility is affected. 
Section 416.1161a of this part de-
scribes certain circumstances affecting 
Medicaid eligibility in which the De-
partment will not deem family income 
to an individual. The Department will 
follow the same standards, procedures, 
and limitations set forth in that sec-
tion with respect to deeming of re-
sources. 
[49 FR 5747, Feb. 15,1984) 
§ 416.1205 Limitation on resources. 
(a) Individual with no eligible 
spouse. An aged, blind, or disabled in-
dividual with no spouse is eligible for 
benefits under title XVI of the Act if 
his or her nonexcludable resources do 
not exceed $1,500 prior to January 1, 
1985, and all other eligibility require-
ments are met. An individual who is 
living with an ineligible spouse is eligi-
ble for benefits under title XVI of the 
Act if his or her nonexcludable re-
sources, including the resources of the 
spouse, do not exceed $2,250 prior to 
January 1, 1985, and all other eligibil-
ity requirements are met. 
(b) Individual with an eligible 
spouse. An aged, blind, or disabled in-
dividual who has an eligible spouse is 
eligible for benefits under title XVI of 
the Act if their nonexcludable re-
sources do not exceed $2,250 prior to 
January 1, 1985, and all other eligibil-
ity requirements are met. 
(c) Effective January 1, 1985 and 
later. The resources limits and effec-
tive dates for January 1, 1985 and 
later are as follows: 
Effactrve date 
Jtn 1, 1965 
Jan 1, 1986 
Jan 1,1987 
Jan 1, 1988 
Jan 1, 1989 
Individual 
$1,600 
1,700 
1,800 
1,900 
2.000 
Individual 
and spouse 
$2*00 
$2550 
$2700 
$2 850 
$3000 
[50 FR 38982, Sept. 26, 1985] 
§416.1207 Resources determinations. 
(a) General Resources determina-
tions are made as of the first moment 
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such individual's resources shall be 
deemed to include any resources, not 
otherwise excluded under this subpart, 
of such spouse whether or not such re-
sources are available to such individ-
ual. In addition to the exclusions 
listed in {416.1210, pension funds 
which the ineligible spouse may have 
are also excluded. Pension funds are 
defined as funds held in individual re-
tirement accounts (IRA), as described 
by the Internal Revenue Code, or in 
work-related pension plans (including 
such plans for self-employed individ-
uals, sometimes referred to as Keogh 
plans). 
(b) Child. In the case of a child (as 
defined in { 416.1856) who is under age 
18, such child's resources shall be 
deemed to include any resources, not 
otherwise excluded under this subpart, 
of an ineligible parent of such child 
(or the ineligible spouse of a parent) 
who is living in the same household 
(as defined in { 416.1851) as such child, 
whether or not available to such child, 
to the extent that the resources of 
such parent (or such spouse of a 
parent) exceed the resource limits de-
scribed in § 416.1205. (If the child is 
living with only one parent, the re-
source limit for an individual applies. 
If the child is living with both parents 
(or one parent and his or her spouse), 
the resource limit for an individual 
ind spouse applies.) In addition to the 
exclusions listed in J 416.1210, pension 
funds which the ineligible parent or 
spouse of a parent may have are also 
excluded. Pension funds are defined in 
paragraph (a) of this section. As used 
in this section, the term parent means 
the natural or adoptive parent of a 
child and spouse of a parent means the 
spouse (as defined in §416.1806) of 
such natural or adoptive parent. 
(c) Applicability. When used in this 
subpart L, the term individual refers 
to an eligible aged, blind, or disabled 
person, and also includes a person 
whose resources are deemed to be the 
resources of such individual (as provid-
ed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section). 
(40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, as amended at 
SO FR 38982, Sept. 26, 1985; 52 FR 8888, 
tt&r. 20, 1987; 52 FR 29841, Aug. 12, 1987; 52 
FR 32240, Aug. 26,1987] 
§ 416.1203 Deeming of resources of an es-
sential person. 
In the case of a qualified individual 
(as defined in §416.221) whose pay-
ment standard has been increased be-
cause of the presence of an essential 
person (as defined in § 416.222), the re-
sources of such qualified individual 
shall be deemed to include all the re-
sources of such essential person. If 
such qualified individual would not 
meet the resource criteria for eligibil-
ity (as defined in §§416.1205 and 
416.1260) because of the deemed re-
sources, then the payment standard 
increase because of the essential 
person will be nullified and the provi-
sion of this section will not apply; es-
sential person status is lost perma-
nently. However, if such essential 
person is an ineligible spouse of a 
qualified individual or a parent (or 
spouse of a parent) of a qualified indi-
vidual who is a child under age 21, 
then the resources of such person will 
be deemed to such qualified individual 
in accordance with the provision in 
§ 416.1202. 
[39 FR 33797, Sept. 20. 1974, as amended at 
51 FR 10616, Mar. 28, 1986] 
§416.1204 Deeming of resources of the 
sponsor of an alien. 
The resources of an alien who first 
applies for SSI benefits after Septem-
ber 30, 1980, are deemed to include the 
resources of the alien's sponsor for 3 
years after the alien's date -of admis-
sion into the United States. The date 
of admission is the date established by 
the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service as the date of admission for 
permanent residence. The resources of 
the sponsor's spouse are included if 
the sponsor and spouse live in the 
same household. Deeming of these re-
sources applies regardless of whether 
the alien and sponsor live in the same 
household and regardless of whether 
the resources are actually available to 
the alien. For rules that apply in spe-
cific situations, see § 416.1166a(d). 
(a) Exclusions from the sponsor's re-
sources. Before we deem a sponsor's 
resources to an alien we exclude the 
same kinds of resources that are ex-
cluded from the resources of an indi-
vidual eligible for SSI benefits. The 
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similar programs, unless determined by the 
Director of the Action Agency to constitute 
the minimum wage, under sections 404(g) 
and 418 of the Domestic Volunteer Service 
Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 409, 413), as amended 
by Pub. L. No. 96-143; (93 Stat. 1077); 42 
UJS C. 5044(g) and 5058). 
NOTE—This exclusion does not apply to 
the income of sponsors of aliens. 
(b) Any assistance to an individual (other 
than wages or salaries) under the Older 
Americans Act of 1965, as amended by sec-
tion 102(h)(1) of Pub. L. 95-478 (92 Stat. 
1515, 42 U.S.C. 3020a). 
[45 FR 65547, Oct. 3, 1980, as amended at 52 
FR 8888, Mar. 20, 19873 
Subpart L—Resources and Exclusions 
AUTHORITY: Sees. 1102, 1602, 1611, 1612, 
1613, 1614(f), 1621, and 1631 of the Social 
Security Act; 42 U.S.C. 1302, 1381a, 1382, 
1382a, 1382b, 1382c(f), 1382J, and 1383; sec. 
211 of Pub. L. 93-66; 87 Stat. 154. 
SOURCE: 40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, unless 
otherwise noted. 
§ 416.1201 Resources; general. 
(a) Resources; defined. For purposes 
of this subpart L, resources means 
cash or other liquid assets or any real 
or personal property that an individ-
ual (or spouse, if any) owns and could 
convert to cash to be used for his or 
her support and maintenance. 
(1) If the individual has the right, 
authority or power to liquidate the 
property or his or her share of the 
property, it is considered a resource. If 
a property right cannot be liquidated, 
the property will not be considered a 
resource of the individual (or spouse). 
(2) Support and maintenance assist-
ance not counted as income under 
§ 416.1157(c) will not be considered a 
resource. 
(3) Except for cash reimbursement 
of medical or social services expenses 
already paid for by the individual, 
cash received for medical or social 
services that is not income under 
(416.1103 (a) or (b) is not a resource 
for the calendar month following the 
month of its receipt. However, cash re-
tained until the first moment of the 
second calendar month following its 
receipt is a resource at that time. 
(4) Death benefits, including gifts 
and inheritances, received by an indi-
vidual, to the extent that they are not 
income in accordance with paragraphs 
(e) and (g) of § 416.1121 because they 
are to be spent on costs resulting from 
the last illness and burial of the de-
ceased, are not resources for the calen-
dar month following the month of re-
ceipt. However, such death benefits re-
tained until the first moment of the 
second calendar month following their 
receipt are resources at that time. 
(b) Liquid resources. Liquid re-
sources are cash or other property 
which can be converted to cash within 
20 days, excluding certain nonwork 
days as explained in § 416.120(d). Ex-
amples of resources that are ordinarily 
liquid are stocks, bonds, mutual fund 
shares, promissory notes, mortgages, 
life insurance policies, bank accounts 
(savings and checking), certificates of 
deposit and similar items. Liquid re-
sources, other than cash, are evaluat-
ed according to the individual's equity 
in the resources. 
(c) Nonliquid resources. (1) Nonli-
quid resources are property which is 
not cash and which cannot be convert-
ed to cash within 20 days excluding 
certain nonwork days as explained in 
§ 416.120(d). Examples of resources 
that are ordinarily nonliquid are loan 
agreements, household goods, automo-
biles, trucks, tractors, boats, machin-
ery, livestock,, buildings and land. Non-
liquid resources are evaluated accord-
ing to their equity value except as oth-
erwise provided. (See §416.1218 for 
treatment of automobiles.) 
(2) For purposes of this subpart L, 
the equity value of an item is defined 
as: 
(i) The price that item can reason-
ably be expected to sell for on the 
open market in the particular geo-
graphic area Involved; minus 
(ii) Any encumbrances. 
[40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, as amended at 
44 FR 43266, July 24, 1979; 48 FR 33259, 
July 21, 1983; 52 FR 4283, Feb. 11, 1987; 52 
FR 16845, May 6, 1987; 53 FR 23231, June 
21,1988; 56 FR 36001, July 30. 1991] 
§ 416.1202 Deeming of resources. 
(a) Married individual In the case 
of an individual who is living with a 
person not eligible under this part and 
who is considered to be the husband 
or wife of such individual under the 
criteria in §§416.1806 and 416.1811 
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(34) provide that in the case of any individual who has been 
determined to be eligible for medical assistance under the plan, 
such assistance will be made available to him for care and 
services included under the plan and furnished in or after the 
third month before the month in which he made application (or 
application was made on his behalf in the case of a deceased 
individual) for such assistance if such individual was (or upon 
application would have been) eligible for such assistance at the 
time such care and services were furnished; 
(35) provide that any disclosing entity (as defined in section 
1320a-3(a)(2) of this title) receiving payments under such plan 
complies with the requirements of section 1320a-3 of this title; 
(36) provide that within 90 days following the completion of 
each survey of any health care facility, laboratory, agency, 
clinic, or organization, by the appropriate State agency de-
scribed in paragraph (9), such agency shall (in accordance with 
regulations of the Secretary) make public in readily available 
form and place the pertinent findings of each such surve) 
relating to the compliance of each such health care facility, 
laboratory, clinic, agency, or organization with (A) the statutory 
conditions of participation imposed under this subchapter, and 
(B) the major additional conditions which the Secretary finds 
necessary in the interest of health and safety of individuals who 
are furnished care or services by any such facility, laboratory, 
clinic, agency, or organization; 
(37) provide for claims payment procedures which (A) en-
sure that 90 per centum of claims for payment (for which no 
further written information or substantiation is required in 
order to make payment) made for services covered under the 
plan and furnished by health care practitioners through individ-
ual or group practices or through shared health facilities are 
paid within 30 days of the date of receipt of such claims and 
that 99 per centum of such claims are paid within 90 days of 
the date of receipt of such claims, and (B) provide for proce-
dures of prepayment and postpayment claims review, including 
review of appropriate data with respect to the recipient and 
provider of a service and the nature of the service for which 
payment is claimed, to ensure the proper and efficient payment 
of claims and management of the program; 
(38) require that an entity (other than an individual practi-
tioner or a group of practitioners) that furnishes, or arranges 
for the furnishing of, items or services under the plan, shall 
supply (within such period as may be specified in regulations 
by the Secretary or by the single State agency which adminis-
ters or supervises the administration of the plan) upon request 
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payments under any plan of the State approved under subchap-
ter I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, or to have 
paid with respect to him supplemental security income benefits 
under subchapter XVI of this chapter) as would not be dis-
regarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his 
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for 
reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources, and (D) 
do not take into account the financial responsibility of any 
individual for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the 
plan unless such applicant or recipient is such individual's 
spouse or such individual's child who is under age 21 or (with 
respect to States eligible to participate in the State program 
established under subchapter XVI of this chapter), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as 
defined in section 1382c of this title (with respect to States 
which are not eligible to participate in such program); and 
provide for flexibility in the application of such standards with ^ ^ 
respect to income by taking into account, except to the extent ^ <*i 
prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of ~ 9;% 
insurance premiums, payments made to the State under section ; ^ « ^ 
1396b(f)(2)(B) of this title, or otherwise and regardless of ^ " . ^ 
whether such costs are reimbursed under another public pro- v - ^5^ 
gram of the State or political subdivision thereof) incurred for -^ ^ 
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized 
under State law; 
(18) comply with the provisions of section 1396p of this title 
with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical 
assistance correctly paid, and transfers of assets; 
(19) provide such safeguards as may be necessary to assure 
that eligibility for care and services under the plan will be 
determined, and such care and services will be provided, in a 
manner consistent with simplicity of administration and the 
best interests of the recipients; 
(20) if the State plan includes medical assistance in behalf of 
individuals 65 years of age or older who are patients in institu-
tions for mental diseases— 
(A) provide for having in effect such agreements or other 
arrangements with State authorities concerned with mental 
diseases, and, where appropriate, with such institutions, as 
may be necessary for carrying out the State plan, including 
arrangements for joint planning and for development of 
alternate methods of care, arrangements providing assur-
ance of immediate readmittance to institutions where need-
ed for individuals under alternate plans of care, and ar-
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(E) for payment for services described in clause (B) or 
(C) of section 1396d(a)(2) of this title under the plan of 100 
percent of costs which are reasonable and related to the 
cost of furnishing such services or based on such other tests 
of reasonableness, as the Secretary prescribes in regula 
tions under section 1395/(a)(3) of this title, or, in the case 
of services to which those regulations do not apply, on the 
same methodology used under section 13957(a)(3) of this 
title; and 
(F) for payment for home and community care (as de-
fined in section 1396t(a) of this title and provided under 
such section) through rates which are reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs of providing care, efficiently and 
economically, in conformity with applicable State and Fed-
eral laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards, 
(14) provide that enrollment fees, premiums, or similar 
charges, and deductions, cost sharing, or similar charges, may 
be imposed only as provided in section 1396o of this title, 
(15) Repealed. Pub.L. 100-360, Title III, § 301(e)(2)(C), as 
added by Pub.L. 100-485, Title VI, § 608(d)(14)(I)(iii), Oct. 13, 
1988, 102 Stat. 2416. 
(16) provide for inclusion, to the extent required by regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary, of provisions (conforming to 
such regulations) with respect to the furnishing of medical 
assistance under the plan to individuals who are residents of 
the State but are absent therefrom; 
(17) except as provided in subsections (/)(3), (m)(3), and 
(m)(4) of this section, include reasonable standards (which 
shall be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with 
standards prescribed by the Secretary, differ with respect to 
income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of 
assistance under the plan who are not receiving aid or assist-
ance under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I, 
X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV of this chapter, and 
with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits 
are not being paid under subchapter XVI of this chapter, based 
on the variations between shelter costs in urban areas and in 
rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of 
medical assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with 
the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking into 
account only such income and resources as are, as determined 
in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, avail-
able to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any 
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and re-
sources, be eligible for aid or assistance in the form of money 
400 
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(V) who are qualified family members as de-
fined in section 1396d(m)(l) of this title;1 
(VI) who are described in subparagraph (C) of 
subsection (/)(1) of this section and whose family 
income does not exceed the income level the State 
is required to establish under subsection (/ )(2)(B) 
of this section for such a family, or 
(VII) who are described in subparagraph (D) of 
subsection (/)(1) of this section and whose family 
income does not exceed the income level the State 
is required to establish under subsection (/ )(2)(C) 
of this section for such a family; 
(11) at the option of the State, to any group or groups 
of individuals described in section 1396d(a) of this title 
(or, in the case of individuals described in section 
1396d(a)(i) of this title, to any reasonable categories of 
such individuals) who are not individuals described in 
clause (i) of this subparagraph but— C ^ ; 
(I) who meet the income and resources require- . o Ce-
ments of the appropriate State plan described in -;c: ".L^ 
clause (i) or the supplemental security income pro- - r\ ^ 
gram (as the case may be), *;p _3 
(II) who would meet the income and resources 
requirements of the appropriate State plan de-
scribed in clause (i) if their work-related child care 
costs were paid from their earnings rather than by 
a State agency as a service expenditure, 
(III) who would be eligible to receive aid under 
the appropriate State plan described in clause (i) if 
coverage under such plan was as broad as allowed 
under Federal law, 
(IV) with respect to whom there is being paid, or 
who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were 
not in a medical institution, to have paid with 
respect to them, aid or assistance under the appro-
priate State plan described in clause (i), supple-
mental security income benefits under subchapter 
XVI of this chapter, or a State supplementary pay-
ment;1 
(V) who are in a medical institution for a period 
of not less than 30 consecutive days (with eligibili-
ty by reason of this subclause beginning on the 
first day of such period), who meet the resource 
requirements of the appropriate State plan de-
391 
42 § 1396a SOCIAL SECURITY CL 7 
(A) that the State health agency, or other appropriate 
State medical agency (whichever is utilized by the Secre 
tary for the purpose specified in the first sentence of 
section 1395aa(a) of this title), shall be responsible for 
establishing and maintaining health standards for private 
or public institutions in which recipients of medical assist-
ance under the plan may receive care or services, 
(B) for the establishment or designation of a State au-
thority or authorities which shall be responsible for estab-
lishing and maintaining standards, other than those relat-
ing to health, for such institutions, and 
(C) that any laboratory services paid for under such plan 
must be provided by a laboratory which meets the applica 
ble requirements of section 1395x(e)(9) of this title or 
paragraphs (13) and (14)! of section 1395x(s) of this title, 
or, in the case of a laboratory which is in a rural health 
clinic, of section 1395x(aa)(2)(G) of this title; 
(10) provide— 
(A) for making medical assistance available, including at 
least the care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through 
(5), (17) and (21) of section 1396d(a) of this title, to-
(1) all individuals— 
(I) who are receiving aid or assistance under any 
plan of the State approved under subchapter I, X, 
XIV, or XVI of this chapter, or part A or part E of 
subchapter IV of this chapter (including individu-
als eligible under this subchapter by reason of 
section 602(a)(37), 606(h), or 673(b) of this title, or 
considered by the State to be receiving such aid as 
authorized under section 682(e)(6) of this title), 
(II) with respect to whom supplemental security 
income benefits are being paid under subchapter 
XVI of this chapter or who are qualified severely 
impaired individuals (as defined in section 
1396d(q) of this title), 
(III) who are qualified pregnant women or chil-
dren as defined in section 1396d(n) of this title, 
(IV) who are described in subparagraph (A) or 
(B) of subsection (/)(1) of this section and whose 
family income does not exceed the minimum in-
come level the State is required to establish under 
subsection (/ )(2)(A) of this section for such a fami-
ly;1 
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of recipients and other persons of low income, as community 
service aides, in the administration of the plan and for the use 
of nonpaid or partially paid volunteers in a social service 
volunteer program in providing services to applicants and re-
cipients and in assisting any advisory committees established 
by the State agency, and (C) that each State or local officer or 
employee who is responsible for the expenditure of substantial 
amounts of funds under the State plan, each individual who 
formerly was such an officer or employee, and each partner of 
such an officer or employee shall be prohibited from commit-
ting any act, in relation to any activity under the plan, the 
commission of which, in connection with any activity concern-
ing the United States Government, by an officer or employee of 
the United States Government, an individual who was such an 
officer or employee, or a partner of such an officer or employ-
ee is prohibited by section 207 or 208 of Title 18; 
(5) either provide for the establishment or designation of a 
single State agency to administer or to supervise the adminis-
tration of the plan; or provide for the establishment or designa-
tion of a single State agency to administer or to supervise the 
administration of the plan, except that the determination of 
eligibility for medical assistance under the plan shall be made 
by the State or local agency administering the State plan ap-
proved under subchapter I or XVI of this chapter (insofar as it 
relates to the aged) if the State is eligible to participate in the 
State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this 
chapter, or by the agency or agencies administering the supple-
mental security income program established under subchapter 
XVI or the State plan approved under part A of subchapter IV 
of this chapter if the State is not eligible to participate in the 
State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this 
chapter; 
(6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in 
such form and containing such information, as the Secretary 
may from time to time require, and comply with such provi-
sions as the Secretary may from time to time find necessary to 
assure the correctness and verification of such reports; 
(7) provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of 
information concerning applicants and recipients to purposes 
directly connected with the administration of the plan; 
(8) provide that all individuals wishing to make application 
for medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to 
do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reason-
able promptness to all eligible individuals; 
(9) provide— 
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Note 3 
5. Eligibility even though she was not eligible pursu-
Although persons eligible for Aid to ant to state regulation. Cruz v. Commit 
Families with Dependent Children are sioner of Public Welfare, 1985, 478 
automatically eligible for medicaid, per- N.E.2d 1262, 395 Mass. 107. 
sons who do not qualify for welfare as-
sistance may nevertheless still qualify *n or(Jcrf f o r P«"K>n t 0 Quality for 
for medicaid. Perez v. Lavine, D.C.N.Y. medicaid, that person must be eligible 
1976, 412 F.Supp. 1340, supplemented and to be eligible a person must qualif) 
422 F.Supp. 1259. under a state plan which agrees with all 
If alien was permanently residing in the statutes and regulations promulgated 
United States under color of law within under this chapter. Flathead Health 
meaning of federal regulation, she was Center v. Flathead County, 1979, 598 
eligible to receive Medicaid benefits, P.2d 1111, 183 Mont. 211. 
§ 1396a* State plans for medical assistance 
(a) Contents 
A State plan for medical assistance must— 
(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivi-
sions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandator}' 
upon them; 
(2) provide for financial participation by the State equal to 
not less than 40 per centum of the non-Federal share of the 
expenditures under the plan with respect to which payments 
under section 1396b of this title are authorized by this subchap-
ter; and, effective July 1, 1969, provide for financial partic-
ipation by the State equal to all of such non-Federal share or 
provide for distribution of funds from Federal or State sources, 
for carrying out the State plan, on an equalization or other 
basis which will assure that the lack of adequate funds from 
local sources will not result in lowering the amount, duration, 
scope, or quality of care and services available under the plan; 
(3) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing 
before the State agency to any individual whose claim for 
medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon 
with reasonable promptness; 
(4) provide (A) such methods of administration (including 
methods relating to the establishment and maintenance of 
personnel standards on a merit basis, except that the Secretary 
shall exercise no authority with respect to the selection, tenure 
of office, and compensation of any individual employed in 
accordance with such methods, and including provision for 
utilization of professional medical personnel in the administra-
tion and, where administered locally, supervision of adminis-
tration of the plan) as are found by the Secretary to be neces-
sary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan, (B) for 
the training and effective use of paid subprofessional staff, with 
particular emphasis on the full-time or part-time employment 
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tion and other services to help such families and individuals attain 
or retain capability for independence or self-care, there is hereby 
authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient 
to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made 
available under this section shall be used for making payments to 
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, 
State plans for medical assistance. 
(Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, 1965, Pub.L 
89-97, Title I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343, and amended Dec. 31, 1973, Pub.L 
93-233, § 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, Pub.L. 98-369, Div. B, Title 
VI, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Effective Dates 
1965 Act Senate Report No. 404 and 1984 Act Amendment by Pub.L 
Conference Report No. 682, see 1965 98-369 effective July 18, 1984, but not to 
U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 1943. be construed as changing or affecting 
any right, liability, status or interpreta-
1973 Act House Report No. 93-627, tion which existed (under the provisions 
see 1973 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, of law involved) before that date, sec 
p. 3177. section 2664(b) of Pub.L. 98-369, set out 
1 M . . A „ tt _ KT fto „,- as a note under section 401 of this title. 1984 Act House Report No. 98-432
 €
„ _ . , . , , _ ,
 t 
Part II and House Conference Report *™ ** ' . Amendment by Pub.L 
No. 98-861, see 1984 ILS.Code Cong, and 93~233 tff'ct™ -*1*, J S P " ? L° P T AdmSTws n 697 ^.o.wuuc wuiig. miu
 m e m s u n d e r s e c t l o n 1 3 9 6 D 0f ^ m } e 
Aam.iNews, p. o*/. fQr c^tn^SLT quarters commencing after 
Amendment! D e c ' 3 1 ' 1 9 7 3 ' $et 1 3 ( d ) o f P u b ' L 93"233' 
l o c . . . . .. , T fto ,. f t set out as a note under section 1396a of 
1984 Amendment Pub.L. 98-369 ^ .
 t^t 
struck out "of Health and Human Servic-
es" following "Secretary". See Change Change of Name 
of Name note set out under this section. "Secretary of Health and Human Ser; 
vices was substituted for "Secretary of 
1973 Amendment Pub.L. 93-233 sub- Health, Education, and Welfare" in text 
stituted in item (1) "disabled individuals" pursuant to section 509(b) of Pub.L 
for "permanently and totally disabled in- 96-88 which is classified to section 
dividuals". 3508(b) of Title 20, Education. 
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see 42 USCA § 3026. 
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of costs of certain veterans' care services, see 38 USCA § 629. 
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§ 1396. Appropriations 
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable 
under the conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance 
on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or 
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient 
to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilita-
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SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1965 
For text of Act sec p. 305 
House Report (Ways and Means Committee) No. 213, Mar. 29, 19G5 
[To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Senate Report (Finance Committee) No. 404, June 30, 1965 
[To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Conference Report No. 682, July 26,1965 [To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Cong. Record Vol. I l l (1965) 
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE 
House Apr. 8, July 27, 1965 
Senate July 9, July 28, 1965 
The Senate Report and the Conference Report are set out. 
SENATE REPORT NO. 401 
^^HE Ccrr.:v.i:tee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H R. 66"5 > 
to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social 
Security Ac: with a supplementary health benefits program ar.d an ex-
panded prcgrarr. of medical assistance, to increase benefits under the old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance system, to improve the Federal-
State publi: assistance programs, and for other purposes, having consid-
ered the sar.-:. report favorably thereon v. ith r-.rr.c\ jmer.ts and re:on*m»:r ! 
PART I 
I. BRIEF SUMMARY 
The overall purpose of H.R. 6675 is as follows: 
First, to provide a coordinated approach for health insurance and medical 
care for the aged under the Social Security Act by establishing three new 
health care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based program for the 
aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary plan to provide physicians' and other 
supplementary health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded medical 
assistance program for the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled, 
and families with dependent children. 
Second, to expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled 
children, child welfare, and the mentally retarded, and to establish a 5-ycar 
program of "special project grants" to provide comprehensive health care 
and services for needy children (including those who arc emotionally dis-
turbed) of school age or preschool age. 
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6. IMPROVEMENT AND EXTEXSIOX OF KERR-MILLS 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(a) Background 
The provision ci medical care for the needy has long been a responsi-
bility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent years, 
the Federal Government has assisted the States and localities in carry-
ing this responsibility by participating in the cost of the care provided. 
Under the original Social Security Act, it was possible for the States, 
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they could 
l -y the medical care they needed. Since 1950, the Social Security Act 
has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provided in be-
half of the needy aged, bh'nd, disabled, and dependent children—the so-
called vendor payments. 
Several times since 1/50, the Congress lias liberalized the previsions 
c: law under which the States administer the State-Federal program of 
m.Mcal assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment was 
:n 1950 when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged program 
v as authorized. This legislation offers generous Federal matching to 
«.• able the States ::- ;r^vidc n cdicr.l care in behalf of aged persons who 
Vve enough income for their 1 a.sic maintenance but not enough for 
m heal care costs. This program has grown to the point where 40 States 
r-.". 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and over 246,000 aged 
w:-e aided in March 1965. Furthermore, medical care as a pan of the 
cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the years 
i.-'ii, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments for some 
:t.-r:s of medical care for at least some of the needy. 
The committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under which 
States operate their medical assistance programs so as to make medical 
services fcr the needy more generally available. To accomplish this ob-
jective, the committee bill would establish, effective January 1, 1966, a 
new title in the Social Security Act—"Title NIX: Grants to the States 
for Medical Assistance Programs." 
Under the House bill, after an interim period ending June 30, 1967, 
all States would have to adopt the new program or lose Federal matching 
as to vendor medical payments since the current provisions of law would 
expire at that time. Under the committee bill the States will have the 
option of participating under the new program or continuing to operate 
under the vendor payment provisions of title I (old-age assistance and 
medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid to families with dependent 
children), title X (aid to the blind), title XIV (aid to the permanently 
and totally disabled), and title XVI (the combined adult program). Pro-
grams of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be 
optional with the States. 
(b) State plan requirements 
(1) Standard provisions 
The provisions in the proposed title XIX contain a number of require-
ments for State plans which are either identical to the existing provi-
sions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are: 
That a plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the 
State, 
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That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing for 
any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted 
upon with reasonable promptness. 
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary 
may from time to time require. 
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict the use or 
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients to pur-
poses directly connected with the administration of the plan. 
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance 
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such as-
sistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness. 
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall be 
an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the eye or 
by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select. 
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who arc 
residents of the State but who are absent therefrom. 
(2) Additions to standard provisions 
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, the 
committee bill contains several other plan requirements which are either 
new or changed over provisions currently in the law. 
The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the State 
equal to not less than 40 percent of the non-Federal share of the expendi-
tures under the plan and that, effective July 1, 1970, the financial par-
ticipation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This pro-
vision was included to make certain that the lack of availability of local 
funds for financing of any part of the program not affect the amount, 
scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration set by the 
State. Prior to the 1970 date, the committee will be willing to consider 
other legislative alternatives to the provisions making the entire non-
Federal share a responsibility of the State so long as these alternatives, 
in maintaining the concept of local participation, assure a consistent 
statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy. 
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance titles 
of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such methods 
of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the 
proper and efficient operation of the plan, with the addition of the require-
ment that such methods must include provisions for utilization of pro-
fessional medical personnel in the administration of the plan. It is im-
portant that State utilize a sufficient number of trained and qualified per-
sonnel in the administration of the program including both medical and 
other professional staff. 
The committee's bill would add a requirement that the State plan in-
clude a description of the standards, methods, and administrative ar-
rangements which affect quality of medical care that a State will use in 
administering medical assistance. This amendment would give no author-
ity to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect 
to the content of such standards and methods. In this respect it is some-
what analogous to the requirement, which has been in the public assist-
ance titles since 1950 and which is included in the new title XIX, requir-
ing States to have an authority or authorities responsible for establish-
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ing Mid maintaining standards for private or public institutions in which 
recipients may receive care or services. 
The committee also added an amendment to require that, after June 
30, 1967, private and public medical institutions must meet standards 
(which may be in addition to the standards prescribed by the State) re-
lating to protection against fire and other hazards to the health and safe-
ty of indi\ iduals, which are established by the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare. The committee assumes that the standards pre-
scribed by many States at the present time will meet or exceed those pre-
scribed by the Secretary. 
The IIruse bill provided that the State or local agency administering 
the State plan under title XJX shall be the same agency which is cur-
rently r.dmir.istcring cither title I (old-age assistance) or that part of 
title XVI (assistance for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and medical 
assistance fur the aged) relating to the aged. Where the program relat-
ing to the aged is State supervise:, the same State agency shall super-
vise the a imiristration of title XIX. 
The cjr.-.mittee believes that the States should be given the otportun-
:ry to select the agenc\ they wish to administer the program A number 
of witnesses appearing before the committee have expressed the belief 
t%at the State health agency should be given the primary responsibility 
under thus program. The committee bill leaves this decision wholly to 
the States with the sole requirement that the determination of eligibility 
for medic-.l assistance be made by the State or local agenc\ administer-
ing State plans approved under title I or XVI. The committee agrees 
with the snatemcr.t in the House report that the welfare agencies ha\e 
'long experience and skill in determination of eligibility." 
The committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1965, and on 
the date a State submits its title XIX plan, the State agency administer-
ing or supervising the administration of the State plan for the blind un-
der title X or title XVI of the Social Security Act is different from the 
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the new 
program, such blind agency may be designated to administer or super-
vise the administration of the portion of the title XIX plan which re-
lates to blind individuals. This would include the eligibility determining 
function. In such case, the portion of the title XIX plan administered 
or supervised by each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan. 
Current provisions of law requiring States to have an agency or agen-
cies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for the types 
of institutions included under the State plan have been continued under 
the bill. Your committee expects that these provisions will be used to 
bring about progressive improvement in the level of institutional care 
and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of 
care in many medical institutions arc not now at a satisfactory level and 
it is hoped that current standards applicable to medical institutions will 
be improved by the State's standard-setting agency and that these stan-
dards will be enforced by the appropriate State body. 
Under provisions of the committee bill, the State plan must include 
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care 
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and 
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of ad-
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ministration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision was 
included in order to provide some assurance that the States will not use 
unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which have the ef-
fect of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on eligibility for 
medical assistance or that the States will not administer the provisions 
for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the qual-
ity of the care to be provided. The committee expects that under this 
provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive 
policies and methods of investigation and that they will develop such pro-
cedures as will assure the most effective working relationships with med-
ical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service ir. order to 
encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision of 
services under the State plan. 
The committee hopes that there will be continuing evaluation c: ali State 
plan requirements in relation to the basic objectives of the legislation. 
(c) Eligibility for medical assistance 
Under the committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include 
provision :;•: medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or as-
sistance ur.der State plans approved under titles I, IV, X,'XIV, and XVI. 
It is only if this group is provided for that States may include medical 
assistance tc the less needy. 
Under the committee bill, medical assistance made available tc persons 
receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must net be less 
in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid 
under any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration, 
and scope of medical assistance made available must be the same for all 
such persons. This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy 
aided UH^T the federal';.- aided categories of assistance. 
The bill prcvides furthermore that as States extend their pr;i;::.ms to 
include assistance for persons who come within the various categories of 
assistance except that their income and resources are sufficient to meet 
their needs for maintenance, the medical assistance given such individuals 
shall not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than that mace avail-
able for persons who are recipients of money payments. This was in-
cluded in order to make sure that the most needy in a State receive no 
less comprehensive care than those who arc not as needy. 
Under the bill, if a State extends the program to those persons not re-
ceiving assistance under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI, the determina-
tion of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among 
the people who, except for their income and resources, would be recip-
ients of money for maintenance under the other public assistance pro-
grams. Thus, the income and resources limitation for the aged must be 
comparable to that set for the disabled and blind and must also have a 
comparability for that set for families with children who, except for 
their income and resources, would be eligible for AFDC. The scope, 
amount, and duration of medical assistance available to each of these 
groups must be equal. 
The committee has amended the House bill, however, so that this pro-
vision as to comparability does not apply in the case of services in insti-
tutions for tuberculosis or mental diseases. Federal financial participa-
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t jn is authorized only with respect to recipients aqcd 65 ; 1 o\er in 
renta l and tuberculosis institutions so it would not be ; rp opriatc to 
•**elude them within the scope of this pro\i*ion. 
(d) Determination of need for medical assistance 
The committee bill would make more specific a pro\ ision now in the 
l.w that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the 
p'an, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives 
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources 
which indi\iduals may hold and be eligible for aid, thc\ r^-st do so by 
maintaining a comparability among the \ anous categorical grours of needy 
people. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be 
:'-at wlrch is applicable for the eligibility of the nced\ aged, fo- e\~i pie, 
-"all be comparable to that winch the State sets to determine the cligibil-
\ for the necd\ bhnd and di«?b>d , and niiist also ha\e a cv^p^rab Jity 
*; the s*?* cards used to deter v n c the eligibility of those \ "n~> ?rc to rc-
*..\<. mec cai assistr rce as n x d ; child-cn and tuc proems c :*rcr V a -
\es caring for them 
\nothcr pi o\ is on is ncljdcd t r r t requires States to t^kc : *o a;cu v t 
'\ such income rnd resources as (determined in acco-dv ce w/h « -r-
'~'
z
 r~cscr,bed b\ the Stcr<.:~rO, are actuav \ r*: .'ible tD t'.e iy' c,.-t 
- recount and as would not be disregarded (or set ?* Jc fo- iitu-e 
• tec-1 m dctcrmirmg the eligibility for and the an-n^nt of f e ?*L C as-
< -\ince ir the fo-jr of mone\ piuiKnts for ai \ such ppp1 ca^t or re-
c picnt under the title of the Social Security Act most appropriate1} ap-
z. cable to hun Income and resources taken into account f '-thermcre, 
- st be rea>on?b'\ c\aluated by the States These pro\ *s o s a~e dc-
;
 g-cd so that the States \\ Al not assume the ?\ nlab.lit\ of , n o ~ c v hich 
r"3) net, in fact be a\ailablc or o\ercvaluate income and re^o ~Cc? vhiCh 
are a\aliable Examples of income assumed include support o-J'.rs iron 
< s.nt fathers, which ha\c not been paid or contributions fr^m reV*,\es 
winch are not in reality recened b\ the needy individual. 
The committee has heard of hardships on certain inciudjals by re-
quiring them to provide support and to pay for the medical care needed 
by relatives. The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to sup-
port each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their 
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled chil-
dren even though 21 years of age or older. Such requirements for sup-
port may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for 
medical care. Be>ond such degree of relationship, however, requirements 
imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationships among 
members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their 
plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than 
a spouse or the parent of a minor child or children over 21 who arc blind 
or permanently and totally disabled. Any contributions actually made 
by relatives or friends, or from other sources, NN ill be taken into account 
by the State in determining whether the individual apphing for medical 
assistance is, in fact, in need of such assistance. 
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weak-
nesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under 
the current pro\isions of Federal law, some States have enacted pro-
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§rrams which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the fi-
nancial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income 
just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided un-
der the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the 
limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical as-
sistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the 
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the 
medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the con-
sideration of an individual's income, the committee bill requires that the 
State's standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical 
assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the 
Secretary, the cost—whether in the form of insurance premiums or oth-
erwise—incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligi-
ble for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be 
sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both 
the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the 
medical care he requires. 
This determination must be made by the agency administering the old-
age assistance or combined adult program; i.e., the welfare agency. 
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the indi-
vidual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount. 
In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that de-
scribed below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items 
of medical service, may a State require the use of income or rcs'urces 
which would bring the individual's income below ihe amount esta: hed 
as the test c: eligibility under the State plan. Such action would reduce 
the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for 
his maintenance. 
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or limit 
the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similar charge, or of any 
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan. 
No deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with re-
spect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This pro-
vision is related to another provision in the bill which requires States 
to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital sen-ices provided under 
the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that the hos-
pital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full under the 
provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered and that 
States may not expect to require the individual to use his income or re-
sources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level) 
toward that bill. The reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services shall 
be determined in accordance with standards approved by the Secretary 
and included in the State plan. 
For any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, a 
charge of any kind may be imposed only if the State so chooses, and the 
charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his income 
and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any enrollment 
fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to inpatient hospital 
services. The Secretary is given authority to issue standards under this 
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pro\ision, which it is expected will protect the income and -csourccs an 
mdi\idual has which are nccessan for his nonmedical needs 
The hospital insurance benefit program included under other provisions 
of the bill pro\ides for a deductible which must be paid :*: connection 
with the individual's claim for hospitalization benefits The committee is 
concerned that hospitalization be readily a\ailable to need,, persons and 
that the necessity of their paving deductibles or cost shanrg s'-all not be 
a hardship on them o* a factor which may prevent their rcCcvmg the 
hospitahz?tion the> reed For this reason, the committee- : ". pruvu,cs 
that the States make provisons, for individuals 65 vears c" older who 
are included m the new plan, of the cost of an> deductible or CjSt sharing 
imposed with respect to individuals under the program e^ t**: -hed bv the 
hospital insurance provisions of the bill. 
\ State medic?1 as= *tance pkn mav piOMde fur the p... ~ . t m u 'I 
ci am deductibles or cost sh?nng under the insurance r-:*-?ri estab-
lished bv part B of t/ue XVIII In the e\ cnt, however, tl >. 5*i*: plan p~o-
Mcies for the individual to assume a portion of such costs, s-ch portion 
shall be determined 01 a basis reasonably related to the :~1 \ dual s in-
come, or income ?nc resources and in conformitv with s ta-ci 'ds .^ucd 
bv the Secretary. T^e Secretary is authorized to issue st?~ca-ds—urjcr 
tins provision which, it is expected, will protect the income r - c resources 
of the individual needed for his maintenance—to guide the Stages Such 
standards shall protect the income and resources of the inu , ,GU:.1 needed 
for his maintenance and pro\ide assurance that the respon- D. ltv placed 
on individuals to share in the cost shall not be an undue burcer on them. 
Titles I and XVI authorizing the medical assistance for the aged pro-
gram now provide that the States may not impose a hen against the 
property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical as-
sistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning in-
correct payments, and prohibit adjustment or recovery for amounts cor-
rectly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death and 
that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under the committee bill, 
has been broadened so that such an adjustment or recover) would be 
made only at a time when there is no surviving child who is tinder the 
age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
(e) Scope and definition of medical services 
"Medical assistance" is defined under the bill to mean payment of all 
or part oi the cost of care and services for individuals who would if 
needy, be dependent under title IV, except for section 406(a)(2), and 
arc under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 4C6(b) 
(1) with whom the child is living, or who arc 65 years of age and older, 
blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income and re-
sources arc insufficient to meet all their medical care costs. The bill, as 
do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in the cost of med-
ical care provided up to 3 months before the month in which the individ-
ual makes application for assistance. Thus, the scope of the program 
includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children as 
defined in State plans, but also children under the age of 21 (and their 
caretaker relatives) who come within the scope of title IV, except for 
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
ELAINE E. BUCKLO, United States Magistrate. 
*1 Plaintiffs, a class of aged, blind and disabled Medicaid 
applicants and recipients, seek to enjoin defendant, the Director 
of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, from denying Medicaid 
benefits to class members solely because their resourcr- exceed the 
Medicaid eligibility standard, when the class merv. ..rs' medical 
expenses exceed the excess of their resources over - .- eligibility 
standard. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. I 
recommend that plaintiffs' motion be granted and defendant's motion 
denied. 
I. 
Title XIX, 42 U.S.C. ss 1396 et seq. (1985) (the Medicaid 
Program) authorizes the federal government to pay part of the cost 
of medical services provided through the states to eligible 
elderly, blind and disabled individuals. States choosing to 
participate in this program must provide services to all 
individuals who are eligible for supplemental security income 
(SSI), except that a state may provide services only to those 
individuals who would have been eligible under the state's plan 
that was in effect on January 1, 1972. 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(f) (the 
s 209(b) option). Illinois participates in the Medicaid Program 
under the s 209(b) option. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 
34, 39 n. 6 (1981) . 
In addition to providing assistance to those eligible for SSI 
(the categorically needy), the states may provide Medicaid benefits 
to those individuals whose income and resources exceed the SSI 
eligibility standards, but who would be eligible if their medical 
expenses were deducted from their income (the medically needy). 42 
U.S.C. ss 1396a(a)(10), a(17)(D), a(f). Illinois provides such 
assistance. 
In Illinois, the Medicaid Program is administered by the Illinois 
Department of Public Aid. It is given broad rulemaking power to 
Database 
DCTU 
determine, within limits, the resource eligibility standards or 
cut-offs and the amount of resources to be disregarded in 
determining whether an applicant's resources exceed that standard. 
111.Rev.Stat. Ch. 23, ss 5-2, 5-4 (1986). Prior to February 1, 
1982, its regulations ("old regulations") provided that if an 
applicant's assets and income exceeded the standards for 
eligibility, the excess assets and income would be applied to 
reduce reimbursement of the applicant's medical expenses, but the 
applicant would still be eligible for Medicaid. These regulations 
thus provided for both income and resource spend-down. 
On February 1, 1982, this regulation was amended so that only 
spend-down of excess income was allowed. If the applicant's 
resources exceeded the eligibility standard, the applicant would be 
ineligible for Medicaid, even if his medical expenses were greater 
than his excess resources. 82 I11.Admin.Reg. 2150 (1982). 
Plaintiffs challenge this regulation on several grounds. 
II. 
Initially, defendant argues that in Action Transmittal 80-58 sent 
by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to all participating states in August, 1980, the 
Secretary interpreted the statute and regulations to prohibit 
resource spend-down and that the court should grant deference to 
that interpretation. Generally, an administrative agency's 
interpretations of its own regulations and the statute it 
administers are entitled to substantial deference and should not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly inconsistent with the statute or 
regulation. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); FEC 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981). If 
the agency's interpretation is reasonable, the court should sustain 
it, even though the court might have interpreted the statute or 
regulation differently. Udall, supra, 380 U.S. at 16; Psychiatric 
Institute v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 812, 814 (D.C.Cir.1981); see 
State of Wisconsin Dept. of Health v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 398 (7th 
Cir.1986). But where the agency's interpretation contradicts its 
earlier position, the interpretation is entitled to little 
deference. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 
837, 858 n. 25 (1975); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
125, 140-5 (1976). 
Under these standards, Action Transmittal 80-58 should not be 
given much weight. Its interpretation of the statute and 
regulations is directly contrary to the Secretary's prior 
interpretation, and there had been no concurrent changes in the 
statute or regulations. The Action Transmittal's justification for 
the change in interpretation is that *2 Although Section 
1902(a)(17)(D) of the Social Security Act provides this option 
[spend-down] with respect to income . . . neither the Act nor Federal 
regulations allow for such flexibility with regard to resources. 
Id. This argument fails to explain why SSI interpreted the Act and 
Regulations otherwise prior to this time. The court will, 
therefore, examine the statutory scheme and regulations adppted by 
the Secretary. Accord, Haley v. Com'r. of Public Welfare, 394 
Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 577-8 (1985). 
III. 
42 U.S.C. s 1396a(4)(A) requires state Medicaid plans to "provide 
such methods of administration . • • as are found by the Secretary to 
be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan." 
Id. Pursuant to this provision, the Secretary has promulgated 
regulations requiring that the state plan provide for the 
establishment of a Medical Care Advisory Committee (MCAC) "to 
advise the Medicaid agency director about health and medical care 
services." 42 C.F.R. s 431.12(b). The MCAC "must have opportunity 
for participation in policy development and program 
administration...." 42 C.F.R. s 431.12(e). The new Illinois 
regulation was never submitted to the MCAC for advice. 
(Defendant's Response to Interrogatory 15.) Plaintiffs contend 
that the regulation is, therefore, invalid. 
The language of the federal regulations states that the MCAC 
"must" be able to participate "in policy development and program 
administration." Id. The MCAC must be consulted before policy 
changes are made, Morabito v. Blum, 528 F.Supp. 252, 264 
(S.D.N.Y.1981), and 'policy' is to be broadly interpreted, covering 
"the entire field of state decision-making with respect to the 
Medicaid Program...." Id. Policy changes affecting eligibility 
for Medicaid, as well as policy changes affecting the sort of 
services provided, must be submitted to the MCAC for advice. Id. 
at 263. The discontinuance of the use of resource spend-down in 
determining the eligibility of the medically needy is a policy 
change, and consultation with the MCAC would seem to be required 
before the new regulation was promulgated. 
The defendant promulgated the rule, however, because it believed 
the amendment was required by federal law. Although the amendment 
affected Medicaid policy, it was not, in ^efendant's view, 
discretionary. Whatever ad\ _ce the MCAC might :ive, it could not 
affect or alter defendant's decision. Prior review of the 
amendment by the MCAC would have been fruitless, and arguably the 
regulation should not be invalidated merely because defendant 
failed to solicit advice which in its view it was bound by law to 
ignore. 
The plaintiffs, however, argue that the MCAC could have given 
advice on how defendant might mitigate the impact of the amended 
rule, for example by recommending that defendant advise applicants 
of the importance of promptly applying excess resources to medical 
bills. The MCAC must be given the opportunity to participate in 
policy decision-making and program administration; decisions about 
how to implement the new regulation eliminating spend-down of 
resources involve policy or program administration on 
which the MCAC must be consulted. 
*3 There remains the question of what relief would be 
appropriate. The plaintiffs argue that since t>.^  regulation was 
promulgated improperly, the court should strike down the 
regulation. However, this remedy is not always appropriate. Thus, 
where there was not total failure to consult the MCAC, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing -co enjoin the policy 
changes. Burgess v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 596, 600 (1st Cir.1982). 
Here, the MCAC was not consulted, but its advice would have been 
irrelevant to defendant's decision on whether to adopt the,amended 
rule. Where the courts have invalidated or enjoined the new 
policy, the policy was usually implemented at the discretion of the 
state agency, and presumably that agency, if it had had the benefit 
of the MCAC's advice, might not have implemented the new policy or 
might have made changes in it. See, e.g., Morabito, supra, 528 
F.Supp. at 256-8 (decision by state to switch from giving benefits 
to all applicants eligible under SSI to giving benefits to those 
eligible under the state's 1972 plan); Becker v. Toia, 439 F.Supp. 
324, 332 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (state statute requiring applicants to make 
payments on prescription drugs and medical appliances; statute gave 
agency discretion in setting amount of payments). Robinson v. 
Maher, CCH Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 27,707 (D.Conn. Jan. 19, 
1976) (budgetary shortfall required agency to reduce Medicaid 
expenditures; "It may well be that such a consultation ... might 
suggest to the commissioner alternative ways to reduce expenditures 
... avoiding unnecessary hardship.") Since defendant would have 
promulgated the amended regulation regardless of any advice the 
MCAC would have given it, striking down the regulation on this 
ground would be an excessive remedy. If this were the only ground 
on which pJaintiffs would prevail, they would at most be entitled 
to an order that defendants obtain the MCAC's advice on what 
measures should be taken to soften the impact of the amended rule. 
IV. 
Plaintiffs argue that because their resources were insufficient 
to meet their medical expenses, the resources were not "available" 
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(17)(B) and (C) and 42 
C.F.R. s 435.845. Plaintiffs misconstrue the meaning of 
"available." The statutory and regulatory provisions in question 
require that the applicant actually be able to use his resources 
and that the value of those resources be evaluated reasonably. 
Resources are unavailable when although the applicant has some 
right in the resource, he cannot use the resource to increase his 
purchasing power. Jackson v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1076, 1086 (7th 
Cir.1982) (difference between subsidized rent paid by applicant and 
market rent of his apartment not a resource available to 
applicant). These provisions do not, however, deal with the 
sufficiency of the applicant's resources to meet his medical and 
other needs. Here, the plaintiffs do not contend that their 
resources cannot increase their purchasing power or that the value 
of their resources has been incorrectly determined. Their 
resources are, therefore, available. 
V. 
*4 Plaintiffs argue that the new Illinois regulations are invalid 
because they require the medically needy to reduce their resources 
below the eligibility standard for the categorically needy. If a 
state elects to provide Medicaid to the medically needy, 42 U.S.C. 
s 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (III) requires the state to use a single 
standard and methodology in determining resource eligibility. In 
addition, 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(17)(B) requires the state, in 
determining eligibility of the medically needy, to take into 
account only such resources as would not be disregarded in 
determining eligibility of the categorically needy. These 
provisions limit the freedom of the states to treat the medically 
needy differently from the categorically needy. Thus, the state 
must use the same income disregards, Calkins v. Blum, 675 F.2d 44, 
45 (2d Cir.1982), and transfer of assets rules, Beltran v. Myers, 
701 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir.), cert. den. 462 U.S. 1134 (1983), for 
both groups. 
In the present case, the new Illinois regulation does not treat 
the medically needy differently from the categorically needy. The 
same resource eligibility level applies to both groups, and neither 
group is permitted to spend down their resources in order to 
qualify. 
The plaintiffs argue, however, that the statute was intended to 
prevent states from requiring the medically needy to spend their 
resources below the level of eligibility of the categorically 
needy. They cite S.Rep. 404, reprinted in 1965, U.S. Code Cong. & 
Ad. News 1943, 2019. That report, however, is directed at the 
income spend-down provision. Once an applicant has been found 
eligible through income spend-down, The State may require the use 
of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical 
expenses.... In no event, however, with respect to either this 
provision or that described below with reference to the use of 
deductibles ... may a State require the use of income or resources 
which would bring the individual's income below the amount 
established as the test of eligibility under the State plan. Id. 
The income spend-down provisions were aimed at preventing the 
applicant from being determined ineligible when his income was less 
than his medical expenses and the categorical assistance level. 
However, there was no similar resource spend-down provision. The 
report does refer to "resources," but only insofar as spending them 
would reduce the applicant's income. The statute does not require 
the states to use resource spend-down, even when not doing so 
results in the applicants' having to expend their resources below 
the resource eligibility level of the categorically needy. 
VI. 
Plaintiffs argue that since Illinois is a s 209(b) state, its 
Medicaid eligibility criteria may be no more restrictive than those 
in place in its 1972 plan and that since under its 1972 plan, 
Illinois permitted resource spend-down, it may not now prohibit it, 
even if the regulations and statute do not allow non-s 209(b) 
states (SSI states) to use resource spend-down in determining the 
eligibility of the medically needy. 
In 197 2, Congress replaced three assistance programs with 
Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled 
(SSI). 42 U.S.C. ss 1381 et seq. In some states more people were 
eligible for SSI than had been eligible for the assistance programs 
SSI replaced, and since all individuals eligible for SSI were 
eligible for Medicaid, the financial burden of Medicaid on the 
states increased. To lessen that increased burden and dissuade 
states frcrr. withdrawing from Medicaid, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. 
s 1396a(f, s 209(b)). Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 38 
(1981). Tnat statute provides that *5 Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this subchapter, except as provided in subsection (e) 
of this section, no State not eligible to participate in the State 
plan program established under Title XVI of this chapter shall be 
required to provide medical assistance to any aged, -blind, or 
disabled individual (within the meaning of Subchapter XVI of this 
chapter [SSI] ) for any month unless such State would be (or would 
have been) required to provide medical assistance to such 
individual for such month had its plan for medical assistance 
approved under this subchapter and in effect on January 1, 1972, 
been in effect in such month.*.. Id. 
s 209(b) thus did not authorize states to create an alternative 
basis for eligibility but only to further restrict the eligibility 
of persons who would otherwise qualify for Medicaid under the SSI 
standards. Savage v. Toan, 795 F.2d 643, 645-6 (8th Cir.1986); 
Morris by Simpson v. Morrow, 783 F.2d 454, 459-60 (4th Cir.1986). 
If Illinois' new regulation is more restrictive than its 1972 plan, 
the regulation is nonetheless valid if the 1972 plan provided 
eligibility on a broader basis than authorized for SSI states and 
the new regulation is required by the Medicaid statute or 
regulations. s 209(b) does "not confer authority upon states to 
create broader eligibility standards than exist nationally for 
SSI." Id. at 459. Before concluding that the new Illinois 
regulation is invalid because it is more restrictive than Illinois' 
1972 plan, it is necessary to determine whether the 1972 plan 
violated the social security statute or regulations. 
Defendant argues that the Medicaid statute forbids resource 
spend-down and that, therefore, the new regulation is valid 
regardless of whether it is more restrictive than the 1972 plan. 
It might appear that 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(10)(C) (i)(III) 
(hereinafter "CIII") would prohibit resource spend-down. That 
provision requires a state providing Medicaid to the medically 
needy to employ a single standard ... in determining income and 
resource eligibility for all such groups, and the methodology to be 
employed in determining such eligibility . . . shall be the same 
methodology which would be employed under the supplemental security 
income program.... Id. In determining eligibility for SSI, 
resource spend-down is not provided for, [FN1] and so it could not 
be used in determining eligibility for Medicaid. 
The history of CIII, however, suggests that it may not be 
applicable here. Prior to 1981, the Medicaid statute required that 
states providing Medicaid to the medically needy determine resource 
and income eligibility of the medically needy "in accordance with 
comparable standards" to those used in determining eligibility for 
the categorically needy under SSI. 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) 
(1976); Atkins v. Rivera, U.S. , 106 S.Ct, 2456, 2462 
(1986). In 1981, the "comparability" requirement was deleted in 
order to give states more flexibility in setting eligibility 
criteria and scope of services for the medically needy. Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, s 2171(a)(3)(C)(i) (OBRA), 95 
Stat. 357, 807; Atkins, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2462; H.R.Rep. No. 
208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 971, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Ad. News 396, 1333. 
*6 In response to this amendment, in 1981 the Secretary revised 
the Medicaid regulations to provide that state plans could use 
income and resource methodologies for determining eligibility of 
the medically needy that were different from those used in 
determining the eligibility of the categorically needy: Section 
2171 of the 1981 Amendments revised the Medicaid statute so that 
the direct linkage between cash assistance programs' and the 
medically needy is no longer explicit. Therefore, we have 
concluded that the State need not adopt the methodology of a 
related cash assistance program in treating income and resources of 
the medically needy. Rather, the State may develop its own. 
However, Section 1902(a)(17) of the Act has not been amended. 
Consequently, these final regulations require that the State must 
use a methodology for the treatment of income and resources that is 
reasonable. 46 Fed.Reg. 47,980 (1981). The Secretary implemented 
the amendment by promulgating 42 C.F.R. ss 435.850-52. The "same 
methodology" provision, 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III), was 
enacted in response to the Secretary's new regulations. Atkins, 
supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2463. The provision reflected Congress' belief 
that the 1981 amendments, upon which the regulations were based, 
gave states certain flexibility in structuring their medically 
needy programs. They were allowed to limit coverage to certain 
categories of medically needy individuals, and to vary the services 
they offered to the different groups they covered. No change was 
made or intended to be made with regard to financial eligibility 
policy. H.R.Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1366, reprinted in 
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 697, 2054. The "same methodology" 
provision was intended to restore the status quo before the 
Secretary's 1981 regulations, and "not ... to change policies 
governing the income and resource standards and methodologies for 
determining eligibility of the medically needy from those in effect 
before OBRA. " Id. at 1367, 2055. Congress', sole intent in 
enacting CIII was to invalidate the Secretary's post-OBRA 
regulations. Atkins, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2463 n. 10. Those 
regulations "had nothing to do with the treatment of excess income 
for the medically needy or with the calculation of spend-downs." 
DeJesus v. Perales, 770 F.2d 316, 325 (2d Cir.1985) (Friendly, J.). 
The post-OBRA regulations were intended to give the states freedom 
to develop methodologies for determining the financial eligibility 
of the medically needy that differed from those used for the 
categorically needy; the purpose of CIII was to invalidate those 
regulations and require that the methodologies be the Same. 
The requirement of uniformity is reasonable in such matters as 
calculation of income and resources in which comparable procedures 
must be applied to both groups. Since spend-down of income, 
however, *7 has no counterpart in the eligibility methodologies, 
it would have been tautologous for Congress to direct that the 
states calculate spend-downs using 'the same methodology' as they 
use in determining eligibility for those programs. DeJesus, supra, 
770 F.2d at 327. Accordingly, CIII has no effect on treatment of 
excess income and calculation of spend-downs. Atkins, supra, 106 
S.Ct. at 2463. 
Similarly, CIII does not prohibit the use of resource 
spend-downs. Arguably, since resource spend-down, unlike income 
spend-down, is not separately authorized, it could be applied only 
as part of the evaluation of resources. 
The SSI regulations require the deduction of incumbrances from the 
value of assets, 20 C.F.R. s 1201, and presumably could also 
require the deduction of unsecured debt, including .medical 
expenses, from the applicant's resources; since they do not, the 
same methodology requirement would prevent the use of similar 
deductions in determining the eligibility of the medically needy 
for Medicaid. But resource spend-down, like income spend-down, is 
really not part of the methodology for evaluating the applicant's 
resources. The resource methodology is the process whereby the 
value of the applicant's resources is calculated. See DeJesus, 
supra, 770 F.2d at 324. In determining the eligibility of both the 
categorically needy and the medically needy, the applicant's 
resources are evaluated and measured against the SSI standard. A 
resource spend-down would be applicable only after the applicant's 
resources had been evaluated, the resource standard applied, and 
the applicant found ineligible; it would be applicable only to the 
medically needy. It would have no counterpart in the eligibility 
methodology of the categorically needy. Consequently, the "same 
methodology" provision would not prevent the use of resource 
spend-down. No other statutory provisions forbid the use of 
resource spend-down in determining the eligibility of the medically 
needy. 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income 
spend-down but is silent regarding resource spend-down. Defendant 
argues from this silence, and the fact that elsewhere in s 
1396a(a) (17) Congress speaks of both income and resources, that the 
statute implicitly forbids the use of resource spend-down. s 
1396a(a)(17)(D), however, does not merely permit but requires 
income spend-down. It was included in the Medicaid statute to 
prevent states from choosing not to use income spend-down. See 
S.Rep. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1965;, reprinted in 1965 U.S. 
Code Cong. £ Ad. News 1943, 2018-9. The provision was not needed 
to permit states to use income spend-down. See id. It cannot be 
held to implicitly forbid states to use resource spend-down. 
*8 Resource spend-down is consistent with the goals of the 
statute. The Medicaid program was enacted "(f)or the purpose of 
enabling each State ... to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf 
of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled 
individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the 
costs of necessary medical services...." 42 U.S.C. s 1396. The 
income spend-down provision, 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(17)(D), was 
incorporated in the Medicaid statute to correct one of the 
weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged 
program. Under the current provisions of Federal law, some States 
have enacted programs which contain a cutoff point on income which 
determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an 
individual with an income just under the specified limit may 
qualify for all the aid provided under the State plan. 
Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the limitation adopted 
by the State are found ineligible for the medical assistance 
provided under the State plan even though the excess of the 
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the 
medical care needed. 
. . . [Under the spend-down provision] before an individual is 
found ineligible . . ., the State must be sure that the income of the 
individual has been measured in terms of both the State's allowance 
for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the medical ,care he 
requires. S.Rep. 404, supra, 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 
2018-9. Resource spend-down serves a similar goal. An individual 
may have resources above the eligibility level, but his medical 
expenses may exceed the excess. Resource spend-down measures the 
applicant's resources in terms of his medical expenses, so that the 
applicant is not found ineligible in this situation. A resource 
spend-down provision in a state plan would thus further the general 
purpose of the Medicaid program of providing medical assistance to 
those "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the 
costs of necessary medical care." 42 U.S.C. s 1396. See Haley, 
supra, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d at 578. 
The regulations similarly do not forbid resource spend-down. 42 
C.F.R. s 435.845 (1985) provides that in determining resource 
eligibility of the medically needy, the agency must— 
• * * 
(d) For aged, blind or disabled individuals in States covering 
all SSI recipients, deduct the value of resources that would be 
deducted in determining eligibility under SSI; 
(e)(1) For aged, blind or disabled individuals in States using 
requirements more restrictive than SSI, deduct the value of 
resources in an amount no more restrictive than those deducted 
under the Medicaid plan on January 1, 1972, and no more liberal 
than those deducted in determining eligibility under SSI. 
*9 (2) However, the amounts specified in paragraph (e)(1) of this 
section must be the same as those that would be deducted in 
determining, under s 435.121, the eligibility of the categorically 
needy; and (f) apply the resource standards established under s 
435.84 3. Id. [FN2] These regulations require that resources be 
evaluated in the same way in determining eligibility of the 
medically needy as in determining eligibility of the categorically 
needy. However, they do not forbid the states to apply the 
resource standard flexibly after the applicant's resources have 
been evaluated, by applying a resource spend-down. 
Resource spend-down is thus permitted, but not required, by the 
Medicaid statute and regulations. Because Illinois is a s 209(b) 
state, its Medicaid eligibility requirements may be no more 
restrictive than those it used in its 1972 p3an. That plan 
required the use of resource spend-down. A s 209(b) state 
generally has the option of picking and choosing among the SSI 
eligibility criteria or the state's 1972 eligibility criteria. 
However, if the 1972 criteria are not invalid, the state may not 
impose more restrictive criteria, even if those criteria are also 
permitted under SSI. See Brogan v. Miller, 537 F.Supp. 139, 144 n. 
12 (N.D.111.1982) . Accordingly, since Illinois' 1972 plan was not 
invalid and the new regulation, by eliminating resource spend-down, 
imposes more restrictive eligibility criteria than the 1972 plan, 
the new regulations are invalid. 
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment should be granted. 
FN1. There is a limited exception. Where the applicant's 
non-liquid resources are not more than one-fourth of the statutory 
maximum resource standard, the applicant is eligible. He must 
liquidate his non-liquid resources within six months, and the 
excess of that amount over the standard is applied against his SSI 
benefits. 20 C.F.R. ss 416.1240-4, 
FN2. The pre-OBRA regulations provided that the amounts 
deducted "must be at least the same as those that would be deducted 
... under 435.121 " 42 C.F.R. s 435.845(e) (1979). 
N.D.Ill.,1986. 
Foley v. Coler 
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not have prepared in presenting her evidence 
and of which she could not have had notice. The 
Tenth Circuit has pointed out that a proposed 
rule does not serve as notice of the final rule: 
At the point of publication of the proposed 
rule the agency is, of course, not bound to the 
issuance of the rule in any exact form. .. . 
[U]ntil publication is made of the rule actu-
ally adopted, the public of course does not 
know which course the agency will take or 
how to prepare for the regulation. Rowell v. 
Andrus, 631 F.2d 699, 702, n.2 (10th Cir. 
1980). 
Therefore, the ALJ was not restricted to the list 
of mitigating factors in the proposed regula-
tion.9 
The I.G.'s position seems to be that once a 
conviction has been demonstrated, untrustwor-
thiness is sufficiently proved to require a five-
year exclusion and that any reduction in that 
period reflects a "sympathy" standard not 
derived from the law. I.G. Br. at 6, 9-12. In 
arguing that remorse and personal circum-
stances are not valid grounds to reduce an exclu-
sion period, the I.G. cited Frank J. Hanev, DAB 
Civ. Rem. C-156 (1990). In that case, the ALJ 
reduced an exclusion period from five years to 
three, also over the I.G.'s objection, despite Peti-
tioner's conviction for a felony. While rejecting 
the stress of Petitioner's involvement in a law-
suit as mitigation, because it might recur, the 
ALJ considered other factors including charac-
ter evidence, Petitioner's mother's illness and 
death, and Petitioner's otherwise good record. 
In Haney, as here, the ALJ determined that a 
conviction alone does not end the discussion, 
since a "criminal conviction in 1988 does not 
necessarily evidence that [Haney] . . . is, at this 
time, an untrustworthy individual." Id. at 8. If 
anything, the Haney decision suggests that the 
ALJ in each case viewed the evidence oi mitiga-
tion individually and carefully weighed it 
9
 We also note that the I.G presented nothing which 
convincingly shows that application of the factors in the 
proposed regulation would have made a difference here The 
I G areued that these regulations would have barred evi-
dence of Petitioner's later remorse and of the circumstances 
motivating the crime if not appearing in the criminal 
record The I.G did not, however, assert that the criminal 
record contained no evidence of Petitioner's remorse or the 
circumstances considered relevant by the ALJ. As the ALJ 
against the factors favoring exclusion. The ALJ 
reasonably determined that Petitioner, who 
completed a one-year probation for a misde-
meanor theft, should not undergo a longer exclu-
sion than Mr. Haney, who was convicted of two 
felonies in a tax fraud scheme spreading over 
several years for which he was still serving five 
years probation. 
This does not mean that we would have 
reduced the exclusion here as substantially as 
the ALJ did if we were making the decision in 
the first instance. Our review of the record indi-
cates that there are factors which the ALJ may 
not have fully considered (but which the I.G. 
did not raise) which lead us to question the 
reduction of the period of exclusion to one year. 
For example. Petitioner testified that she turned 
the patient account books for the Bellmead 
Nursing Home over to her sister. Transcript 
(Tr.) at 72. It is not clear whether the ALJ 
considered the fact that this may have contrib-
uted to further thefts and that Petitioner could 
have instead set up a system for accounting for 
the patient funds such as the system she testi-
fied she later used in other nursing homes. Tr. at 
90. 
We view our role as a limited one, however. 
Our guidelines state that our standard of review 
on disputed issues of fact is "whether the ALJ's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence" 
and on disputed legal issues is whether "the 
ALJ's decision was erroneous." DAB Guidelines, 
Appendix B at 28.29 (1989). The I.G. did not 
challenge the ALJ's findings of fact, and we 
have concluded that the I.G.'s arguments con-
cerning the legal standard applied are without 
merit. Thus, given the limited scope of our 
review, we must affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing analysis, wc affirm the 
ALJ decision. 
found, Petitioner was sentenced to one-year probation, not 
incarceration. Finally, we note that limiting the ALJ's con-
sideration to on/v those factors listed in the proposed regula-
tions would appear to be unwise, based on our experience in 
deciding cases It is extremely difficult to anticipate what 
all relevant circumstances might be. The approach in the 
existing regulations allows for consideration of "(a)ny other 
factors bearing on the nature and seriousness of the program 
violations." 
[H 39,089] Christine Harriman v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services. 
U.S. District Court, District of Maine, Civil No. 90-0046-B, Nov. 9, 1990. 
Medicaid: Financial Eligibility 
Maine—Resource spenddown.—An individual who (together with her spouse) had over 
$10,000 in assets and was in hospital intensive care for about a month in January and Februarv of 
Medicare and Medicaid Guide f 39,089 
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1989 following a pancreatic attack was not entitled to spend down to Maine's Medicaid resource-
eligibility level of $3,000' by incurring medical expenses, even though her hospital bill was $42,000. 
She received the hospital bill in February, began paying it in March, and applied for Medicaid in 
April. As a result, she could not qualify under the state's rules that allow a resource spenddown only 
if an individual applies for Medicaid and spends down to the state's eligibility level in the month in 
which the expenses were incurred. Although federal law requires states (such as Maine) that cover 
medically needy individuals to allow applicants to spend down their income to the state's income-
eligibility level for Medicaid by incurring medical expenses, it allows but does not require a resource 
spenddown. Finding that "the plaintiff appears to have all the logic and policy on her side of the 
argument, but the Commissioner appears to have the law on his side," the court invited the parties 
to consider whether to certify to the Maine Law Court questions of whether a comprehensive 
resource spenddown must be allowed and whether refusal to allow it violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
SeeU 14,311.74, 15,594. 
Memorandum 
HORNBY. District Judge: 
I. 
The question in this class action is whether a 
state must consider the amount of accrued medi-
cal bills in evaluating whether an applicant's 
personal resources disqualify her for Medicaid— 
in other words, whether the state must apply a 
"resource spend-down" rule as it does in evalu-
ating income. The plaintiff appears to have all 
the logic and policy on her side of the argument, 
but the State Commissioner of Human Services 
appears to have the law on his side, and I 
conclude that federal law does not require the 
state to use a resource spend-down rule. Before 
ruling on the question whether state law 
requires it. however, I invite the parties to con-
sider whether that question should be certified 
to the Maine Law Court pursuant to Maine 
Rule of Civil Procedure 76B. The Clerk's office 
shall schedule a conference of counsel to discuss 
that issue. 
The plaintiff suffered a pancreatic attack in 
early January of 1989. and spent nearly one 
month in intensive care. Upon her release from 
the hospital in early February she received a bill 
in excess of $42,000. At the time she went into 
the hospital, she, together with her husband, 
had over $10,000 in liquid assets. According to 
her uncontested affidavit, she has spent all but 
$500 on the outstanding medical bills, leaving 
her with only the home she owns jointly with her 
husband. On April 4, 1989. she sought Medicaid 
coverage to pay the regaining medical bills The 
Commissioner found her ineligible for coverage 
from January through March because, on the 
first day of each of those months, her assets 
exceeded the $3,000 eligibility limitation con-
tained in the Maine Department of Human Ser-
vices regulations. The Commissioner did find 
her eligible for coverage beginning April 1, 1989, 
but that coverage would not apply to these 
medical bills. In an administrative appeal, a fair 
hearing officer upheld the decision. 
The plaintiff brought this class action against 
the Commissioner of Human Services seeking to 
have herself declared eligible and an injunction 
enjoining the Commissioner to adopt a resource 
spend-down policy. The Commissioner 
impleaded the United States Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. The plaintiff has 
now moved for summary judgment against the 
Commissioner on all her state and federal claims 
except her claim that the program violates the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The defendant Commissioner has 
not contested any of the facts asserted by the 
plaintiff, but has disputed her legal conclusions. 
The third-party Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services has 
not participated in the arguments on the 
motion. 
II. 
The Medicaid program is a joint federal/state 
venture created bv Title 19 of the Social Secu-
rity Act, 42 U.S.C." § § 1396 et seq. It is designed 
to furnish financial assistance to those whose 
"income and resources are insufficient to meet 
the costs of necessarv medical services." 42 
U.S.C. §1396(1). 
Applicants who are ineligible for AFDC (Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children) or SSI 
(Supplemental Security Income) assistance may 
qualify for Medicaid if they meet the definition 
of "medicallv needv" and are disabled like the 
plaintiff. 42 U.S'.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C); 22 
M.R.S.A. §3173. So far as resources are con-
cerned, Maine has provided by regulation that a 
married spouse is eligible as "medically needy" 
only if the couple's available assets are $3,000 or 
less. Maine Medical Assistance Eligibility' Man-
ual, § 3340. 
There is, likewise, an income limit. In the case 
of income, however, eligibility is determined by 
setting off any excess income against the medi-
cal bills and then providing Medicaid for the 
remainder of the bills. This procedure is known 
as the "spend-down" rule. Manual § 5000. The 
Department regulations contain no comparable 
provision for considering resources. 
The plaintiff argues that the federal statute 
requires the Commissioner to include in the 
H 39,089 ©1991, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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state program a resource spend-down rule. She 
relies upon the stated purpose of the federal 
statute—that it is designed to furnish assistance 
to persons whose "income and resources are 
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medi-
cal services" (emphasis supplied). 42 U.S.C. 
§1396(1). The federal statute specifically 
requires the state to have an income spend-down 
rule. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D). But there is 
no similar requirement in the federal statute for 
a resource spend-down rule. There is confusing 
language in the Senate Report to the bill that 
produced the income spend-down requirement. 
Specifically, 
[t]he state may require the use of all the 
excess income of the individual toward his 
medical expenses, or some proportion of that 
amount. In no event, however, with respect to 
either this provision or that described below 
with reference to the use of deductibles for 
certain items of medical service, may a state 
require the use of income or resources which 
would bring the individual's income below the 
amount established as the test of eligibility 
under the state plan. Such action would 
reduce the individual below the level deter-
mined by the state as necessary for his main-
tenance. 
S. Rep. No. 404. 89th Cong.. 1st Sess., 78 (1965), 
reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News, 1943, 2019 (emphasis supplied). But 
whatever the reference to resources might mean 
in the Senate Report, the federal statute clearly 
deals only with income spend-down. I am satis-
fied, therefore, that the federal statute does not 
require a state to have a resource spend-down 
rule.1 
Federal law does, however, permit a state to 
adopt a resource spend-down rule. See Westmil-
ler Bv Hubbard v. Sullivan. 729 F.Supp. 260. 
263 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Although the Medicaid 
Act does not expressly mention a resource 
spend-down, it is clear from other sections of the 
Act and from the legislative liiatory that tht 
states have discretion in utilizing such a 
[resource] spend-down in determining eligibil-
ity."); Folev v. Suter, No. 83 C 4736, slip. op. at 
9(N.D. 111.'1986) (unpublished 1986 WL 20891) 
("Resource spend-down is thus permitted, but 
not required by the Medicaid statute and regu-
lations."); Hession v. Illinois Department of 
Public Aid, 129 IIL2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751, 757 
(111. 1989) ("[W)e perceive nothing in section 
1396a(A)(17) which precludes a State that par-
1
 The fact that 42 U S.C. § 1396p permits individuals to 
give away their resources in order to establish Medicaid 
eligibility does not translate into congressional legislation 
requiring a resource spend-down rule; nor does the fact that 
42 U.S.C § 139cVbXuXDXii) fTEFRA) treats as an errone-
ous excess payment only the difference between the allowa-
ble resource level under the plan and the actual amount of 
ticipates in the Medicaid program from using 
the resource spend down methodology if it 
chooses to do so."); Halev v. Commissioner of 
Public Welfare. 394 Mass." 466. 476 N.E.2d 572. 
578 (Mass. 1985) ("We conclude that, although 
Congress did not require use of a resource spend 
down, such use is a reasonable method of evalu-
ating resources.") (footnote omitted); Contra, 
Ramsev v. Department of Human Services, 301 
Ark. 285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1990) ("The 
pertinent federal statutes and regulations and 
their application through the Arkansas state 
Medicaid Plan establish no authority in any 
category for a 'spend-down1 of excess resources 
that is similar or identical to the expressly 
authorized 'spend-down' of excess income.") 
Clearly, if the eoal of Medicaid is to assist 
individuals who are medically needy—defined 
as having insufficient income or resources to 
meet the cost of necessary medical services—the 
sensible solution is the spend-down rule, a rule 
that has been applied in assessing income by 
both the federal and state governments. It 
makes no sense to find that someone with 
$10,000 in assets, but $42,000 in medical bills is 
not needy, while finding that someone with 
$2,999 in assets and $3,001 in medical bills is 
needy. The Commissioner has advanced abso-
lutely no reason for treating assets differently 
from income in considering a spend-down; I 
have been unable to conceive of such a reason; 
and the only reason I have found in the case law 
is this cryptic statement in Ramsey v. Depart-
ment of Human Services, 301 Ark. 285. 783 
S.W.2d361.364(Ark. 1990): 
The rationale behind treating resources and 
income differently is that income merely 
restores resources to their previous levels. It is 
accrued day by day in return for labor. On the 
other hand, resources in place, or acquired, 
are viewed as wealth in hand that increases 
the recipient's well-being. A rational basis, 
therefore, can be said to exist for this distinc-
tion in treating resources and income differ-
ent!) . 
Somehow that rational basis still eludes my 
understanding. 
The remaining question in this case, there-
fore, is whether Maine statutes and regulations 
require the use of a resource spend-down and, if 
not, whether the failure to provide such a rule 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. The ques-
tion of state law may be determinative of the 
cause. There are no precedents on this issue in 
the family's assets (here, approximately $7,000. the amount 
of the resource spend-down if such a rule applied) The fact 
that Congress, in providing for federal recovery of erroneous 
excess state payments, contemplated that a state might use 
a resource spend-down rule and calculated the recovery of 
federal funds accordinely does not establish that Congress 
mandated the use of such a jrule 
Medicare and Medicaid Guide U 39,oa9 
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the decisions of the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court. It is for this reason that I will meet with 
the lawyers to discuss whether this question of 
Maine statutory construction should be certified 
to the Law Court under Me. R. Civ. P. 76B.2 
Opinion of the Court 
KAVE. J.: Petitioners, providers of nonemer-
gency transportation services to Medicaid recip-
ients, by this proceeding seek to compel 
respondent, Commissioner of the Department of 
Social Services (DSS), to process their claims for 
transportation services rendered to Medicaid 
recipients without the agency's prior approval. 
Petitioners acknowledge that prior agency 
approval is a statutory prerequisite but contend 
they are nonetheless entitled to have their 
claims processed because of an informal practice 
permitting them to obtain "retroactive prior 
approval" after the services were rendered, 
which respondent should either be estopped 
from contesting, or found to have ratified. In 
that there is no basis here for the application of 
2
 Maine does, apparently, permit a spend-down of assets 
within the month of application Thus, if an applicant has 
$3,000 in the bank on January 1 and applies for Medicaid 
assistance on January 5. she may become eligible retroac-
tively, for the entire month, if she spends or gives awav 
$2,001 before the end of January Manual § 3340 
In this case. Mrs Hamman incurred her medical obliga-
tions in Januarv. did not receive the bill until February and 
apparently did not begin spending the $10,000 to pay the 
bill until March Thus, she is considered ineligible dunne 
Januarv and Februarv Since the bill was received in Febru-
ary, her spend-down in March also does not count Manual 
§ 1530. example 2 She now cannot obtain Medicaid assis-
The plaintiff's motion for summarv judgment 
is therefore DENIED. 
estoppel or ratification, we affirm the order of 
the Appellate Division dismissing the petition. 
By statute, DSS must provide Medicaid recip-
ients with "transportation when essential to 
obtain care and services1' ^Social Services Law 
§ 365-a [2] [j]) The statute reauires that such 
transportation be "upon prior approval, except 
in cases of emergency," and the implementing 
regulation states that "[pjrior authorization by 
the local social services official shall be required 
for * * * transportation when essential to obtain 
medical care and services, except emergencv 
care"(18NYCRR505.10[b]). 
Petitioner New York State Medical Trans-
porters Association, Inc. is an association of 
companies that provide nonemergency invalid 
tance to pay this bill and may, instead, have to sell her 
home (jointly owned with her husband), otherwise an 
exempt asset under the Manual, §3310.01. The Maine Law 
Court may conclude, as did the courts in Massachusetts and 
Illinois, that the state goal of preserving certain assets, such 
as a home, from being consumed by medical bills, along with 
the statutory requirement that assistance be available to 
those who do "not have sufficient income or resources to 
provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency 
and health," 22 M R.S A §3174 (emphasis supplied!, 
requires the use of a retroactive resource spend-down rule 
But that is solely a question of state law 
[f 39,090] In the Matter of New York State Medical Transporters Association, Inc. v. 
Cesar A. Perales. 
New York Court of Appeals, 77 NY2d. 126, Dec. 20, 1990. 
Before: WACHTLER, Chief Judge, and TTTONE, HANCOCK, JR., BELLACOSA, KAYE, ALEXANDER, and 
SIMMONS. Judges. 
Medicaid: Transportation Services 
New York—Prior authorization for transportation services.—The New York Medicaid 
agency was entitled to enforce a state law provision requiring prior authorization as a condition of 
payment for nonemergency transportation services, even though its fiscal agent sometimes 
responded to an overwhelming number of prior authorization requests by granting "retroactive prior 
approval" after the services were provided. The agency had informed providers that prior authoriza-
tion would be deferred only when providers experienced extreme difficulty in obtaining it by 
telephone and that retroactive prior approval requests may never be made more than 30 days after 
transportation of a patient. The providers sought to have their claims considered despite their 
failure to secure prior authorization or to obtain timely retroactive prior approval. They claimed 
that (1) the agency had compromised the provision and should, therefore, be estopped from 
enforcing it; and (2) the provision was unenforceable because the agency had, in effect, ratified the 
fiscal agent's failure to abide by it. Estoppel and ratification may not be used, however, to keep an 
agency from discharging its statutory duties. Since the law is clear that prior authorization is 
required and that providers are expected to abide by it, providers could not establish that they had 
suffered "manifest injustice" as a result of the agency's refusal to consider all of their claims. 
See 11 14.605.89, 14,729.62, 15,620. 
H 39,090 ©1991, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
ADDENDUM G 
deficient because it does not provide a sufficient basis to deter-
mine that the appropriate legal standards have been followed 
by the hearing officer in reaching her decision. We reverse and 
remand for further proceedings because the appealed order fails 
to set forth in sufficient detail the five-step analysis required by 
20 C.F.R. § 416.920 and the analysis required by 20 CJF.R. 
§ 404, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Rule 202.03 (1991), as a predi-
cate to the hearing officer's decision approving the denial of 
the claimed benefits. Walker v. Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services, 533 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (Walker 
I); cf. McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir.1986). In 
the absence of the hearing officer's detailed evaluation of the 
criteria and questions under the cited regulations, we are unable 
to provide adequate appellate review of that decision. Cf. 
Walker v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 
554 So.2d 1202 (Ha. 1st DCA 1989) (Walker II). 
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
2 MMLR % 90 
Giuseppina MATARAZZO, 
v. 
Lorraine ARONSON, Commissioner of Income 
Maintenance, 
No. CV91-0388251 
Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of 
Hartford-New Britain 
June 30, 1992 
The plaintiff appealed from an administrative 
decision upholding the denial of retroactive Medic-
aid coverage for medical expenses incurred before 
the assets possessed by her and her spouse were 
reduced below the $2,400 limit on such assets as 
specified by state law. The plaintiff maintained that 
the denial of retroactive benefits by refusing to 
apply a resource spend down provision was unlaw-
ful in that Connecticut, as a § 209(b) state, was 
required to maintain the same eligibility require-
ments in effect as of January 1,1972, including that 
of a resource spend down provision. Further, the 
plaintiff asserted that a resource spend down provi-
sion was necessary for compliance with the disre-
gard of assets provision of state law. Otherwise, 
potential beneficiaries would have to be stripped of 
all assets before establishing eligibility, argued the 
plaintiff. 
HELD for the state agency. 
The court ruled that the state agency was not 
compelled to employ an asset spend down provi-
sion. First, § 209(b) states were required only to 
maintain eligibility requirements specified in the 
approved state plan in effect as of January 1,1972. 
The court noted that the record was totally silent as 
to whether or not that state plan contained a re-
source spend down provision. Second, while the 
court disregarded, due to its inconsistency with 
prior policy, a 1980 transmittal from the Health 
Care Financing Administration prohibiting states 
from employing resource spend down, the court 
noted that state law effectively prohibited resource 
spend down by specifically excluding married cou-
ples with more than $2,400 in assets from Medicaid 
coverage. Third, since both state and federal law 
protected an applicant's resources up to $2,400, the 
plaintiff realized the same financial loss with or 
without resource spend down. On the basis of the 
foregoing, the plaintiffs appeal was dismissed. 
HOLZBERG, J. 
Memorandum of Decision 
In this administrative appeal the plaintiff contests the de-
fendant's denial of her application for Title XIX benefits. At 
the time of her initial application the plaintiff and her husband 
had joint assets, consisting principally of a bank account, of 
nine thousand dollars. Because the Medicaid resource limit for 
a married couple is twenty-four hundred dollars, plaintiffs 
application was denied even though during the three-month 
period prior to the application being denied plaintiff had in-
curred in excess of $150,000 in medical bills. The principal 
issue raised in this appeal is whether the refusal of the defendant 
to setoff plaintiff s accrued medical expenses against her excess 
resources is a violation of state and federal laws governing Title 
XIX. Resolution of this issue requires an odyssey through the 
labyrinths of the Social Security Act, a statute aptly described 
by one court as "an aggravated assault on the English language, 
resistant to attempts to understand it" Friedman v. Berger, 409 
Fed. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.1976). 
The relevant facts are as follows. In February, 1990, the 
plaintiff, at the age of sixty-two, became seriously ill and was 
hospitalized for emergency treatment Because she had no med-
ical insurance she filed an application for medicaid benefits 
with the Department of Income Maintenance. As part of the 
application Mrs. Matarazzo, who was being assisted by her 
daughter, disclosed that she and her husband had a joint savings 
account of nine thousand dollars, which represented their life 
savings. Title XIX regulations require that a married applicant 
have less than twenty-four hundred dollars in assets. Based 
on information provided to them by the intake worker, Mrs. 
Matarazzo and her daughter reasonably believed that once the 
savings account was reduced to less than twenty-four hundred 
dollars, plaintiffs application would be approved retroactive to 
the date of application such that Title XIX would cover the 
approximately $150,000 in medical bills incurred by plaintiff. 
However, when plaintiffs application was approved on June 
27, 1990, she was informed that it was granted retroactive to 
June 1. Consequently, the plaintiff remains responsible for the 
substantial medical bills that she incurred in the preceding three 
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ble for the state supplement program whose assets as defined 
by the commissioner exceed sixteen hundred dollars, or it living 
with a spouse, exceed twenty-four hundred dollars." The plain 
language of the statute itself prohibits the defendant from grant-
ing Title XDC benefits to any married person, such as plaintiff, 
whose assets exceed twenty-four hundred dollars. Additionally, 
the use of a resource spend down appears, by implication, to 
be barred by General Statutes Sec. 17-134b. That provision 
directs the Commissioner to grant assistance to individuals 
whose income is applied to the cost of authorized medical care: 
"Any income in excess of the applicable amounts shall be 
applied as may be required by said federal law, and assistance 
shall be granted for the balance of the cost of authorized medical 
assistance." (Emphasis supplied). Because the enumeration of 
a power in a statute impliedly forbids things not enumerated, 
State ex. rel. Barlow v. Kaminsky, 144 Conn. 612 (1957), Con-
necticut law prohibits the use of a resource spend down. 
Thus, while federal law may permit use of a resource spend 
down, Connecticut law does not. Plaintiffs reliance on Hessian 
and Foley is unavailing since both Illinois and Massachusetts 
statutes, unlike Connecticut's, specifically authorize a resource 
spend down. In Hessian, the court noted that the Illinois code, 
"requires that, in the case of single individuals residing alone, 
the Department must disregard at least SI500 in assets when 
determining Medicaid eligibility." 544 N£.2d at 757. The Illi-
nois court further observed that the lower appellate court, 
"agreed with Hessian that the Illinois Public Aid Code requires 
the Department to utilize a resource spend down methodology 
in determining an applicant's eligibility." Id. at 753. 
Finally, petitioner asserts that Connecticut's asset disre-
gard statute requires the use of a resource spend down. General 
Statutes §§ 17-82, 17-134b and 17-134c makes ineligible any 
married person whose assets exceed $2400. Put differently, 
DIM must disregard $2400 of a married person's assets when 
considering eligibility for Title XIX. Petitioner argues that with-
out a resource spend down she will have to deplete all of her 
resources to become eligible. Because state and federal law 
explicitly allow an applicant to retain up to $2400 in resources, 
it appears that with or without a resource spend down petitioner 
cannot be required to divest herself of the statutorily protected 
$2400 as a condition of eligibility. In the absence of any proof 
that petitioner was not permitted to retain the $2400 of protected 
assets plaintiff cannot prevail in this claim. 
While this is a case in which the plaintiff appears to "have 
all the logic and policy on her side of the argument, but the 
state appears to have the law," Harriman v. Commissioner of 
Maine Department of Human Resources, # 900046, F.Supp. 
(D.Me. Nov. 9, 1990), our Supreme Court has again reminded 
us that policy flaws in the Medicaid statute are a matter for 
legislative correction, not judicial modification. Mercado v. 
Commissioner of Department of Income Maintenance, supra. 
Because this court is not free to substitute its judgment for the 
state and federal legislatures, and because it concludes that 
neither state nor federal law require the use of a resource spend 
down, it declines to reverse the decision of the hearing officer. 
The plaintiffs appeal is therefore dismissed. 
In summary, this court concludes that the plaintiff has not 
sustained her burden of proving that the state plan in effect as 
of January 1,1972, authorizes the use of a resource spend down. 
Even if plaintiff had provided proof of that fact she cannot 
prevail because, even assuming the HCFA prohibition should 
be ignored, state law does not require the use of a resource 
spend down. In the absence of any claim that use of a resource 
spend down is required by federal law, the defendant did not 
act illegally, arbitrarily or capriciously in denying plaintiffs 
application. Plaintiffs appeal is therefore dismissed. 
1
 A resource spend down allows an applicant who is ineligible be-
cause of excess resources to obtain retroactive coverage once she 
spends down her excess resources. For example, an individual may 
have resources above the eligibility level, but her medical expenses 
may exceed the excess. Resource spend down measures the applicant's 
resources in terms of her medical expenses, so that the applicant is not 
found ineligible in this situation. 
2
 Section 209(b) provides in pertinent part; 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, 
. . . no State not eligible to participate in the State plan 
program established under subchapter XVI of this chapter 
shall be required to provide medical assistance to any 
aged, blind, or disabled individual (within the meaning 
of subchapter XVI of this chapter) for any month unless 
such State would be (or would have been) required to 
provide medical assistance to such individual for such 
month had its plan for medical assistance approved under 
this subchapter and in effect on January 1,1972, been in 
effect in such month, except that for this purpose any such 
individual shall be deemed eligible for medical assistance 
under such State plan it (in addition to meeting such other 
requirements as are or may be imposed under the State 
plan) the income of any such individual as determined 
in accordance with section 1396b(f) of this title (after 
deducting any supplemental security income payment 
and State supplementary payment made with respect to 
such individual, and incurred expenses for medical care 
as recognized under State law) is not in excess of the 
standard for medical assistance established under the 
State plan as in effect on January 1, 1972. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(t) (1982). 
3
 ACTION TRANSMITTAL 80-58 states: 
The current page 6 of ATTACHMENT 2.6-C allows 
States to require a "spend-down" of an individual's re-
sources, by indicating that excess liquid resources can be 
applied to the cost of medical care. Although section 
1962(a)(17)(D) of the Social Security Act provides this 
option with respect to income (by taking into account 
incurred medical expenses), neither the Act nor Federal 
regulations allow for such flexibility with regard to re-
sources. We have, therefore, eliminated this option on 
page 6 of ATTACHMENT 2.6-C to correct this error and 
reflect Federal law and regulations. 
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Christine HARRIMAN, el a!., 
COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, et al., 
No. 90-0046-B-H 
U.S. District Court. Maine 
March 4, 1992 
The appellant represented a class of individu-
als whose level of assets rendered them ineligible 
for Medicaid benefits. In an underlying decision, 
Maine's Supreme Court ruled that state law did not 
require an asset spend down. The appellant filed 
another motion, contending that the Commission-
er's policy of allowing for income spend down, but 
noi asset spend down, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
HELD: for the Commissioner, 
The court, while firing that the policy made 
"little economic or logical sense/* concluded that it 
met the rational basis standard, and thus did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. In considering 
the class of individuals whose assets exceeded the 
threshold level, the court opined that this group was 
likely, on the whole, to "have greater flexibility in 
making alternative ammgements fox their medical 
needs," In addition, the court noted that the state 
had a legitimate interest in avoiding the costly asset 
evaluation process that would accompany an asset 
spend down provision. Accordingly, the appellant's 
motion for summary judgment was denied. 
HORNBY, J, 
This class action challenge* the Commissioner of Human 
Services' ("Commissioner**) refusal to consider accrued medi-
cal bills in evaluating whether an applicant's personal resources 
disqualify her for Medicaid.1 i have previously ruled in this 
case that the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. $5 1396 et seq., does 
not require a state to adopt a so-called resource "spend down" 
rule. On December 18,1990,1 certified to the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court (sluing as the Law Court) the question whether 
22 M.R.S.A. S 3174 required the Commissioner to apply a 
resource spend down. In a Mandate dated August 12,1991, the 
Law Court held that the Maine statute does not compel an asset 
spend down. The parties have now filed cioss-motions for 
summary judgment on the sole remaining question: whether the 
Commissioner's policy providing for an income spend down 
but not a resource spend down is inherently irrational kntl thus 
violates the Equal Protection Clause (Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Counts iv and V). Because I conclude that a rational basis docs 
exist for the Commissioner's policy, the plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment is DEl>nED and the Commissioner's motion 
is GRANTED. 
An applicant may qualify for Medicaid assistance if she 
meets the definition of "medically needy" and is disabled. 42 
U.SC. fi l396a(a)(lOXC); 22 M.R.S.A. §ft 3173,3174. In de-
termining whether she is medically needy the Suite evaluates 
the applicant's incvxnc and resource*. Income eligibility i* de-
termined by calculating her gross income and applying certain 
deductions to arrive at her "countable income* See 42 C.ER. 
i 435.831(a); Maine Medical Assistance Eligibility Manual 
("Manual") H 3330-3554. She is eligible If her countable 
income falls below the State's income limit. Medically needy 
applicants may subtract from their income any incurred but 
unpaid medical expenses, thus reducing their net countable 
income to the eligibility standard. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a<a)(17); 
42 CP JL 8 435.831(c); Manual 5 5000, TWs is referred to as 
the income spend down rule and itessentially permits a "special 
deduction" for an applicant's incurred medical expenses. Hogan 
v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 886,889 (1st Cir. 1985). With respect to 
resources, a person is eligible as "medically needy* only if bcr 
assets do not exceed the State's asset eligibility limit ($3,000 
or less in the case of a married couple). Manual i 3340. Unlike 
the case of income eligibility, however, no deductions ate per-
mined and no comparable "spend down" provision exists for 
incurred medical expenses unless the resources are actually 
spent for such a purpose during the month in Question,2 
Hamroan contends that the Commissioner's refusal to con-
sider her (or class members9 lUce her) incurred but unpaid 
medical expenses when evaluating herassets, while considering 
such expenses when evaluating another applicant's income, 
creates inequities and irrationally discriminates against those 
with resources. Hanirnan points out that she is in substantially 
the same financial position a* those medically needy persons 
VoU.lt i . 24 
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who have incorce exceeding the Medicaid limits but are found 
eligible only by application of the spend down rule; if the State 
were to include ha incurred medical expenses in its evaluation 
of her assets she would Tall below the $1,000 eligibility limit,5 
The Equal Protection Clause dictates that "all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike," Ptylcr v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982X quotbg FJ. Foysitr Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 4tZ 415 (1920). In the area of economics 
and social welfare, however* ii is clear that a suite's separate 
ucatmcru is not unconstitutional merely because the classifica-
tion is inequitable ox unwise. Sckwtiker v. ffogan, 457 VS. 
569,589 (1982). If there is a rational basis for the classification 
related to a legitimate state interest, then the classification doe* 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Dandrid$c i\ Williams, 
397 U.S. 471,465 (1970) CTTjhe Equal Protection Clause does 
not require that a State must choose between attacking every 
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. It is 
enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from 
invidious discrimination." Id, at 486*87 (citation omitted).) 
Although the State's decision to provide for a spend down 
when measuring income but not when measuring resources 
makes little economic or logical sense and although h is a very 
close question* I have concluded that the policy does barely 
meet the rational basis standard. Ifogan instructs us that the 
validity of a broad classification "is not properly judged by 
focusing solely on the portion of the disfavored class that is 
affected most harshly by its terms," 457 U.S. at 589—-here, 
people like the Harrimans who have minimal income but have 
saved some money and now find it offset by a hospital debt. 
Instead, a court is to took at the broad category—in this case, 
people with accumulated resources. Considering such people 
as a class, I conclude that the State could rationally believe that 
they "generally are better able to provide for their medical 
needs," 457 U.S. at 590, than people vvtio have been unable to 
accumulate resources. In other words, people with accumulated 
resources, as a group, are likely to have greater flexibility 
in making alternative arrangements for their medical needs. 
whether it be by previous purchase of insurance, arranging for 
loans, family assistance, etc. Thus, it is rational to define need 
on the basis of these resources—even though some persons 
with resources, like the Harrimans, may actually be in greater 
need of assistance because of an accrued medical bill than 
persons who receive assistance because they had no resources 
to start with, This conclusion is fortified by the administrative 
convenience arguments the State has made. So long as the State 
is evaluating assets only of those applicants who claim to have 
less than S3»QO0 (per couple) the administrative task is compara-
tively light. If, however, persons with substantial assets arc able 
to claim benefits because a large medical bill offsets those 
assets, the State will be confronted with evaluating many more 
assets and the task will not always be simple—for example, 
collectibles, stock that does not trade on a public exchange, 
etc,4 Use of the spend down to reduce income presents no 
comparable difficulties, because in most instances it is simple 
to measure the amount of the income stream to an applicant 
(except perhaps in instances of some self-employed individu-
als). Moreover, once that particular item of excess income has 
passed, the Commissioner need no longer be concerned with it. 
In the case of a spent down resource, on the other hand, once 
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used it would presumably be disqualified from a similar use in 
the future and it would, therefore, have to be tracked as, for 
example, if a particular item were sold and the proceeds used to 
purchase a different item. All of these administrative problems 
support as rational the decision to draw the line between income 
aiid resources for purposes of applying the spend down rule. 
The Slate should not bo compelled to use its limited budget to 
hire more people to apply a difficult rule where the alternative 
is to direct tta funds to people in need even though not all 
people in need can be reached 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs* motion for summary judgment 
on Counts IV and V is DENTED and the defendants* motion 
for summary Judgment is GRANTED. SO ORDERED. 
1
 The Medicaid program is a cooperative federal and state venture 
providing financial assistance to those whose "income and resources 
arc insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical *ervice&*M 41 
U.S.C. ( 1396(1).The applicable federal and sate statutory provision* 
regarding * lifiWity are found at 42 U.S.C. f 1396a and 22 M.R.S A . 
f 3174 ratpccUvcly, 
1
 Ccruin aucts are excluded from the asset evaluation, including the 
applicant's primary residence, vehicle and household goods. Manual 
i J310. Moreover, in ihe case of assets encumbered by debt, the 
Commissioner uzily considers the applicants equity in the property 
(i.e. the amount by which the fair mark* value of the asset exceeds 
ihc debt owed on it}. Manual \ 3300. 
' Daring a period of hospitalization from January 1989 to February 
1989, Hamrnan incurred over S42,000 is medical bills. At the time 
she was hospitalized ihe and her husband had over 510,000 in liquid 
ttseu. By April 1989, Haxtiman had spent alt but 1500 of thc*e axscU 
on her outstanding medical bills and applied for Medicaid to cover the 
remaining bills. The CummUtumer denied Medicaid coverage for the 
period January through March, however, became on the first day of 
each of those months her available raseu e&pcodod the State's $3,000 
elijibil ity limitation. According to H&rrir&an, the Commissioner should 
h*vc determined eligibility by spending down her assets by the amount 
of her incurred expenses (whether she paid them or not), at the Com-
missioner does when determining eligibility on the beais of income. 
4
 Although the applicant most in the fusi initince vital up her re-
sources and preterit their value, the State most review the evaluation 
to avoid fraud or erroneous overpayments. 
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JEWISH HOSPITAL, INC, 
v. 
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES. 
No. C 90-0791-UA) 
U.S. District Court, Wcsicm District of Kentucky 
March 16,1992 
The hospital contested the Secretary* inter-
pretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395wwt<JX5)(F)(5Xw) 
as it pertained to his calculation of its "dijpropor-
.; all rights reserved. Vol. i.lw.24 
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